Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during February 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country’s broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., SAF, RSF, or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity  of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the Phoenix social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results 

Volume and Engagement 

• In February 2026, hate speech posts in Sudan fell by 22.8% in comparison to January 2026 in the data sample. The reduction in post volume is associated with account closures that happened in February and January, particularly large following pages affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces such as Ahmed Kabori. Yet engagement levels remained high, indicating sustained resonance despite the drop in volume.

Spikes in Online Activity

• February 3: The Sudanese army broke the siege imposed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the city of Kordofan for many months, sparking a wave of online reactions, particularly from supporters of both sides of the conflict. These supporters engaged in discussions about the event from a mobilization perspective, while civilian voices called for an end to the war in Sudan.
• February 20: The RSF commander visited Uganda and received a large official welcome. In his address to supporters of the “Ta’asis” alliance, he acknowledged the presence of Colombian mercenaries fighting within his ranks, reigniting the debate surrounding the issue of mercenaries in the Sudanese war.
• February 23: The RSF attacked the area of ​​Mistriha, a stronghold of Musa Hilal, one of the most prominent Janjaweed leaders in the Darfur war. This attack, which followed a speech by Hemedti, ignited online discussions about long-standing socio-political conflicts and how the war exacerbates them.
• February 26: A digital campaign targeted Khalid Omar Youssef, vice chairman of the Sudanese Congress Party, following his speech at the European People’s Party headquarters in Brussels, where he devoted part of his remarks to calling for the classification of the Sudanese Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization and linking it to the events of October 7 in Israel, which subsequently led to a digital attack by supporters of the Sudanese Armed Forces on this issue.