

Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

February 2026

BUILD UP A

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We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to mahmoud@howtobuildup.org

Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during February 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., SAF, RSF, or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the [Phoenix](#) social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results

Volume and Engagement


- In February 2026, hate speech posts in Sudan fell by 22.8% in comparison to January 2026 in the data sample. The reduction in post volume is associated with account closures that happened in February and January, particularly large following pages affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces such as Ahmed Kabori. Yet engagement levels remained high, indicating sustained resonance despite the drop in volume.

Spikes in Online Activity

- **February 3:** The Sudanese army broke the siege imposed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the city of Kordofan for many months, sparking a wave of online reactions, particularly from supporters of both sides of the conflict. These supporters engaged in discussions about the event from a mobilization perspective, while civilian voices called for an end to the war in Sudan.
- **February 20:** The RSF commander visited Uganda and received a large official welcome. In his address to supporters of the "Ta'asis" alliance, he acknowledged the presence of

Colombian mercenaries fighting within his ranks, reigniting the debate surrounding the issue of mercenaries in the Sudanese war.

- **February 23:** The RSF attacked the area of Mistriha, a stronghold of Musa Hilal, one of the most prominent Janjaweed leaders in the Darfur war. This attack, which followed a speech by Hemedti, ignited online discussions about long-standing socio-political conflicts and how the war exacerbates them.
- **February 26:** A digital campaign targeted Khalid Omar Youssef, vice chairman of the Sudanese Congress Party, following his speech at the European People’s Party headquarters in Brussels, where he devoted part of his remarks to calling for the classification of the Sudanese Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization and linking it to the events of October 7 in Israel, which subsequently led to a digital attack by supporters of the Sudanese Armed Forces on this issue.



Overview of Narratives

The “narrative war” continued in February 2026, with both the SAF and RSF leveraging civilian suffering, framing atrocities in comparative ways to discredit the other side, boasting about military gains, accusing each other of drone attacks, and justifying violence. The digital campaign triggered by the RSF commander’s visit to Uganda exposed significant regional divisions, competing alliances with armed groups in Sudan, and ongoing contestation over legitimacy and representation. Meanwhile, Khalid Omar Youssef’s visit to the European Union sparked parallel campaigns around peace and the designation of the Islamist movement as a terrorist organization, further highlighting the divide between those advocating for a truce and international engagement and those pushing for continued military dominance.

1. **Reducing violations:** The digital space became a place for "comparative atrocities," as pro-SAF and pro-RSF accounts engaged in a systematic effort to downplay their own side’s violations while aggressively amplifying those of the opponent. Pro-SAF celebrated the breaking of RSF sieges in Kadugli and Dilling and aid reopenings, minimizing reports of their own shelling; pro-RSF flooded timelines with similar content. This narrative battle moved beyond reporting facts, turning civilian suffering - including famine deaths in South Kordofan and North Darfur - into a tool for justification and political leverage.
2. **Hemedti’s Visit to Uganda:** The RSF leader’s official visit to Entebbe/Kampala on 20 February and his meeting with President Museveni sparked massive online discussions.

Pro-RSF accounts framed it as a genuine peace initiative, posted videos of the hero's welcome from Sudanese chanting for the "RSF" and "TASIS," and portrayed Museveni as a neutral mediator. This was met by an intense counter-campaign from pro-SAF and government-aligned voices condemning the visit as an "affront to humanity," an "insult to the Sudanese people," and direct support for RSF "genocide and crimes." The digital mobilization showed the RSF's attempts to regain international legitimacy amid fresh sanctions.

3. **Khalid Omer Yousif's Visit to the EU:** The 23 February speech by Khalid Omer Yousif at the European People's Party headquarters in Brussels on "pathways to achieving peace in Sudan" triggered parallel digital battles. Civilian and Somoud-coalition supporters circulated video clips of the event, launched solidarity campaigns praising it as authentic democratic advocacy, and used it to urge EU backing for a civilian-led process. This was countered by pro-SAF and hardline accounts accusing Khalid (and the broader civilian bloc) of treason, being "foreign agents," and undermining Sudan's interests. The exchanges intensified the polarization already seen around earlier European tours.
4. **Military operations vs. the path to a truce:** As fighting intensified in Kordofan, the digital sphere mirrored the escalation with conflicting claims of territorial control. SAF accounts flooded feeds with "proof-of-presence" videos from newly reopened roads in Kadugli and Dilling, celebrating broken sieges; RSF accounts countered with drone-strike compilations and claims of border gains. Both sides used these clips to sabotage any talk of ceasefire or Ramadan truce, framing concessions as betrayal or weakness and demanding total military victory instead.



Khalid Omer Youusif
@KHOYousif

Show translation

تشرفت بالمشاركة كمتحدث رئيسي في فعالية عن #السودان صباح اليوم في مقر رئاسة حزب الشعب الأوروبي (#EPP) ببروكسل وهو الكتلة البرلمانية الأكبر بالبرلمان الأوروبي، بدعوة من منظمة (EDS) وهي الذراع الشبابي والطلابي لل (EPP)، حيث حضر الفعالية عدد من النواب البرلمانيين الأوروبيين والمهتمين بالشأن السوداني.

عقب ذلك عقدت عدداً من الاجتماعات بمقر البرلمان الأوروبي ومقر حزب الشعب الأوروبي مع عدد من النواب البرلمانيين من دول أوروبية عديدة، إضافة لمنظمات ومراكز بحثية معنية بصنع السياسات في الإتحاد الأوروبي.

قدمت في الفعالية التي شاركت فيها وفي اللقاءات مع النواب البرلمانيين شرحاً حول الحرب في السودان والتي خلفت المأساة الإنسانية الأكبر عالمياً، وأنها شهدت انتهاكات مروعة يجب التحقيق فيها ومحاسبة مرتكبيها، كما أكدت أنه لا حل عسكري للنزاع في السودان، وأن خارطة طريق الرباعية هي المسار الأمثل للحل السلمي، مع ضرورة إقرار هدنة إنسانية فورية وغير مشروطة، وإبتداع حوار سياسي يقود لاستكمال مسار ثورة ديسمبر المجيدة، تطرقت للدور الذي تقوم به عناصر النظام البائد (المؤتمر الوطني/الحركة الإسلامية) في إشعال الحرب وإعاقة جهود السلام، وشددت على أهمية تصنيف هذه الجماعة كمنظمة إرهابية، وهو ما سيقود لإضعاف قدرتها على إطالة أمد النزاع.

سنواصل الجهد حتى نخمد نار الحرب في بلادنا، ولن يهدأ لنا بال حتى نرى السلام يعم كافة ربوعها، ونشهد عودة النازحين واللاجئين وتحقق العدالة في مواجهة المجرمين، وتخليص البلاد من كل مستبد يريد بها شراً.

Translation : I was honored to participate as a keynote speaker this morning in an event about #Sudan at the headquarters of the European People's Party (#EPP) in Brussels—the largest parliamentary bloc in the European Parliament—upon the invitation of the EDS organization, which is the youth and student arm of the EPP. The event was attended by a number of European parliamentarians and individuals interested in Sudanese affairs.

Following that, I held a series of meetings at the European Parliament headquarters and the European People's Party headquarters with a number of parliamentarians from several European countries, in addition to organizations and research centers concerned with policymaking in the European Union.

In the event I participated in and in the meetings with parliamentarians, I provided an explanation about the war in Sudan, which has resulted in the world's largest humanitarian catastrophe, and which has witnessed horrific violations that must be investigated and held accountable. I also emphasized that there is no military solution to the conflict in Sudan, and that the Quartet's roadmap is the optimal path to a peaceful resolution, with the necessity of establishing an immediate and unconditional humanitarian truce, and initiating a political dialogue that leads to completing the path of the glorious December Revolution. I addressed the role played by elements of the defunct regime (National Congress/Islamic Movement) in igniting the war and obstructing peace efforts, and I stressed the importance of classifying this group as a terrorist



@ObaiCJ - Feb 25

عضو الماخور وصبي شخبوط في جولته الأوروبية للدفاع عن حق أبوظبي في تدمير السودان بحجة محاربة الإرهاب، يخاطب الأوروبيين ويتبنى رؤيتهم حول طوفان الأقصى والبتسلب الحق في مقاومة الاحتلال وتوصمها بالإرهاب وبربطها بالسودان - مع إنه شيء بشرفنا-، دا ما سلوك سياسي دا سلوك مخبر وعميل.



Translation : The brothel member and Shakhbout's boy, on his European tour to defend Abu Dhabi's right to destroy Sudan under the pretext of fighting terrorism, addresses the Europeans and adopts their vision about the Al-Aqsa flood and the right to resist the occupation and labels it as terrorism and links it to Sudan - even though it is something that honors us - this is not political behavior; this is the behavior of an informant and a spy.


network, which will lead to weakening its ability to prolong the conflict.

We will continue the effort until we extinguish the fire of war in our country, and we will not rest until we see peace prevail across all its lands, witness the return of the displaced and refugees, achieve justice in confronting the criminals, and rid the country of every tyrant who wishes it harm.



Jedo Fadlalla

23 February at 15:51 · 🌐



Translation : The resting place has been liberated. My family, the Mahamid, we are proud of you, and that is our hope. Musa Hilal is a traitor and must be arrested and not allowed to escape.



Abd Al-Rahman Amasib

23 February at 17:19 · 🌐

حزين على ما حصل في مستريحة .
#الدولة_الجديدة



Translation: I'm saddened by what happened in Mustariha.

#TheNewState



Ahmad Shomokh

20 February at 17:21 · 🌐

موسيفي استقبل الإرهابي وكيل سلطة ابوظبي كجنجويدي قائد للمليشيا الإرهابية .. وليس كزعيم "للتأسيسيين" ولا "مجلسهم الرئاسي" .. يبدو ان دمج الهادي حجر والطاهر ادريس في مليشيات ابوظبي الجنجويدية قد اكتمل!
كما أكدت معلومات الطيران ان الإرهابي حمدتي وصل يوغندا قادماً من أبوظبي




Yoweri K Museveni

@KagutaMuseveni

X.com

Today at State House Entebbe, I welcomed Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, head of the Rapid Support Forces, who briefed me on the current situation in Sudan. As always, I emphasized that dialogue and a peaceful political solution are the only sustainable paths to stability for Sudan and the region.



Translation: Museveni received the terrorist, an agent of the Abu Dhabi authority, as a Janjaweed commander of a terrorist militia—not as the leader of



Ahmad Show

20 February at 21:33 · 🌐

الرئيس الأوغندي يستقبل فخامة الرئيس دقلو ويؤكد على الحل السلمي في السودان.
#احمد_شو



Translation: The Ugandan President receives His Excellency President Dagalo and affirms his commitment to a peaceful solution in Sudan.

#Ahmed_Show

"Ta'asis" or their "Presidential Council." It seems the integration of Al-Hadi Hajar and Al-Tahir Idris into Abu Dhabi's Janjaweed militias is complete!

Flight information also confirmed that the terrorist Hemedti arrived in Uganda from Abu Dhabi.

Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month's online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- **Civil society strengthens its digital foothold:** The coordinated online campaign around Khalid Omer Yousif's speech at the European People's Party successfully carried forward the momentum from previous months (January European tour and earlier solidarity drives). Civilian networks kept high visibility, turned the event into an online rallying point, and built a more stable digital presence that gives mediators a reliable civilian partner track.
- **Warring parties weaponize digital space for mobilization:** Both SAF and RSF networks treated every event - Kordofan gains, drone strikes, Hemedti's Uganda visit, and Khalid's Brussels appearance - purely as recruitment tools. Victory videos and atrocity clips were used to call for more fighters, donations, and loyalty rather than to support talks, leaving mediators with zero genuine openings and making any truce proposal look like surrender to their own online audiences.
- **War voices still dominate, but civilian spaces are opening:** Digital engagement continued to amplify the war rhetoric far louder than peace messages. Yet the sustained civilian push around the events in February created small but real breathing spaces for pro-peace voices. The coming months will show whether these emerging pockets can grow into a credible platform that mediators can use and the generals cannot ignore.

Harmful and Divisive Narratives

Patterns

- **Comparative atrocities & selective outrage:** Pro-SAF and pro-RSF networks flooded platforms with graphic videos, RSF drone strikes on markets, mosques, and aid convoys versus SAF "proof-of-presence" in Kadugli and Dilling. Each side downplayed its own violations and amplified the other's, turning civilian suffering into daily propaganda. This kept the "no-truce" mood alive and made any peace proposal look like weakness or treason.
- **Regional divisions and contradictory RSF messaging exposed:** Hemedti's Uganda visit revealed sharp divisions among regional actors on the Sudanese issue. The digital campaigns around the visit created a damaging presence: they downplayed and diminished Hemedti's own admissions of having Colombian mercenaries with him, while amplifying his threats of deploying forces in the east and other areas. At the same time, pro-RSF accounts insisted they "nevertheless want peace exposing a clear contradiction between their claims and reality that further eroded trust in any RSF-linked mediation track.

- **Smear cascades against civilian democratic voices:** Khalid Omer Yousif’s Brussels speech and the civilian democratic track triggered immediate backlash from pro-RSF and hardline pro-SAF accounts. They labelled Khalid and Somoud “foreign traitors selling Sudan.” The goal was to isolate civilian leaders, scare off international mediators, and raise personal and political costs for anyone speaking for a democratic settlement.
- **Mobilisation disguised as information:** Both military networks used victory clips, famine footage, and “hero’s welcome” videos purely as recruitment tools—calling for more fighters, donations, and loyalty. Meanwhile, civilian democratic accounts tried to keep famine alerts and peace demands visible. War voices stayed louder, but small pro-peace pockets around the civilian track started to carve out fragile space.

Targets

- **Civilian democratic leaders & activists:** Khalid Omer Yousif, Somoud figures, and anyone linked to the civilian track, hit with treason smears, threats, and doxxing to isolate them from Sudanese audiences and international mediators.
- **Peacebuilders, humanitarians & journalists:** Anyone pushing truces, humanitarian access, or civilian-led solutions faced harassment that often spilled offline, as what happened when SAF reclaim control on Kadogli; they start attacking any civilian who called for a truce in Kordofan.

Actors

- The harmful content in February is notably similar to that of previous months and remains fueled by pro-SAF hardline networks and RSF supporters that amplify hate speech to mobilize fighters. The digital attacks on civilian political coalitions are frequently directed by authoritarian affiliated accounts in order to obstruct their efforts to end the conflict in Sudan.

Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In February 2026, peace-themed posts dropped sharply to around 1.3K, a 35% decline from January. Yet these fewer posts generated an impressive 76.1K comments, a 49% increase in engagement.

This contrast is one of the most important signals from the month. While the raw volume of civilian peace messaging fell (under pressure from the flood of military victory clips, drone-strike footage, smear campaigns against Khalid Omer Yousif, and recruitment drives by both SAF and RSF networks), the depth of public interaction exploded, with many posts that are calling for peace in Sudan turning into long, heated threads debating civilian-led solutions, humanitarian ceasefires, and the failures of military rule.

What this reveals is resilience and growing resonance:

- Sudanese users (both inside the country and in the diaspora) are no longer just scrolling past peace content; they are stopping, replying, arguing, and sharing it more than ever.
- Even as war voices still dominate the overall feed (recruitment calls, atrocity comparisons, and diplomatic poisoning), the civilian pro-peace track is building a more committed and vocal audience.
- The smear campaigns and “total victory” mobilization did not silence the peace demand; instead, they seem to have pushed more people into active discussion when peace messages do appear.

For peacebuilders and mediators, this is a quiet but powerful development: the civilian democratic space is smaller in quantity but deeper in quality. The audience is more engaged, more ready to defend political settlement ideas, and less passive. If these pockets of intense discussion continue to grow in the coming months, they could eventually create the critical mass needed to counter the digital veto that the military networks currently hold over truce talks.

In short, February proved that while the generals still control the volume, the civilian call for peace is winning the quality of conversation, a shift that mediators should watch closely.

