Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during April 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country’s broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the Phoenix social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results 

Volume and Engagement 

• In April 2026, hate speech posts accounted for 6.21% of all recorded posts. Compared with March 2026, this represents a 79.39% decline in posts containing hate speech, using the same data collection methodology adopted in the previous month. This decrease appears to be linked not only to more coordinated civilian and peace-oriented messaging online, but also to the political and emotional weight of key April anniversaries — including the commemoration of the April 6 sit-in, the anniversary of the fall of the Bashir regime on April 11, and the third anniversary of the outbreak of the war — which collectively created broader openings for anti-war, solidarity, and democratic narratives to gain visibility and engagement.

Spikes in Online Activity

April 30: The Joint Forces issued a statement calling on their soldiers to comply with directives issued by the Sudanese Armed Forces. This followed a wide digital campaign led by accounts associated with separatist currents such as the River and Sea group, which incited the Sudanese Armed Forces to take action against the Joint Forces, accusing them of military expansion in Khartoum State and describing this as a repetition of what had happened with the RSF. In the opposite direction, accounts linked to the armed movements rejected these accusations, which fueled widespread hate-driven discourse between the two sides.

April 2: A statement issued by the Sumoud coalition on the evening of April 1, mourning Osama Hasan one of the leaders of the Ta’asis coalition, triggered major debate. Supporters of the statement argued that, through this position, Sumoud was standing against political assassinations. Those who disagreed with the statement argued that, in principle, there should be no equivalence between those who carry arms (RSF) and those politically allied with them (Ta’asis).

April 6: Democratic forces in Sudan marked the anniversary of the April 6, 2019, marches, which signaled the beginning of the Sudanese protesters’ sit-in in front of the Sudanese army headquarters.

April 8: Videos filmed in the Delgo area of Northern State called for the expulsion of displaced people from the area, sparked a wide wave of online debate. Supporters of the River and Sea separatist group called for the removal of all displaced people coming from Darfur states from northern and central Sudan. In contrast, unionist political activists rejected these calls, stressing that Sudan is a homeland for all, and that no person should ever practice discrimination or call for the expulsion of people on the basis of ethnicity or geography.

April 11: Similar to the commemoration of April 6, the forces of the December Revolution marked the anniversary of the fall of the Bashir regime (1989–2019). A speech by the commander-in-chief of SAF, general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, also sparked a major wave of discussion between supporters of the Sudanese revolution and followers of the former regime, who disagreed over Burhan’s position in relation to the revolution.

April 15: This day marked the third anniversary of the outbreak of the war in Sudan, prompting debate among Sudanese people over the usefulness of its continued course. Several Sudanese influencers also published a joint video calling for an end to the war, reminding audiences of its atrocities, and emphasizing that speaking about peace is not an act of betrayal. In a related development, the Berlin Ministerial Conference on Sudan, held on the same day, generated broad online debate around the usefulness of external intervention and how solutions can be placed in Sudanese hands. In another context, the sudden death of Sudanese activist Muzan Alneel on the same day sparked a big wave of solidarity among Sudanese activists, as well as among many human rights groups in the region that she had been part of.

April 19: General Al-Nour Al-Gubba joined the Sudanese Armed Forces after having been one of the most prominent leaders of the Rapid Support Forces. This development opened a wide debate, still ongoing, around the credibility of claims by some SAF supporters that they stand for justice. Many questioned why commanders accused of contributing to, or directly committing, crimes against humanity are being pardoned and welcomed, while at the same time dozens of people are being sentenced to death on charges of cooperating with the RSF.

April 23: Remarks by Sudanese Congress Party Deputy President Khalid Omer Yousif to an Italian newspaper were published, triggering online debate about the usefulness Sumoud’s external visit. At the same time, SAF-aligned accounts continued their attacks on Khalid Omer Yousif, accusing him of being an agent. Khalid and supporters of Sudan’s civilian democratic forces have consistently rejected and responded to these accusations, arguing that such accounts are working to entrench the reality of war and return Sudan once again to dictatorial rule.

April 25: A youth conference organised by Sumour was held in Nairobi from April 25 to 28, 2026. It sparked debate among Sudanese activists, Some accused the Sumoud coalition and organizers of attempting to dominate youth representation, while participants argued the conference reflected diverse youth currents. Questions around representation persisted, particularly following the boycott by groups such as the Sudanese Youth Network (SYN).

April 27: Statements by the defected major general triggered a new wave of online debate between those who viewed pardoning figures like him and granting them military ranks as a continuation of the cycle of impunity and those who supported the step, arguing that any defection from the RSF is positive because it contributes to shortening the war by helping dismantle the RSF.