

# Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

*April 2026*

**BUILD UP A**

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*We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to [mahmoud@howtobuildup.org](mailto:mahmoud@howtobuildup.org)*

## Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during April 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the [Phoenix](#) social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

## Main Results

### Volume and Engagement

- In April 2026, hate speech posts accounted for 6.21% of all recorded posts. Compared with March 2026, this represents a 79.39% decline in posts containing hate speech, using the same data collection methodology adopted in the previous month. This decrease appears to be linked not only to more coordinated civilian and peace-oriented messaging online, but also to the political and emotional weight of key April anniversaries — including the commemoration of the April 6 sit-in, the anniversary of the fall of the Bashir regime on April 11, and the third anniversary of the outbreak of the war — which collectively created broader openings for anti-war, solidarity, and democratic narratives to gain visibility and engagement.


### Spikes in Online Activity

- **April 2:** A statement issued by the Sumoud coalition on the evening of April 1, mourning Osama Hasan one of the leaders of the Ta'asis coalition, triggered major debate. Supporters of the statement argued that, through this position, Sumoud was standing against political assassinations. Those who disagreed with the statement argued that, in principle, there

should be no equivalence between those who carry arms (RSF) and those politically allied with them (Ta'asis).

- **April 6:** Democratic forces in Sudan marked the anniversary of the April 6, 2019, marches, which signaled the beginning of the Sudanese protesters' sit-in in front of the Sudanese army headquarters.
- **April 8:** Videos filmed in the Delgo area of Northern State called for the expulsion of displaced people from the area, sparked a wide wave of online debate. Supporters of the River and Sea separatist group called for the removal of all displaced people coming from Darfur states from northern and central Sudan. In contrast, unionist political activists rejected these calls, stressing that Sudan is a homeland for all, and that no person should ever practice discrimination or call for the expulsion of people on the basis of ethnicity or geography.
- **April 11:** Similar to the commemoration of April 6, the forces of the December Revolution marked the anniversary of the fall of the Bashir regime (1989–2019). A speech by the commander-in-chief of SAF, general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, also sparked a major wave of discussion between supporters of the Sudanese revolution and followers of the former regime, who disagreed over Burhan's position in relation to the revolution.
- **April 15:** This day marked the third anniversary of the outbreak of the war in Sudan, prompting debate among Sudanese people over the usefulness of its continued course. Several Sudanese influencers also published a joint video calling for an end to the war, reminding audiences of its atrocities, and emphasizing that speaking about peace is not an act of betrayal. In a related development, the Berlin Ministerial Conference on Sudan, held on the same day, generated broad online debate around the usefulness of external intervention and how solutions can be placed in Sudanese hands. In another context, the sudden death of Sudanese activist Muzan Alneel on the same day sparked a big wave of solidarity among Sudanese activists, as well as among many human rights groups in the region that she had been part of.
- **April 19:** General Al-Nour Al-Gubba joined the Sudanese Armed Forces after having been one of the most prominent leaders of the Rapid Support Forces. This development opened a wide debate, still ongoing, around the credibility of claims by some SAF supporters that they stand for justice. Many questioned why commanders accused of contributing to, or directly committing, crimes against humanity are being pardoned and welcomed, while at the same time dozens of people are being sentenced to death on charges of cooperating with the RSF.
- **April 23:** Remarks by Sudanese Congress Party Deputy President Khalid Omer Yousif to an Italian newspaper were published, triggering online debate about the usefulness Sumoud's external visit. At the same time, SAF-aligned accounts continued their attacks on Khalid Omer Yousif, accusing him of being an agent. Khalid and supporters of Sudan's civilian democratic forces have consistently rejected and responded to these accusations, arguing that such accounts are working to entrench the reality of war and return Sudan once again to dictatorial rule.

- **April 25:** A youth conference organised by Sumour was held in Nairobi from April 25 to 28, 2026. It sparked debate among Sudanese activists, Some accused the Sumoud coalition and organizers of attempting to dominate youth representation, while participants argued the conference reflected diverse youth currents. Questions around representation persisted, particularly following the boycott by groups such as the Sudanese Youth Network (SYN).
- **April 27:** Statements by the defected major general triggered a new wave of online debate between those who viewed pardoning figures like him and granting them military ranks as a continuation of the cycle of impunity and those who supported the step, arguing that any defection from the RSF is positive because it contributes to shortening the war by helping dismantle the RSF.
- **April 30:** The Joint Forces issued a statement calling on their soldiers to comply with directives issued by the Sudanese Armed Forces. This followed a wide digital campaign led by accounts associated with separatist currents such as the River and Sea group, which incited the Sudanese Armed Forces to take action against the Joint Forces, accusing them of military expansion in Khartoum State and describing this as a repetition of what had happened with the RSF. In the opposite direction, accounts linked to the armed movements rejected these accusations, which fueled widespread hate-driven discourse between the two sides.



## Overview of Narratives

This section outlines the main narratives observed during April 2026 and provides examples of how they appeared across social media.

1. **Shifts Toward Peace Discourse:** The most defining narrative shift in April was the visible consolidation of anti-war and peace-oriented discourse around the third anniversary of the war. Rather than appearing as scattered appeals, peace messaging emerged through coordinated efforts — including a joint video published by several Sudanese influencers — and grounded itself in lived atrocities, civilian grief, and the explicit rejection of the framing that calls for peace to amount to betrayal. This anti-war wave also intersected with debates around the Berlin Ministerial Conference, where civilians weighed the usefulness of external intervention against the principle that any sustainable solution must remain in Sudanese hands. The decline in the share of hate-speech in the past two months are in large part a reflection of this mobilization, suggesting that peace narratives are no longer occupying the margins of online discussion.

- 2. Exclusionary and separatist discourse:** A particularly alarming trend in April was the amplification of exclusionary narratives rooted in ethnic and geographic identity. Video clips from the Delgo area of Northern State calling for the expulsion of displaced people, alongside campaigns by accounts linked to the so-called River and Sea separatist current, sought to redraw the boundaries of belonging in Sudan along regional and ethnic lines. The same current later mobilized to incite military action against the Joint Forces, framing them as an existential threat to Khartoum State. These narratives matter because they shift the war's discursive terrain from political contestation toward questions of who is entitled to remain inside the national community, pushing hate speech beyond the binary of SAF–RSF camps into a more fragmented and dangerous geography of exclusion.
- 3. Debates on selective justice and accountability :** The defection of Major General Al-Nour Al-Gubba from the RSF to SAF, and his subsequent integration into the Sudanese Armed Forces, opened one of the month's most consequential debates. Civilian voices contrasted the welcoming of commanders associated with serious abuses with the simultaneous death sentencing of dozens of people on charges of cooperating with the RSF, arguing that the justice claims made by parts of the SAF camp are being selectively applied. Pro-SAF accounts countered that any defection weakens the RSF and is therefore politically useful. This narrative is significant because it ties an immediate military development to the longer-term question of transitional justice and exposes contradictions that mediators and accountability advocates will inevitably encounter.
- 4. Debate over civilian forces' political consistency:** In April, online debate around civilian forces reflected not only coordinated attacks against democratic actors but also growing criticism of their weak coordination and perceived inconsistency. A major trigger came after Sumoud issued a statement mourning a leader of the Ta'asis Alliance; supporters saw the statement as a principled rejection of political assassinations, while critics argued that armed actors and those allied with them should not be treated in the same way as civilian political figures. Similar debates emerged around Khalid Omer Yousif's remarks in *Il Tempo*, Sumoud's external engagements, and the Nairobi youth conference, where questions of representation, legitimacy, and political alignment were heavily contested. While SAF-aligned accounts exploited these moments to delegitimize civilian democratic voices as foreign-backed or politically compromised, the discussions also exposed real challenges within the civilian camp, particularly fragmented messaging, unclear boundaries with armed actors, and a lack of coherent political communication.
- 5. Revolutionary memory as a contested political resource:** April carries dense political symbolism for Sudan's democratic movement, and this was reflected in the digital sphere. The anniversaries of the April 6, 2019, marches and the April 11 fall of the Bashir regime became moments around which revolutionary forces reasserted their narrative of democratic continuity and rejected attempts to reframe the post-2019 transition. General Burhan's speech triggered a parallel debate between revolutionary voices and supporters of the former regime over his historical positioning, underscoring how memory itself is being actively contested in the service of present political claims.

**Eglal Adam**  
1 April · 🌐

أعلن بوضوح أن هذا البيان لا يمثلني بأي شكل من الأشكال ولا يعبر عن موقفي كما  
أؤكد أن تحالف تأسيس هو أحد أطراف الصراع ولا يمكن تقديمه كجسم مدني محايد  
في ظل ما يجري في هذا الوقت المؤلم تبقى أولويتنا الحقيقية هي إنقاذ أرواح  
المدنيين ووقف الحرب التي أرهقت البلاد وأثقلت كاهل شعبها تنتمي الرحمة  
والمغفرة لكل الضحايا وتنتمي الشفاء للجرحى وأن نعم السلام قريباً وتنتهي هذه  
المعاناة  
#لا\_للحرب

**التحالف المدني الديمقراطي لقوى الثورة - ...**  
1h · 🌐

التحالف المدني الديمقراطي لقوى الثورة "صمود"  
بيان نعي وإدانة

ينعي التحالف المدني الديمقراطي لقوى الثورة "صمود"، الفقيه  
أسامة حسن رئيس حزب التحالف الديمقراطي للعدالة الاجتماعية  
وعضو الهيئة القيادية لتحالف السودان التأسيسي "تأسيس"، والذي  
اغتيل في منزله بمدينة نيالا عبر هجوم بطائرة مسيرة تابعة للقوات  
المسلحة السودانية.

اننا ندين هذا الفعل الإجرامي الذي يمثل جريمة اغتيال سياسي  
لشخص مدني أعزل، وهو ما يدخل الممارسة السياسية في البلاد في  
نفق أكثر إظلاماً، ويعمق من دوامة العنف والموت التي تعصف  
بالبلاد.

Translation : I clearly state that this statement does not represent me in any way, nor does it reflect my position. I also affirm that the Tasis Alliance is one of the parties to the conflict and cannot be presented as a neutral civilian body amid what is happening during this painful time.

Our true priority remains saving civilian lives and ending the war that has exhausted the country and placed a heavy burden on its people.

We pray for mercy and forgiveness for all victims, for the recovery of the wounded, and for peace to prevail soon so that this suffering may come to an end.

#No\_To\_War

**Hanan Hassan**  
2 April · 🌐

أنت ك سياسي عندك واجب أن تحافظ على مبادئ السلام والإنسانية، وتدين كل  
أعمال العنف والاعتقالات السياسية بصراحة، لأن السكوت أو محاولة التوافق مع  
الشماتة تعني تبرير الانتهاكات وتهديد المسارات السلمية.

أولاً:  
لازم صياغة موقفك بكل وضوح وإدانة العنف والاعتقالات بصراحة وإدانة بكل قوة لأي  
عنف سياسي أو اغتيال، لأنه يضر بالثقة الوطنية ويعرقل مسارات السلام.

ثانياً:  
التأكيد على المبادئ الإنسانية:  
لأنه حتى في حالات الخصومة، يبقى الموت شأن إنساني قبل أي شيء، ويجب أن  
يكون محل حزن، لا انجرار بارتعاش ومسكنة خلف خطابات الكراهية  
دي مسؤولية سياسية واجتماعية عظيمة لو ما قدرها هوناً..  
بداية  
ممارسات الانتقام تزيد الانقسامات وتعطل أي جهود لبناء الأمن والاستقرار... أنت  
كزول داعي للسلام بتتلولو وتتلون مالك؟  
صراحة أنا بحترم البلبوسي شديد لأنه موافقه واضحة عنصرية وكراهية واحتفاء بموت  
الأخر.. وما عندو اي احترام للإنسان وحقوقه..

المهم موقف صمود  
دا هو الاتساق والتأكيد على الالتزام بالمسار السلمي.  
وحق الحياة، احترام الإنسان، رفض الانتقام، الحفاظ على ما تبقى من الدولة  
والمؤسسات المتناهرة  
See less

Translation : As a politician, you have a duty to uphold the principles of peace and humanity and to clearly condemn all acts of violence and political assassinations. Silence, or attempting to accommodate gloating over death, amounts to justifying violations and threatening peaceful pathways.

First, you must formulate your position with complete clarity: explicitly condemn violence and political assassinations, and strongly denounce any form of political violence or assassination, because it damages national trust and obstructs paths toward peace.

Second, you must reaffirm humanitarian principles. Even in cases of political rivalry, death remains, before anything else, a human matter that should be met with grief, not with trembling submission and self-pity before hateful speech.

This is a major political and social responsibility. If someone cannot uphold it, then they diminish its meaning.

It is self-evident that practices of revenge deepen divisions and obstruct any efforts to build security and stability. As someone who claims to advocate for peace, why are you wavering and changing colors?

Honestly, I respect Al-Balboosi<sup>1</sup> a great deal because his positions are clear: racism, hatred, and celebration of the death of the other. He has no respect for human beings or their rights.

The important point is that Sumoud's position represents consistency and a reaffirmation of commitment to the peaceful path: the right to life, respect for human dignity, rejection of revenge, and the preservation of what remains of the state and its collapsing institutions.

<sup>1</sup> Al-Balboosi is a common term used to describe supporters of the continuation of the war who back the Sudanese Armed Forces.

احمد شموخ  
19 April at 19:45 · 🌐

#الاستسلام\_سمح



Translation: #Surrender\_Is\_Good

مازن الأمير @mazinalamir · Apr 20

الغريب في الأمر أن الأوساط الشعبية التي تستاء من انضمام جزار الفاشر النور قبة للجيش لا يزعجها أن على رأس الجيش نفسه البرهان وجرائمه المروعة في حق المدنيين والسودان، وهو غوار في الحكم والإنصاف، النور القبة بجرائمه يشبه الجيش، الذي لا يختلف عن الدعم السريع في شيء.

NabeilShakoor @NabeilShakoor · Apr 20

يسود شعور متزايد من الاستياء في الأوساط الشعبية من استقبال الجيش للمنتسقين من «قوات #الدعم\_السريع» الذين يُتهمون بالاشتراك في المسؤولية الجنائية عن ارتكاب انتهاكات وفظائع ضد المدنيين، بينما تتواصل محاكمة المدنيين بمزاعم بالتعاون مع «قوات الدعم السريع» إبان سيطرتها على ولايات

1 6 386

Translation: What is striking is that the popular circles outraged by the joining of Al-Fasher's butcher, Al-Nour Gubba, to the army do not seem equally disturbed by the fact that the army itself is headed by Al-Burhan, with his horrific crimes against civilians and against Sudan. This reflects a serious flaw in judgment and fairness. With his crimes, Al-Nour Gubba resembles the army itself, which is no different from the Rapid Support Forces in any meaningful way.

BESHA @JUJYJOL

Show translation

كان جبت كوز وسألته من ثورة ديسمبر فأكيد حبشتما لأنها أبعدته .

كان جبت عسكري جيش او شرطة او جهاز فبرضو حبشتمها لأنها قلت منو ورفدته من الخدمة وشالت الحماية السياسية وقادت في النهاية لحرب أرغمته يرجع للخدمة يا يستشهد يا يفقد عضو .

طيب كان جبتنا احد الثوار وسألناه عن الثورة حنلقاه يا استشهد في بدايتها يا في فضل الاعتمام يا عشان عاين غلط لي جنجويد او فرد مشتركة وما أتحقق اي شي من الأسباب الطلع ليها .

كان جبتنا سياسي وطني حقيقي هدفه كان التغيير للأفضل والحكومة وبناء الدولة حنلق ان مافي دولة .

الثورة دي الاستفادو منها بس هم الجنجويد والقحاطة والمشاركة والله ولمن الناس كلها توعى على الحقيقة دي بس ممكن الناس تحاول تعالج لكن الاستمرار في الاحتفال وتقديسها دا مستوى بعيد من التخلف .

#السودان

Translation: If you brought an Islamist/NCP loyalist and asked him about the December Revolution, he would certainly insult it, because it removed him from power.

If you brought a soldier from the army, police, or security services, he would also insult it, because it diminished his status, dismissed him from service, stripped away his political protection, and eventually led to a war that forced him back into service — either to be killed or to lose a limb.

Then, if we brought one of the revolutionaries and asked him about the revolution, we would find that he was either killed at its beginning, killed during the sit-in massacre, or killed simply because he looked the wrong way at a Janjaweed fighter or a member of the Joint Forces — while none of the things he went out for were achieved.

And if we brought a genuine national politician

المسيح قداسة البابا والإمبراطور:عبد الواحد-الثاني @althany86556

Show translation

لولا جنرالات نظام الرئيس:عمر حسن أحمد البشير، الذين قادوا مسيرة السودان بعد سقوط نظامه بدموع ودماء وتكرار الذات وعلى رأسهم: عبد الفتاح البرهان، لما كان هنالك السودان الذي نراه اليوم ونعشم بأن لنا فيه وطن وموارد.

ثورة ديسمبر التي تسمى بالمجيدة إندلعت لتمحو وجودنا من ذاكرة الأرض.



Translation: Had it not been for the generals of President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir's regime, who led Sudan's path after the fall of his regime with tears, blood, and self-denial — foremost among them Abdel Fattah al-Burhan — there would be no Sudan as we see it today, no homeland in which we could still place our hopes, and no resources to claim. The December Revolution, which is called "glorious," erupted in order to erase our existence from the memory of the earth.


whose aim was change for the better, governance, and state building, we would find that there is no state left at all.

The only ones who benefited from this revolution were the Janjaweed, the FFC people, and the Joint Forces. By God, only when everyone wakes up to this truth will people be able to start addressing it. But continuing to celebrate and sanctify it is an extreme level of backwardness.  
#Sudan



Meram Alamin  
15 April · 🌐

ثلاث سنوات .. بنختلف في الطريقه لكن بنتفق على الوطن .. جدودنا وصونا نقيف مع بعض ونشمر للعمل ونتحد للأمل ..  
تصحيح عدد النازحين خارج السودان وفقاً للأمم المتحدة 4 مليون خطأ في النطق من رهبة التصوير وسوء حفظي للأرقام 😊 #السودان #sudan See less



Translation: Three years... We may differ on the path, but we agree on the homeland ... Our ancestors entrusted us to stand together, roll up our sleeves for work, and unite around hope.



William Long John  
14 April · 🌐

#جنجويد\_قحاطة



Translation: #Janjaweed\_Qahata



Ethar Khalil  
29 April at 09:40 · 🌐

مايفعله البرهان واستخباراته وصحفيهم الأغباء ((الذين لم يتفوق في الغباء عليهم إلا الجاكومي الكذاب الأشر وان يجتهدوا معهم قليلاً من التدريب والبعد عن السوقية))، سينقلب وبالأعلى الجميع، عنصرية البرهان ونظامه تظن أنهم الآن باتوا في مأمن، فليحترق الآخرون، العدو ع بعد خطوات وان رأوا أنه انهار، أو لم يروا كيف ان التمرد قضت عليه بعوضة!!  
وما يعلم جنود ربك إلا هو!!  
باقون ببقاء وعد الله وعدالة القضية التي هي من عدل الله وقيادة وفراسة شعبنا

حتى آخر رمق  
#مورال\_فوق See less

Translation: What Al-Burhan, his intelligence services, and their foolish journalists are doing — those whose stupidity is surpassed only by the vicious liar Al-Jakoumi, though with a little training and less vulgarity they might catch up — will backfire on everyone.



Abd Al-Rahman Amasib  
28 April at 15:56 · 🌐

مع عدم احترامي يعني .  
هسع رئيس الجمهورية القائد العام ده لما يطلع أولاد المشتركة من أمبدة يسبوا السيدة والدته ، و هي بنت بيت شرف و دين و هي متوقفة أصلاً .  
موقفه بيكون شنو ؟  
حيقول العسكري لا يثار و لا يستثار و ما عارف ليك ؟  
و لا حيعمل أقل ما يلزم لصون عرضه و سمعته ؟  
سؤال ثاني ..  
إذا قبلها البرهان لنفسه و لم يقم بأي رد فعل فكيف سيدافع عن شرف الآخرين في الخرطوم و غيرها ؟  
أنا جاد بالمناسبة .  
#وهكذا See less

Translation: With all due disrespect. Now, when the President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief sees members of the Joint Forces coming out of Ombada and insulting his

Al-Burhan’s racism and his regime believe they are now safe, so let others burn. But the enemy is only a few steps away, even if they think it has collapsed. Have they not seen how Nimrod was brought down by a mosquito?  
 “And none knows the soldiers of your Lord except Him.”  
 We remain, sustained by God’s promise; by the justice of our cause — which comes from God’s own justice — and by the leadership and discernment of our people.  
 Until the last breath.  
 #Morale\_Up

mother — a woman from an honorable and religious family, who has already passed away — what would his position be?  
 Will he say, “A soldier should neither provoke nor be provoked,” and whatever other nonsense?  
 Or will he do the bare minimum to protect his honor and reputation?  
 Second question:  
 If Al-Burhan accepts this for himself and takes no action, how will he defend the honor of others in Khartoum and elsewhere?  
 I am serious, by the way.

## Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month’s online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- **Peace advocacy has reached a more visible threshold:** April demonstrated that civilian and pro-peace actors are no longer merely reacting to events but are actively shaping anniversaries, atrocities, and political moments into coherent calls for de-escalation. The sharp month-on-month drop in the share of hate speech is itself partly a function of this mobilization. For peacebuilders, this is a strategic opening: investing in and amplifying civilian peace constituencies now is more likely to translate into measurable shifts in the broader narrative environment than it would have been in earlier periods of the war.
- **Exclusionary discourse is a rising risk to social cohesion:** The expansion of separatist and anti-displaced rhetoric — particularly the River and Sea framing — signals a threat that extends beyond the SAF–RSF axis. Hate speech rooted in ethnic and geographic identity is harder to mediate than political disagreement because it directly contests who belongs in the national community. Peacebuilders should pay close attention to this trend and consider targeted interventions to defend the principle of inclusive belonging in Sudan, particularly for displaced communities originating from Darfur.
- **Impunity through military integration complicates transitional justice:** The Gubba precedent is likely to recur. Each defection of an RSF commander into the SAF will pose the same question about how justice is administered for war-related crimes. Mediators should anticipate that this will become a recurring sticking point in any political settlement and that civilian groups will increasingly use these episodes to test the credibility of justice frameworks proposed by armed actors.
- **Civilian diplomats face increasing discursive risk:** As civilian democratic actors engage more visibly with international audiences and platforms, attacks framing them as foreign agents are intensifying. This dynamic raises the political cost of international engagement and risks isolating civilian leaders from external support. Peacebuilders and convening

Organizations should consider how to protect and legitimize civilian political work conducted on international stages, rather than allowing it to be reframed as treachery.

- **Youth representation is becoming a contested political terrain:** Debates around the Nairobi conference reveal that the question of who legitimately speaks for Sudanese youth is itself becoming a political battle. For peacebuilders, this is a reminder that supporting genuinely plural youth processes — including engagement with bodies that boycott specific gatherings, such as the Sudanese Youth Network — is more important than backing any single platform that claims to speak for an entire generation.

## Harmful and Divisive Narratives

### Patterns

- **Exclusionary and ethnogeographic discourse:** A defining harmful pattern this month was the open articulation of exclusionary positions based on ethnicity and geography. Calls to expel displaced people from northern and central Sudan and the broader River and Sea separatist framing moved hate speech beyond political enemies and into the terrain of belonging itself. This pattern is especially divisive because it reframes the war as a contest over who has the right to live where in Sudan and erodes the foundational principle that Sudan is a homeland for all.
- **Impunity through integration:** Another clear pattern was the normalization of impunity through military reabsorption. As former RSF commanders such as Al-Nour Al-Gubba were welcomed into the SAF, accounts in the pro-SAF camp framed their integration as a political win without engaging with allegations of past abuses. The simultaneous escalation of death sentences against alleged RSF collaborators sharpened the contrast and exposed the selective and instrumental nature of justice as it is currently being practiced in the online debate.
- **Delegitimization of civilian voices through ‘agent’ framing:** A recurring tactic was the portrayal of civilian democratic actors — particularly those engaging with international platforms — as foreign agents working against Sudan. Khalid Omer Yousif and Sumoud were central targets of this framing during the month. This pattern is harmful because it forecloses legitimate civilian diplomacy and treats engagement with international actors as evidence of disloyalty rather than political work.
- **Incitement to state action against rival armed actors:** A more specific but consequential pattern emerged at the end of the month, when accounts associated with separatist currents incited the Sudanese Armed Forces to take action against the Joint Forces, framing them as a repetition of the RSF. The Joint Forces’ eventual statement of compliance with SAF directives did not bring the campaign to an end, and the resulting exchange produced sustained hate-driven discourse between separatist accounts and accounts linked to armed movements.

## Targets

- **Displaced communities, especially those originating from Darfur**, were directly targeted by exclusionary discourse calling for their expulsion from northern and central Sudan. These communities — already living under conditions of forced displacement — were portrayed as a demographic threat rather than as fellow Sudanese citizens entitled to safety and belonging.
- **Civilian democratic actors and coalitions, particularly Sumoud and figures** such as Khalid Omer Yousif, were sustained targets of delegitimization. Their engagement with international platforms was systematically reframed as agency for foreign interests, and their political work was attacked as treachery rather than as legitimate civilian leadership.
- **The Joint Forces and armed movements aligned with them** were the targets of a separatist-driven incitement campaign that sought to position them as an existential threat in Khartoum State and to push the Sudanese Armed Forces toward action against them.
- **The legacy of the December Revolution, including the protesters who marched in April 2019**, was the target of revisionist framing by accounts aligned with the former regime, who used the April 6 and April 11 anniversaries to challenge the post-Bashir transitional narrative and to reposition the role of the army within that history.

## Actors

- **Pro-SAF:** Continued to occupy a central position, particularly in framing the Gubba defection as a political win, dismissing civilian engagement with international platforms as treachery, and resisting accountability-oriented narratives around the war's third anniversary.
- **Separatist currents (notably the River and Sea framing):** Emerged this month as a more distinct actor cluster, driving exclusionary discourse against displaced communities, inciting against the Joint Forces, and pushing a discourse that fragments Sudan along ethnic and regional lines. Their rise is one of the most significant actor-level developments of April.
- **Islamist and former-regime aligned accounts:** Used the anniversaries of April 6 and April 11 to contest revolutionary memory and reframe the post-Bashir transition, drawing on General Burhan's positioning to challenge the legitimacy of the December Revolution.
- **Pro-civilian and pro-peace:** Continued the trajectory observed in March, becoming more organized and more visibly able to shape narratives around the war's third anniversary, the Berlin Ministerial Conference, accountability for the Gubba precedent, and digital solidarity around the death of activist Muzan Alneel. The sharp drop in the share of hate-speech posts this month is in part a reflection of their growing capacity to set the agenda.
- **Pro-RSF and Ta'asis-affiliated:** Were comparatively less dominant in this month's hate speech dynamics than in previous months but remained active around the Sumoud statement of April 1.

## Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In April 2026, calls for peace and solidarity totalled 1,860 posts, with likes on these posts rising by 42.92% compared to March. Read alongside the sharp month-on-month decline in the share of hate speech posts, these figures point to an environment in which peace-oriented content is not only present but generating measurably deeper engagement. The third anniversary of the war provided a

focal point that civilian and peace-oriented voices were able to seize, turning a moment that could have collapsed into resignation into one that produced visible mobilization.

Peace narratives in April were anchored in specific events rather than in abstract appeals. The joint video by Sudanese influencers calling for an end to the war, the wave of digital solidarity following the sudden death of activist Muzan Alneel, the civilian engagement around the Berlin Ministerial Conference, and the use of the April 6 and April 11 anniversaries to recommit to democratic continuity all reflect a more grounded and politically literate peace discourse. Rather than separating peace, accountability, and democratic transition into distinct conversations, civilian actors increasingly tied them together as parts of the same project.

After three years of war, Sudanese civilians advocating for peace appear to be maintaining a reasonable pace in the digital sphere. Three years is a long time for any pro-peace constituency to remain coherent under conditions of active conflict, and the fact that engagement with peace and solidarity content is still trending upward rather than flattening is itself a meaningful signal. It suggests that civilian peace advocacy has developed enough organizational and narrative depth to sustain itself across cycles of escalation, anniversary moments, and political shocks, rather than collapsing into reactive bursts of discourse that fade once the news cycle moves on.

Important shortcomings remain. Peace mobilization continues to rely heavily on a relatively small set of civilian platforms, coalitions, and high-profile figures, which makes it vulnerable to the kind of delegitimization campaigns directed at Khalid Omer Yousif and Sumoud during the month. The reach of peace narratives into spaces dominated by separatist discourse — particularly Northern State and the central areas where the River and Sea framing has gained traction — remains limited, leaving large segments of the online environment outside the orbit of peace and solidarity messaging. And the relationship between online peace advocacy and offline political organizing is still uneven, which raises real questions about how digital momentum is being converted into durable political weight on the ground.

Taken together, however, the direction of travel remains positive. The April figures, the substance of the discourse, and the ability of civilian voices to set the agenda around the war's third anniversary all suggest that peace and solidarity narratives are continuing to consolidate as a genuine force in Sudan's online environment. Progress is uneven and far from sufficient on its own, but the trajectory observed over recent months is real, and it provides peacebuilders, mediators, and civilian organizers with a foundation that did not exist a year ago. The task now is less about building peace constituencies from scratch and more about protecting, broadening, and connecting the ones that have already taken shape.

