Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during July 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country’s broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated) as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the Phoenix social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results 

Volume and Engagement 

• In July 2026, hate speech accounted for 12.15% of the collected data, up from 9.67% in June under using the same data collection methodology, an increase of 25.6%. Likes on comment on hatespeech content almost doubled compared to June as well, which indicates stronger engagement. The increase coincided with a shift toward military confrontation, threat perception, and contested legitimacy, as July events framed discourse around imminent attacks, atrocity and accountability, territorial advances, terrorism designations, and competing peace narratives. These adversarial frames encouraged actors to mobilize supporters, delegitimize opponents, and portray rivals as existential threats, making harmful discourse more central than in June’s diplomacy-focused discussion.

Spikes in Online Activity

• July 1, 2026: The chair of the U.S. congressional foreign affairs committee warned of an imminent RSF attack on El Obeid and the risk of atrocities similar to those seen in El Fasher. On the same day, SAF carried out military operations, generating a wave of endorsement and mobilization among its supporters. The RSF also targeted civilians in Kosti on that day as well.
• July 8, 2026: The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan stated that the RSF had carried out brutal mass killings, systematic abductions of women and girls and mass rape in El Fasher. The Sudanese army announced that it had regained control of the town of Kurmuk. Meanwhile, reports circulated about a delegation from the Somoud Alliance visiting Israel, with SAF supporters amplifying these claims widely online.
• July 12, 2026: The Anti-Terrorism and Crimes Against the State Court in Port Sudan issued death sentences in absentia against Hemedti, his brother, and 15 members of the RSF. The European Parliament also called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist organization.
• July 15, 2026: The RSF targeted the city of Al Dabbah in northern Sudan using strategic drones. Khalid Omar Yousif, Vice President of the Sudanese Congress Party, stated that the G7 foreign ministers’ statement and the European Union’s statement represented an important shift in international positions toward the Sudanese crisis, particularly in terms of clarity and holding those obstructing peace efforts responsible for prolonging the war.
• July 22, 2026: Meetings of the Quintet mechanism on Sudan, which had been scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa during July, were postponed until September to allow for further consultations. The postponement followed disagreements between political forces and the Quintet over the design of the process.
• July 27, 2026: Hemedti delivered a speech calling on his forces to expand their operations and move from what he described as a defensive posture to an offensive one. The speech sparked wide debate over the credibility of the RSF and the Tasis Alliance’s claims and calls for peace.
• July 31, 2026: Videos circulated showing the Sudanese army commander walking through the streets of Khartoum.