Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during March 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country’s broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the Phoenix social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results 

Volume and Engagement 

• In March 2026, hate speech posts increased by 27.71% compared to February 2026, using the same data collection methods as in the previous month. This increase is mainly linked to key developments on the ground, including the SAF’s capture of the city of Bara, RSF drone attacks in White Nile State, and the U.S. State Department’s designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Spikes in Online Activity

• March 5: SAF recaptured the strategic city of Bara, sparking widespread celebration among SAF supporters, particularly because of previously reported abuses committed by the RSF in the city.
• March 9: The US State Department announced its intention to designate the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudanese Islamic Movement, affiliated entities, and the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTOs). A significant number of accounts associated with civilian forces in Sudan amplified and celebrated this, while accounts linked to the SAF, as well as Islamist groups, downplayed its significance.
• March 12: An RSF drone strike targeted the village of Shukeiri in White Nile State, resulting in at least 17 civilian casualties. The attack drew widespread condemnation, with political alliances like the “Somoud” coalition issuing statements rejecting drone attacks by all sides. This led to an online debate about the impact of drones in the ongoing Sudanese war.
• March 16: After announcing their intention on March 9th, the US State Department officially designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudanese Islamic Movement, and other affiliated entities as FTOs.
• March 17: The Committee for Dismantling the Empowerment of the June 30, 1989 Regime—established in 2019 after the fall of Omar al-Bashir to dismantle the former regime’s networks and recover public assets—announced its return to work to “besiege” the Islamic Movement inside and outside Sudan. A counter-campaign questioning the committee’s ability to operate from outside Sudan followed this announcement.
• March 21: Reports emerged of a deadly strike on Al-Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur, resulting in dozens of casualties, including children. The incident sparked widespread online debate, with RSF-aligned and civilian accounts blaming the SAF and calling for accountability, while SAF-affiliated accounts denied targeting the hospital, claiming the strike was directed at a nearby site. In parallel, some RSF- and Ta’asis-affiliated accounts circulated misleading or fabricated images to amplify emotional reactions.
• March 26: SAF leadership dismissed Brigadier General Tariq Kajab, which sparked debate among SAF-aligned and Islamist actors. Also on the same day, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement attacking US envoy Massad Boulos after he condemned the army’s bombing of Al-Daein Hospital.
• March 29: SAF bombarded Nyala. This bombing occurred on the same day that Khalid Omar Yusuf posted about a Darfur 24 report claiming that there were understandings between the SAF and the RSF to halt attacks on airports in Nyala and Khartoum. Accounts supporting the SAF mocked Khalid Omar after the bombing.
• March 30: News spread about the arrest of the Islamist leader of the dissolved National Congress Party, “Al-Nu’man Abdul Halim.” Accounts loyal to the civilian forces criticised Al-Nu’man’s arrest. Along with that, clips of an interview with Abdul Khaliq Abdullah, an associate professor of political science at the United Arab Emirates University in Al Ain, went viral. In the interview he stated that the UAE is not responsible for funding the RSF. Accounts supporting SAF accused Abdul Khaliq of being part of the UAE narrative that denies international reports about their support for the RSF.