

# Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

*March 2026*

**BUILD UP A**

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*We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to [mahmoud@howtobuildup.org](mailto:mahmoud@howtobuildup.org)*

## Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during March 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the [Phoenix](#) social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

## Main Results

### Volume and Engagement

- In March 2026, hate speech posts increased by 27.71% compared to February 2026, using the same data collection methods as in the previous month. This increase is mainly linked to key developments on the ground, including the SAF's capture of the city of Bara, RSF drone attacks in White Nile State, and the U.S. State Department's designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

### Spikes in Online Activity

- **March 5:** SAF recaptured the strategic city of Bara, sparking widespread celebration among SAF supporters, particularly because of previously reported abuses committed by the RSF in the city.
- **March 9:** The US State Department announced its intention to designate the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudanese Islamic Movement, affiliated entities, and the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTOs). A significant number of accounts

associated with civilian forces in Sudan amplified and celebrated this, while accounts linked to the SAF, as well as Islamist groups, downplayed its significance.

- **March 12:** An RSF drone strike targeted the village of Shukeiri in White Nile State, resulting in at least 17 civilian casualties. The attack drew widespread condemnation, with political alliances like the "Somoud" coalition issuing statements rejecting drone attacks by all sides. This led to an online debate about the impact of drones in the ongoing Sudanese war.
- **March 16:** After announcing their intention on March 9th, the US State Department officially designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudanese Islamic Movement, and other affiliated entities as FTOs.
- **March 17:** The Committee for Dismantling the Empowerment of the June 30, 1989 Regime—established in 2019 after the fall of Omar al-Bashir to dismantle the former regime’s networks and recover public assets—announced its return to work to “besiege” the Islamic Movement inside and outside Sudan. A counter-campaign questioning the committee’s ability to operate from outside Sudan followed this announcement.
- **March 21:** Reports emerged of a deadly strike on Al-Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur, resulting in dozens of casualties, including children. The incident sparked widespread online debate, with RSF-aligned and civilian accounts blaming the SAF and calling for accountability, while SAF-affiliated accounts denied targeting the hospital, claiming the strike was directed at a nearby site. In parallel, some RSF- and Ta’asis-affiliated accounts circulated misleading or fabricated images to amplify emotional reactions.
- **March 26:** SAF leadership dismissed Brigadier General Tariq Kajab, which sparked debate among SAF-aligned and Islamist actors. Also on the same day, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement attacking US envoy Massad Boulos after he condemned the army’s bombing of Al-Daein Hospital.
- **March 29:** SAF bombarded Nyala. This bombing occurred on the same day that Khalid Omar Yusuf posted about a Darfur 24 report claiming that there were understandings between the SAF and the RSF to halt attacks on airports in Nyala and Khartoum. Accounts supporting the SAF mocked Khalid Omar after the bombing.
- **March 30:** News spread about the arrest of the Islamist leader of the dissolved National Congress Party, “Al-Nu’man Abdul Halim.” Accounts loyal to the civilian forces criticised Al-Nu’man’s arrest. Along with that, clips of an interview with Abdul Khaliq Abdullah, an associate professor of political science at the United Arab Emirates University in Al Ain, went viral. In the interview he stated that the UAE is not responsible for funding the RSF. Accounts supporting SAF accused Abdul Khaliq of being part of the UAE narrative that denies international reports about their support for the RSF.



## Overview of Narratives

This section outlines the main narratives observed during March 2026 and provides examples of how they appeared across social media.

- 1. Military momentum as a legitimacy narrative:** A central narrative thread during the month was the use of battlefield developments to construct political legitimacy. Pro-SAF discourse treated territorial advances and bombardments not simply as military events but as evidence that force remains the only credible path to authority, order, and national restoration. In this framing, battlefield success became a moral argument in itself: gains on the ground were presented as proof that the SAF represents the state, while calls for restraint or negotiated understandings were mocked as weakness, illusion, or political betrayal. This narrative further narrowed space for ceasefire-oriented discourse by making military escalation appear both necessary and vindicatory.
- 2. Anti-Islamist discourse:** March also saw the reactivation of pro- and anti-Islamist narratives as a major organizing axis in online debate. The U.S. designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, and other groups as FTOs reinforced the civilian-led discourse that situates Islamist networks at the center of war prolongation and incitement. At the same time, pro-SAF and Islamist-aligned accounts attempted to contain the political effects of this development by minimizing its importance, reframing it as foreign interference, or attacking those celebrating it. What emerged was not just a debate over a designation but a wider contest over whether the war should be understood partly as a struggle over the return, survival, or rollback of Islamist influence in Sudan.
- 3. Civilian anti-war actors as a more organized narrative force:** we have been seeing a gradual strengthening of civilian anti-war discourse in Sudan's digital sphere. Rather than remaining purely reactive, civilian actors appeared increasingly able to shape discussions and amplify messages that challenge militarized escalation. This is evident by the fact that civilians were able to capitalize on the moment when the US State Department designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as an FTO. Civilian voices showed greater capacity to frame this political development in way that expanded the visibility of peace-oriented positions in Sudan
- 4. Foreign actors influence the narratives:** International and regional actors continued to affect the Sudanese digital spaces. Domestic struggles over blame and legitimacy incorporated U.S. actions, statements by foreign officials, and commentary linked to the UAE. Rather than being discussed on their own terms, these interventions were filtered through pre-existing alignments: civilian actors used them to validate anti-Islamist and accountability-oriented positions, while SAF-aligned voices framed criticism as foreign bias and used external commentary to reinforce narratives of international hostility or manipulation. This reflects a broader dynamic in Sudan's online war: external actors matter not only because of their material influence but also because they are repeatedly repurposed as narrative assets in the internal contest over who is patriotic, compromised, criminal, or internationally backed.

5.



Translation : As a citizen of Al-Daein, with family residing there and daily contact with them, I say: What Khalid Silk's friend conveyed to Khalid Silk<sup>1</sup> is incorrect! What happened yesterday in Al-Daein: Drone strikes targeted the police station near the hospital, which the Rapid Support Forces terrorist militias had converted into an arms depot. Due to the force of the explosion, some shrapnel fell into the hospital, causing injuries. As for Khalid Silk's claims, there are only two possibilities: either he is lying, or, to cover up his lie, he based his tweet on a friend's communication, or Khalid Silk's friend is simply lying!

Thank you!




Translation : The United States of America should be classified as the most terrorist state. As al-Bashir said, #AmericalsUnderMyBoot.



Translation : Do these people fall under this classification or not?

Your stance on the return of the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Rapid Support Forces will determine whether or not you are included in this classification!

#Sudan



Translation: #News  
Islamist Ali Karti: Whoever wants to classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group should classify the entire Sudanese people as terrorists 😊  
#Comment  
Lower your voice, we want to hear the shouts of the rest of Haj Nour's sons and the Northern Bank<sup>2</sup>...  
The Sudanese people have spoken with one voice: "Just fall!" But you're a fool, stubborn and headstrong.

<sup>1</sup> The name "Khaled Silk" is a popular nickname for "Khaled Omar Youssef," the vice chairman of the Sudanese Congress Party, His opponents often use it to belittle him, rather than using his full name.

<sup>2</sup> The phrase "sons of Haj Nour and the Northern Bank" here refers to the accusation that they have homosexual tendencies; it is a phrase used to insult.

And what's coming is much worse than what's past.  
Just stick to your position.


 **Amgad Fareid Eltayeb** ✓  
@Amgad\_Fareid

Show translation

فصح مستشار نظام أولاد زايد د. عبد الخالق عبدالله نفسه ودويلته وهو يعترف ويبرر لتدخلاتهم في السودان، ودعمهم للمليشيا الدعم السريع، بأن هناك دولاً أخرى تدعم المليشيا أيضاً، وكأن منطق العبقري يقول إن الجريمة تفقد صفتها الإجرامية عندما تصبح مزدحمة. اعترافكم بدعم الإبادة الجماعية التي تمارسها المليشيا هي شراكة في الجرم. فارعوا ايديكم عن السودان والتفتوا الي شأن بلادكم وشعبكم افضل لكم.



Translation: Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, an advisor to the Zayed regime, exposed himself and his state by admitting and justifying their interventions in Sudan and their support for the Rapid Support Forces militia. He claimed that other countries also support the militia, as if his brilliant logic dictates that a crime loses its criminal nature when it becomes widespread. Your admission of supporting the genocide perpetrated by the militia is complicity in the crime. Take your hands off Sudan and attend to your country and people; it would be better for you.

 **جدو طلب**  
21 March at 18:42 · 🌐

لن ننسى الأرواح البريئة التي فقناها في يوم العيد الكبير، لن ننسى أطفالنا الصغار الذين كانوا في عنابر مستشفى #الضعين، ينتظرون بصيص أمل وعلاجاً يعيد لهم حياتهم، ويحلمون فقط بأن يعيشوا فرحة العيد كبقية الأطفال.  
لكن براميل مسيرات جيش الإخوان بأمر من شياطين الحركة الإسلامية على كرسي والبرهان حولت اجسادهم إلى أشلاء على حائط المستشفى، سُلبت فيها البراءة، وغابت فيها الابتسامة، وامتلات الجدران بقصص الألم التي لا تُنسى.  
ستبقى هذه الحادثة جرحاً في الذاكرة، وشهادة على مجزرة دموية أرتكبتها جيش البازنقر العنصري، لا يجب تجاهلها.



طفل مصطفى أحد ضحايا استهداف مستشفى الضعين، الذي نفذه جيش البرهان

Translation: We will never forget the innocent lives we lost on Eid. We will never forget our little children who were in the wards of Al-Daein Hospital, waiting for a glimmer of hope and treatment to restore their lives, dreaming only of experiencing the joy of Eid like other children.

But the barrels fired by the Muslim Brotherhood's army, at the behest of the Islamist movement's devils, Ali Karti and Burhan, turned their bodies into shreds against the hospital walls. Innocence was stolen, smiles vanished, and the walls were filled with unforgettable stories of pain.

This incident will remain a wound in our memory, a testament to a bloody massacre committed by the racist Bazinger army, a massacre that must not be ignored.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> It is important to note that some of the images used in this post were AI-generated.

الفاضل منصور  
16 March at 17:02

دعكم من بارا الحرة جيش الإخوان مليشيات البراء بن مالك ومليشيات كيكل ومرترقة الحركات المسلحة يهربون من عموم أحرار و فيافي شمال كرفان وتبقت فقط الأبيض يتجمعون فيها ويحتمون بالمدينين وقريبا تسمعوا بخبرهم 🙏🙏



Translation: Forget about "Free Bara." The Muslim Brotherhood's army, the Bara'a bin Malik militias, the Kikel militias, and the mercenaries of the armed movements are fleeing from all the forests and deserts of northern Kordofan. Only El Obeid remains, where they are gathering and taking refuge among civilians. Soon you will hear the news of their elimination.

kamal  
@kamalgoga

Show translation

الله أكبر الله أكبر  
بارا حرة من دنس المليشيا بحول الله وقوته ننتصر... 🇸🇩🇪🇪🇵🇸  
#بل\_يس\_يا\_سحبي... 🇸🇩🇪🇪🇵🇸



Translation: God is great, God is great!  
Bara is free from the militia's filth. By God's will and power, we will triumph... 🇸🇩🇪🇪🇵🇸  
#OnlyFighting, my friend... 🇸🇩🇪🇪🇵🇸

Khalid Omer Yousif @KHOYousif · Mar 23

فيديو جديد للضابط الإسلامي في القوات المسلحة السوداني العميد طارق كجاب، يدعو فيه #إيران لضرب محطات الطاقة وتحلية المياه في #الخليج.

هذه التصريحات المتواترة لا تعبر عن مواقف فردية، بل عن فكر إرهابي يختطف مؤسسات الدولة السودانية، ويوظفها ضمن مشروع إقليمي أوسع مرتبط بالمحور الإيراني، يستهدف زعزعة الأمن الإقليمي والدولي.

اختار شعب #السودان تخلص بلاده من اختطاف الإرهابيين حين خرج بالملايين في 2019 لإسقاط نظام الحركة الإسلامية في السودان، فاشعلت هذه الجماعة الإرهابية الحرب لإعادة اختطاف الدولة مرة أخرى.

الموقف الحقيقي للسودان وشعبه هو موقف صارم ضد الإرهاب الإيراني، ومع دول الخليج الصديقة التي تربطنا بها علاقات وثيقة لم يعكر صفوها سوى هذه الجماعة الإرهابية. عليه فإن الانحياز الحقيقي لشعب السودان والحفاظ على مؤسسات دولته، يمر عبر بوابة إجهاد مشروع الحركة الإسلامية السودانية الإرهابية، وليس دعمها وتمكينها من اختطاف السودان تحت غطاء الحفاظ على مؤسسات الدولة.

#الحركة\_الإسلامية\_تنظيم\_إرهابي

Translation: A new video has surfaced showing Brigadier General Tariq Kajab, an Islamist officer in the Sudanese Armed Forces, calling on Iran to attack power and desalination plants in the Gulf.

These repeated statements do not reflect individual opinions, but rather a terrorist ideology that has hijacked Sudanese state institutions and is exploiting them within a broader regional project linked to the Iranian axis, aiming to destabilize regional and international security.

تنسيقية لجان المقاومة\_ الفاشر  
26 March at 17:05

البرهان يا طارق كجاب يمضي في تأسيس مشروعه السلطوي الجديد، ومن الطبيعي في مثل هذه المشاريع أن تفضي كل الأصوات التي تترك الحسابات أو تعترض طريق الطموح للسلطة، فالمعادلة عنده واضحة: تثبيت حكمه أولاً ولو على حساب الذين قاتلوا معه أو على حساب التوازن داخل الدولة.  
أما موقفك المناهض للجنود والقتال دفاعاً عن مؤسسة الجيش وبقاتها يظل جزءاً من التكفير عن خطية أكبر: جريمة إنشاء وتكوين مليشيات ال دقلو في عهد نظام الإنقاذ الذي تتنمون إليه، والصمت الطويل على جرائمها حين كانت أداة بيدكم تمارس القتل والتدمير دون مساءلة.  
الحقيقة البسيطة: من يقف مع الدولة السودانية ومؤسستها، فإن الدولة باقية، من يراهن على الأشخاص ومشاريعهم السلطوية، فالأشخاص ومشاريعهم إلى زوال.



Translation: O Tariq Kajab, Burhan is proceeding with establishing his new authoritarian project, and it is natural in such projects to eliminate all voices that disrupt the calculations or obstruct the path to power. His equation is clear: to consolidate his rule first, even at the expense of those who fought alongside him or at the expense of the balance within the state.

The people of Sudan chose to liberate their country from the grip of terrorists when millions took to the streets in 2019 to overthrow the Islamist regime. This terrorist group then ignited a war to re-hijack the state.

The true stance of Sudan and its people is a firm one against Iranian terrorism and in support of the friendly Gulf states, with whom we have close relations that have only been marred by this terrorist group. Therefore, genuine support for the Sudanese people and the preservation of their state institutions lies in thwarting the project of the Sudanese Islamist terrorist movement, not in supporting and enabling it to hijack Sudan under the guise of preserving state institutions.

#IslamicMovementIsATerroristOrganization

As for your stance against the Janjaweed and your fight to defend the army institution and its survival, this remains part of a form of atonement for a greater sin: the crime of creating and forming the Dagalo militias during the era of the Salvation regime to which you belong and your long silence regarding their crimes when they were a tool in your hands, carrying out killing and destruction with impunity.

The simple truth is that whoever stands with the Sudanese state and its institutions will endure; whoever bets on individuals and their authoritarian projects will perish.

## Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month's online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- **Online militarized narratives are making compromise harder:** Framing battlefield gains as the sole way forward undermines mediation, as it cynically portrays diplomacy as weakness. This pervasive militaristic narrative raises the political cost for leaders to pursue non-military solutions, making advocates for ceasefires or negotiations vulnerable to accusations of being unpatriotic. Consequently, political figures struggle to champion necessary compromises, locking the conflict into perpetual military engagement and escalating the human and economic cost.
- **Accountability vs amnesty tensions are becoming more central to peace efforts:** Rising calls for accountability are often coupled with demands to exclude certain actors such as the NCP and key SAF and RSF leaders from future political arrangements. While these demands reflect legitimate grievances, they risk hardening positions and complicating mediation efforts.
- **Contested atrocity narratives are weakening trust in facts:** The selective amplification, denial, or manipulation of civilian casualties is eroding the shared factual foundation essential for mediation. This environment makes efforts in trust-building, civilian protection, and verification increasingly challenging, as even evidence is rapidly drawn into propaganda conflicts.
- **Civilian digital actors are becoming a more important peace constituency:** After three years of war, civilian anti-war voices appear more organized and better able to shape debate around peace, de-escalation, and accountability. This creates a real opening for peacebuilders and mediators: there is now a more visible online constituency that can help legitimize peace efforts, provided it is meaningfully engaged and not treated as peripheral.

# Harmful and Divisive Narratives

## Patterns

- **Punitive victory narratives:** A major pattern this month was the framing of military action not only as success but also as deserved punishment of the enemy and vindication of one's own camp. Celebrations around battlefield developments, mockery of truce-oriented discourse, and the use of new attacks to discredit talk of restraint all fed a narrative in which force appeared morally cleansing rather than politically costly. Such rhetoric is harmful because it normalizes escalation, glorifies humiliation, and makes any peaceful language appear weak, naïve, or treacherous.
- **Atrocity denial, selective outrage, and emotional manipulation:** Another clear pattern was the continued use of civilian suffering through highly selective moral framing. Violations were amplified when committed by opponents, denied or minimized when linked to one's own side, and in some cases accompanied by misleading or fabricated content to intensify emotional reaction. The result was not simply polarization, but an information environment in which outrage itself became partisan. This phenomenon is especially divisive because it erodes the possibility of shared grief, shared facts, or consistent standards around civilian protection.
- **Attacking peace and civilian voices:** It's obvious that there was an effort to portray civilian criticism, international condemnation, or external scrutiny not as part of accountability but as hostile alignment against Sudan or against the military camp. In this pattern, those raising concerns about atrocities, Islamist influence, or regional backing for armed actors were vulnerable to being reframed as serving foreign agendas. This tactic is divisive because it narrows the space for independent civilian positions and makes mediation, monitoring, and peace advocacy easier to attack as betrayal rather than engagement.

## Targets

- **Victims of violent acts were key targets.** When victims were perceived to be on the same side as those speaking about them, their suffering was often amplified but reduced to symbolic narratives—stripped of context and complexity, and used to reinforce existing political positions. When victims were perceived to belong to the opposing side, they were more likely to be dehumanized or blamed, and in some instances portrayed as responsible for or deserving of the violence inflicted on them.
- **Civilian democratic voices and peace advocates** were also targeted through delegitimization, mockery, and attempts to portray them as hostile, naïve, or politically suspect.

## Actors

- **Pro-SAF:** Remained central in shaping militarized and triumphalist narratives, especially around battlefield developments and the rejection of truce-oriented discourse.

- **The Islamists:** Appeared more visibly distinct this month, particularly in light of the U.S. terrorist designation and debates triggered by shifts within the military establishment. This suggests a growing separation, at least discursively, between pro-SAF and explicitly Islamist networks.
- **Pro-RSF and Ta'asis-affiliated:** continued to amplify narratives that justify or obscure abuses, weaponize civilian suffering, and attack rival political positions.
- **Pro-civilian:** were more visible and more interventionist this month, showing greater ability to shape debate around peace, accountability, and de-escalation. This suggests that parts of the civilian camp may be regaining initiative in the digital sphere after three years of war.

## Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In March 2026, peace-oriented discourse showed clear growth across platforms. Posts advocating for peace increased by 32.45% compared to February, generating 673.5K likes, a 38.55% increase, while comments on these posts rose by 58.35%. Taken together, these shifts suggest that peace narratives are becoming more visible and generating deeper interaction. This points to an important development in Sudan's digital sphere: civilian and peace-oriented voices are generating more engagement and becoming more effective in shaping meaningful public discussion.

Peace narratives appeared more organized, assertive, and politically grounded than in earlier periods. Rather than making abstract calls to stop the war, civilian and pro-peace actors are actively using developments on the ground and political events to advocate for peace, while grounding discussions in concrete themes such as accountability and civilian protection.

This shift matters because it suggests that peace advocacy is beginning to move from the margins of reaction toward a more coherent narrative space of its own. After three years of war, parts of the civilian camp seem increasingly capable of turning moments of outrage, grief, and political controversy into more sustained calls for de-escalation and democratic accountability.

