This round of the conflict snapshot series offers insight into both offline and online conflict trends in Sudan throughout September 2023. It encompasses instances of violence and their repercussions on various population groups, infrastructure, essential services, as well as offline and online polarization dynamics. The analysis draws from data gathered by embedded observers, reflecting the perspectives of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), host communities, and service providers in regions including Gadarif, Kassala, Blue Nile, West, and South Kordofan. Additionally, it analyzes public social media data from Facebook. The report also identifies emerging risks and opportunities, alongside providing actionable recommendations.
Key Trends – Conflict Dynamics
In September, South Kordofan saw a continuation of clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), resulting in the death of two civilians in Kadugli. The SPLM-North also entered the village of Kiga, forcing residents to flee and still maintains control over the national road connecting Kadugli to Dilling.
In response to the situation, the Great Kadugli People’s Initiative was launched. Led by Prince Hazem Yacoub1, the initiative aims to promote peaceful coexistence, combat hate speech, and dispel rumors. It has extended invitations to RSF and SPLM to cease hostilities and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
In West Kordofan, clashes between the SAF and local citizens in the Balila area resulted in the deaths of two civilians. Additionally, an altercation between armed citizens and formal armed forces in Al-Wahda Market in the city of Al-Fula resulted in the deaths of two SAF members.
In Gadarif, the conflict has caused increased crime rates, particularly theft and smuggling. It has also strained the state’s healthcare infrastructure, overwhelming rural hospitals and leaving Al-Nuaimi Hospital as the main provider of services, despite limited supplies and equipment.
In Blue Nile, the division and polarization of the population continues to create two partisan groups with some supporting the RSF, while others lean towards the SAF. The conflict has brought about significant economic and political consequences, including loss of life, displacement, and the failure of the agricultural season.
Occasional clashes were reported in South and West Kordofan, while Gadarif, Kassala, and Blue Nile experienced fewer instances of violence.
Approximately 40% of the respondents mentioned occasional clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Another 28% reported rare clashes between SAF and RSF, while 24% of the respondents indicated that very frequent clashes between SAF and RSF occurred during the reporting period. Qualitative data also suggests frequent clashes between SAF and SPLM.
The intensity of incidents varied across different states as reported by monitors: In West Kordofan, 64% noted frequent “Battles in the field” involving SAF and RSF. In South Kordofan, 40% witnessed occasional and frequent “Explosions/Remote Violence” and shelling incidents between SAF and SPLM-N. At checkpoints and roads, 44% reported occasional “Violence against Civilians,” mainly attributed to RSF, resulting in property looting. Gadarif, Kassala, West, and South Kordofan experienced 60% mentioning “Property Destruction” from SAF-RSF clashes, disrupting healthcare systems. Additionally, 4% highlighted the “Establishment of New Permanent Bases” by RSF, often referred to as “Daglo’s Kingdom”2 in Sudan, emphasizing the multifaceted nature of these issues.
The report was produced in partnership with Search for Common Ground.