

Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

May 2026

BUILD UP 

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We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to mahmoud@howtobuildup.org

Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during May 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the [Phoenix](#) social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results

Volume and Engagement


- In May 2026, hate speech posts accounted for 11.75% of all recorded posts. Compared with April 2026, this represents an 89.22% increase in posts containing hate speech, using the same data collection methodology. This rise is linked to military escalation, contested atrocity narratives, and debate around the release, return, and defection of prominent political and military figures. Online tensions also increased as political signals from both warring sides remained contradictory, while hate-driven discourse expanded beyond the SAF–RSF divide into tribal, regional, and foreign-actor narratives.

Spikes in Online Activity

- **May 4:** Authorities in Khartoum accused Ethiopia of attempting to carry out attacks on Khartoum and Khartoum International Airport.
- **May 11:** Somoud civic coalition issued a statement emphasizing Sudan's unity. Its chair, Abdalla Hamdok, stated that any ceasefire in Sudan would fail unless accompanied by a clear

political track. On the same day, al-Safna, a senior figure in the RSF, announced his defection from the RSF.

- **May 14:** U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos stated that Sudan's warring parties were not ready to negotiate an end to the war. Meanwhile, the city of Nyala in western Sudan was subjected to renewed shelling.
- **May 18:** Tribal rhetoric escalated in eastern Sudan following local disputes between communities in the region and miners from Darfur over gold prospecting. Reports also circulated about the release of Abu Lulu, who is accused of war crimes in El Fasher, as well as the return of Mohamed Ibrahim Bagal, a former Islamist figure and RSF-aligned politician to Sudan.
- **May 21:** Abdel Fattah al-Burhan made remarks to Middle East Eye news outlet suggesting his readiness to engage in dialogue with the UAE under certain conditions. The Sudanese Sovereign Council denied these remarks later the same day in an official press statement.
- **May 27:** On Eid al-Adha, al-Burhan called for a broad Sudanese dialogue that would exclude only those he described as "steeped in Sudanese blood." On the other side, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, stated that the RSF would continue its war against the Islamic Movement and claimed that it was the opposing side that rejected peace.
- **May 30:** The Rapid Support Forces attacked areas west of Bara, killing 40 civilians. Separately, the SAF-appointed governor of Khartoum made controversial remarks questioning the ownership of housing units in certain areas, claiming that their owners had not been known for a hundred years.
- **May 31:** Abdelrahim Dagalo delivered a speech denying RSF responsibility for the atrocities committed in El Fasher.



Overview of Narratives

This section outlines the main narratives observed during May 2026 and provides examples of how they appeared across social media.

- 1. Atrocity denial and the contest over recent violence:** A defining narrative thread in May was the rapid pivot from mass-violence events to official denials and counter-claims. Abdelrahim Dagalo's speech denying RSF responsibility for the atrocities committed in El Fasher, and the framing battles that followed the RSF attack west of Bara that killed 40 civilians, illustrate how acts of large-scale violence are now being treated less as facts to be addressed than as narrative terrain to be captured. This pattern matters because it erodes the shared factual ground that any credible accountability or peace process would have to rest on, and it conditions audiences to expect denial rather than acknowledgement after every new atrocity.
- 2. Dialogue weaponized as a polarizing framework:** Across the month, calls for and rejections of dialogue were instrumentalized as polemical tools rather than as openings for political engagement. Burhan's offer of a "broad Sudanese dialogue" qualified by the exclusion of those he described as "steeped in Sudanese blood"; the Sovereign Council's same-day denial of his reported readiness to engage with the UAE; and Hemedti's pledge that the RSF would continue its war against the Islamic Movement, alongside Massad Boulos's public assessment that the warring parties were not ready to negotiate, together produced a digital environment in which "dialogue" itself became a contested category rather than a substantive track. The cumulative effect was the closure of the narrow political opening that civilian voices had begun to widen around the war's third anniversary.
- 3. Impunity through rehabilitation:** Building on the precedent set in April by the integration of former RSF commander General Al-Nour Al-Gubba into the Sudanese Armed Forces despite widespread accusations of involvement in serious abuses, May brought further examples of controversial figures being reintegrated into political and military structures. The release of Abu Lulu, who is accused of war crimes in El Fasher, the return of Mohamed Ibrahim Bagal, and the defection of senior RSF figure al-Safna to the SAF reinforced a recurring narrative that commanders and political elites can move across camps or return to public life without accountability, while ordinary civilians continue to bear the costs of the war. Civilian and pro-peace accounts cited these developments to question the credibility of justice claims made by all warring parties, while supporters of each camp portrayed them as tactical victories.
- 4. Exclusionary discourse extending into new geographies:** Hate-driven discourse continued to broaden beyond the SAF–RSF binary into ethnic, tribal, and territorial registers, but in May it took root in new spaces. The escalation of tribal rhetoric in eastern Sudan around disputes between local communities and miners from Darfur reactivated identity-based mobilization in a region that has so far been relatively peripheral to the war's online front. At the same time, the SAF-appointed governor of Khartoum's controversial remarks about houses "whose owners had not been known for a hundred years" introduced a property- and origin-based exclusionary framing into the capital itself, implicitly raising the question of which residents

are being written out of the post-war city. Together, these dynamics extend the war's discursive geography of exclusion into both peripheral regions and the symbolic center.

5. Foreign developments repurposed for domestic narratives. Statements and actions by international and regional actors continued to be rapidly absorbed into Sudan's internal narrative battles. The Khartoum authorities' accusations that Ethiopia attempted to target Khartoum and its international airport, the debate over Burhan's reported willingness to engage in dialogue with the UAE, and the widespread reuse of Massad Boulos's assessment that the warring parties were "not ready to negotiate" all illustrate the pattern. Rather than being discussed on their own terms, these developments were repurposed as evidence in domestic disputes over patriotism, legitimacy, and betrayal.



Ahmad Shomokh
@ahmadshomokh

Show translation

- لم يكن موقف الحكومة السودانية أو تيار الدفاع عن السيادة والاستقلال في أي لحظة هو رفض التفاوض المباشر مع العدو الإماراتي، بصفته عدو، ورفض محاولات غسل دوره وتحويله لوسيط مثل محاولات الرباعية وجنيف ALPS

- لا يوجد أي مؤشر أن زيارة البحرين كانت أكثر من كونها تضامنية، بل كل المؤشرات تؤكد أن العدو الإماراتي ليس لديه أي استعداد لخفض التصعيد العسكري الإمبريالي ضد استقلال وسيادة ووحدة السودان، كما يقول الميدان العسكري وجبهة النيل الأزرق

- إمعان @EyadHisham10 وغيره في تشويه وتغييب الموقف السوداني الرسمي وتصويره كموقف غير عاقل ولا ينطلق من محدّدات موضوعيّة تحمي مصالح ملايين السودانيين في الدفاع عن كيانهم الحضاري والمؤسّساتي في مواجهة حرب استيعابية استثنائية، بل ويبرز للعدوان الإماراتي بتبني دعايته حول أن أبوظبي تحارب الإسلاميين في السودانين ولذلك لا يريد شيطان العرب التفاوض مع الحكومة السودانية، قد تزيد من عدد متابعيه، لكنها ببساطة لن تغيّر الواقع على المدى المتوسط والبعيد... فالنصر حتماً للسودان وللسودانيين في مواجهة الاحتلال والغزو الثالث في تاريخنا

Translation : - The position of the Sudanese government or the Sovereignty and Independence Defense Current was never, at any moment, a rejection of direct negotiations with the Emirati enemy, as an enemy, and a rejection of attempts to whitewash its role and turn it into a mediator like the attempts of the Quartet and Geneva ALPS

- There is no indication that the Bahrain visit was anything more than a show of solidarity; rather, all indicators confirm that the Emirati enemy has no readiness to de-escalate the imperialist military escalation against the independence, sovereignty, and unity of Sudan, as the military field and the Blue Nile Front say

- The bootlicking of @EyadHisham10 and others in distorting and obfuscating the official Sudanese position and portraying it as an unreasonable stance that does not stem from objective determinants protecting the interests of millions of Sudanese in defending their civilizational and institutional entity in the face of a subjugating, eliminatory war, and even justifying the Emirati aggression by adopting its propaganda that Abu Dhabi is fighting the Islamists among the Sudanese and therefore the devil of the



Eiad Husham @EyadHisham10 · May 21
My final clarification regarding today's story.

- The phone call was between MEE editorials, General Burhan, and a member of Burhan's office who acted as translator throughout the conversation.

- After the call, the quotes were sent back through the same translator to General Burhan for the verification. We received confirmation that's the quotes were accurate and approved, and only then were they included in the report.

- If @aftaburhan has now changed his position, that's his responsibility — not ours, evidence of the quotes being sent back for approval and confirmed as accurate do exist.

🚩 If you guys are attacking me because this is personal for you go ahead. It changes nothing.

The Quotes are accurate, verified and approved then it was included in the report after MEE editorial spoke to him.

22

43

89

75K



Arabs does not want to negotiate with the Sudanese government, may increase his number of followers, but simply will not change the reality in the medium and long term .. For victory is certainly for Sudan and the Sudanese in confronting the occupation and the third invasion in our history



Khalid Omer Yousif
@KHOYousif

تسجيل السافنا الذي قام أ. مجاهد بشرى بنشره على صفحته بالأمس، يسقط كل روايات وأكاذيب معسكر الحرب بالضربة القاضية.

فالسافنا لم يعد مستسلماً أو تابعاً كما روج أبواق معسكر الحرب، بل تباهى الرجل بالمبالغ المالية التي تلقاها مقابل تغيير موقفه.

السافنا لم يخضع للدولة وسلطانها، بل على البرهان مجموعة من "الشحادين الصغار" ليس إلا، وأنه "جاء بوضعية أفضل منهم".

كشف السافنا أنه لا يتقاضى المال من حكومة البرهان، بل من جهات خارجية، فعن أي سيادة، وأي أمن قومي، وأي رفض للتدخل الخارجي، يحدثنا المدلسون الكذبة في معسكر "بقاء الدولة"؟!

الآن حصص الحق، وانكشفت عورة معسكر الحرب بلا غطاء، إنها حرب إجرام مكتمل لم تجلب لبلادنا سوى الخراب. هي ليست حرب كرامة أو سيادة، بل محض مشروع سطوي يسعى عبره العسكر والحركة الإسلامية الإرهابية إلى إحكام قبضتهم على البلاد، غير مباليين بما يتعرض له الناس من مأساة هذا القتل، ولا بالتفريط في سيادة الدولة وسلامتها، ولا تهتئ لهم شعرة وهم يمرغون كرامة السودان وأهله في التراب.

الحمد لله الذي ألهمنا الوقوف ضد هذه الحرب منذ يومها الأول، وحصننا من فتنها، ومنحنا القدرة على مواجهة أكاذيب أبواقها حتى انكشفت الحقيقة كاملة. اليوم لا عذر لمن يذعن رأسه في الرمال، فواجب إيقاف هذه الحرب يبدأ بسحب أي مشروعية عنها، والتصدي لكل من يسعى لإطالة أمدها. فالسكوت عن هذا الباطل أو التماهي معه، مشاركة في الجرم الذي يفتك ببلادنا وشعبنا الصابرين المكثوم.

#لا_لحرب

Translation: The recording published yesterday by Mr. Mujaheed Bushra on his page delivers a knockout blow to all the narratives and lies of the war camp.

For the Safna is no longer surrendered or repentant, as the mouthpieces of the war camp promoted. Rather, the man boasted about the financial sums he received in exchange for changing his position.

The Safna did not submit to the state and its authority. On the contrary, he sees the Burhan government as nothing more than a group of "petty beggars," and that he "came in a better position than them."

The Safna revealed that he does not receive money from the Burhan government, but from external parties. So about what sovereignty, what national security, and what rejection of foreign intervention do the lying fabricators in the "State Survival" camp speak to us?!

Now the truth has come to light, and the war camp's shame has been exposed without cover. It is a full-fledged criminal war that has brought nothing to our country but ruin. It is not a war of dignity or sovereignty, but merely an authoritarian project through which the military and the terrorist Islamic Movement seek to tighten their grip on the country, unconcerned with the tragedies people suffer as a result of this fighting, nor with the squandering of the state's sovereignty and integrity, and not a hair stirs for them as they drag Sudan's dignity and its people through the mud.



Basyoni Kamel Basyoni
20 May at 13:26

الرد على ما تروج له يا خالد سلك بخصوص "السافنا" ومحاولاتك المستمرة لتصنيف هذه الحرب بأنها "غير شرعية" أو عبثية.

إن محاولتك لتوظيف تسجيل "السافنا" لتصفية حسابات سياسية وتبرير مواقفكم المخزية تجاه الوطن والشعب لن تنطلي على أحد. الشعب السوداني اليوم واعٍ تماماً ويعلم من الذي يقف معه في خندق الدفاع عن الأرض والعرض، ومن الذي يبرر للمليشيات والانتهاكات ويبحث لها عن ذرائع سياسية تحت مسميات "الحرب العنيفة". هذه الحرب ليست حرباً "عبثية" كما تحاولون تصويرها لشرعية وجود المليشيات، بل هي معركة وجودية للشعب السوداني في مواجهة مخططات تدمير الدولة وتهجير المواطنين وسلب ممتلكاتهم. الشعب السوداني قال كلمته بوضوح واختار الانحياز لمؤسساته الوطنية وكرامته، ولن نزيدنا محاولاتكم لتزييف الحقائق إلا تمسكاً بوطننا ودعمًا لمن يحمل السلاح دفاعاً عنه، بعيداً عن المتاجرين بالقضايا في الفنادق والعواصم الخارجية. See less



Khalid Omer Yousif
1h

تسجيل السافنا الذي قام أ. مجاهد بشرى بنشره على صفحته بالأمس، يسقط كل روايات وأكاذيب معسكر الحرب بالضربة القاضية.

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Translation: A response to what you are promoting, Khalid Silik, regarding "al-Safna" and your ongoing attempts to classify this war as "illegitimate" or absurd.

Your attempt to use the "al-Safna" recording to settle political scores and justify your disgraceful positions toward the homeland and the people will not deceive anyone. The Sudanese people today are fully aware and know who stands with them in the trench of defending land and honor, and who provides justifications for militias and violations, searching for political excuses for them under labels such as "the absurd war."

This war is not "absurd," as you are trying to portray it in order to legitimize the existence of the militia. Rather, it is an existential battle for the Sudanese people against plans to destroy the state, displace citizens, and seize their property. The Sudanese people have spoken clearly and chosen to stand with their national institutions and dignity. Your attempts to falsify the truth will only make us more committed to our homeland and more supportive of those who carry arms in its defense, far from those who trade in causes from hotels and foreign capitals.

Praise be to God who inspired us to stand against this war from its very first day, fortified us against its sedition, and granted us the ability to confront the lies of its mouthpieces until the full truth was revealed. Today, there is no excuse for those who bury their heads in the sand. The duty to stop this war begins with stripping it of any legitimacy, and confronting everyone who seeks to prolong it. For silence about this falsehood, or alignment with it, is complicity in the crime that is ravaging our country and our patient, afflicted people.



Translation: Sheiba Dirar lashes out: "Kamil Idris must go; Darfur must go."

...
 خالد محمدنور
 19 May at 15:45 · 🌐

بالنسبة لي، موضوع الدهابة "التعدين التقليدي"، الحمد لله عدى على خير بحكمة بالغة من عدد من الإدارات والقيادات الأهلية، على رأسهم الناظر ترك وشبيبة ضرار. لكن من الضروري فتح هذا الملف الشائك ومعالجة المشاكل قبل وقوعها. أماكن التعدين هذه تقريباً خارج سلطة وإدارة الدولة، التي لا تُرى منها سوى محصلي الرسوم للمحلية. ليس هناك مراكز شرطة، ولا دفاع مدني، ولا أي شيء. بطون القبائل تفرض رسومها وإتاواتها على المعدنين حسب رؤيتها، وبالمنااسبة هذه الرسوم هي سبب المشكلة الأساسية التي حدثت. وقد تفتتح مستقبلاً باباً للنزاعات بين القبائل ويطون القبائل حول الأرض ومن له الحق في الرسوم والإتاوات.

حصول القبائل - برأيي - على مقابل مادي هو حق، ففي النهاية هذه أرضهم، وهم المتضررون من تداعيات التعدين العشوائي صحياً وأمنياً، لكن هذا المقابل يجب أن يكون تحت إشراف الدولة وسلطتها.

ومن ناحية أخرى، هؤلاء المعدنون التقليديون "الدهابة" هم الشرائع الأضعف، ناس على باب الله يطلبون الرزق، وكلنا نذكر قبل أسابيع قليلة عندما انهار منجم في ولاية البحر الأحمر ومات العشرات منهم، بدون أي جهود حقيقية لإنقاذهم من قبل الدولة. بالطبع يوجد بينهم متفلسون، مثل المجموعة التي اعتدت على الشباب، وأساعت لكل الأمة البجاوية بقبائح الألفاظ، وهؤلاء يضبطهم ويردعهم القانون. See less

Translation: For me, the issue of the 'Dahhaba' (traditional miners), thank God, passed peacefully due to the great wisdom of several local administrations and leaders, foremost among them Nazir Turk and Sheiba Dirar.

However, it is necessary to open this complex file and address the problems before they occur. These mining areas are almost outside the authority and management of the state, which is only visible through the local fee collectors. There are no police stations, no civil defense, nothing. The tribal sub-clans impose their fees and royalties on the miners according to their own vision, and incidentally, these fees were the cause of the primary problem that occurred. They may also open the door in the future for disputes between tribes and tribal sub-clans over the land and who has the right to the fees and royalties.

In my opinion, it is the right of the tribes to receive financial compensation, as this is ultimately their land, and they are the ones harmed by the repercussions of random mining—health-wise, environmentally, and security-wise. However, this compensation must be under the supervision and authority of the state.

	On the other hand, these traditional miners, the 'Dahhaba', are the weakest segments of society; they are humble people seeking livelihood. We all remember a few weeks ago when a mine collapsed in the Red Sea state and dozens of them died, with no real efforts by the state to rescue them. Of course, there are delinquents among them, such as the group that assaulted the young man and insulted the entire Beja nation with vile language, and these are to be restrained and deterred by the law.
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Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month's online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- Atrocity denial is becoming the default response to mass violence:** As acts of large-scale violence are increasingly met with denial and counter-attribution rather than acknowledgement, mediators can no longer assume that even basic facts will function as shared starting points in any political process. Investments in independent documentation, evidence preservation, and protected channels for survivor testimony will need to grow in parallel with mediation efforts, because the gap between what happened and what is admitted will continue to widen with each new event.
- Impunity through rehabilitation is becoming structural rather than incidental:** Building on the General Gubba joining SAF in April, and the releases, returns, and defections happening in May, it seems that the reabsorption of figures associated with serious abuses into one side's apparatus is not an exception but an emerging norm. Mediators should monitor how these developments influence supporters' trust in their own camps and shape public debates on accountability.
- The geography of exclusion is widening into peripheral regions and the capital itself:** Hate-driven discourse is no longer confined to the SAF–RSF axis or to the war's original front lines. The eastern Sudan tribal escalation around miners from Darfur, and the property- and Origin-based framings emerging from the Khartoum governor's remarks show that exclusionary narratives are now reaching both peripheral regions and the symbolic center of the state. Peacebuilders should treat social cohesion in these spaces as an active, time-sensitive concern rather than as a post-settlement question.
- Civilian peace narratives continue to lose visibility after gaining some traction:** Peace-oriented narratives declined significantly in May as military escalation, atrocity-related debates, and exclusionary rhetoric dominated the online conversation. As a result, civilian actors increasingly found themselves reacting to events rather than setting the agenda, underscoring the need for sustained support to strengthen their ability to respond rapidly, shape public discourse, and proactively advance alternative narratives.

Harmful and Divisive Narratives

Patterns

- **Atrocity-denial cycles:** Each major incident of mass violence this month triggered a near-immediate denial response from the implicated camp, producing a recurring two-step structure of violence followed by denial and counter-accusation, with each step generating its own engagement spike. The result is a discursive environment in which atrocity is processed not as a fact to be addressed but as a narrative resource to be captured. This pattern is harmful because it shifts the baseline expectation away from acknowledgement and toward denial, raising the threshold for any future accountability process to clear.
- **Exclusion mapping outward:** Exclusionary discourse continued to expand, moving from the original SAF–RSF axis into peripheral regions and into the capital itself, with multiple distinct exclusionary registers - tribal, regional, and property-based - surfacing in the same month. Each register carries its own constituency and its own logic of who belongs. This pattern is divisive because it multiplies the in-out distinctions any post-war political community would need to repair, rather than reducing them, and converts hate speech from a binary into a layered system.
- **Rehabilitation over accountability:** A clustered set of developments of releases, returns, and defections communicated a coherent message that political and military rehabilitation remains available to figures associated with serious abuses, while ordinary actors continue to bear the costs of the war. The pattern operates asymmetrically: high-profile actors move freely across camps while low-profile actors are punished by them. This pattern is harmful because the asymmetry is visible to civilian audiences and steadily erodes the credibility of every accountability framework offered by armed actors.
- **Dialogue as polarization:** Calls for and rejections of dialogue functioned this month as instruments of polarization rather than as openings for political engagement. The pattern is recognizable by its structure rather than its content: dialogue is offered with built-in exclusions, contradicted internally within hours, or rejected outright as a precondition for continued war, with each move generating polarizing engagement on both sides. This pattern is divisive because it converts the vocabulary of peace itself into a partisan signal, complicating any future process that will need that vocabulary to function as neutral ground.

Targets

- **Civilians demanding accountability** for war-related crimes in Sudan were increasingly targeted through a recurring cycle of release, return, and military rehabilitation of figures associated with serious abuses. Their calls for justice were not only sidelined but actively portrayed as obstacles to political and military progress, contributing to the marginalisation and silencing of survivor-centred demands for accountability.

- **Marginalized communities**, particularly Sudanese citizens of **Darfuri** origin living and working outside their home regions, were targeted by an escalating tribal discourse that converted ordinary economic friction into identity-based hostility. They were portrayed as out-of-place in parts of Sudan they have long moved through, rather than as fellow citizens with the same right to livelihood and presence anywhere in the country.
- **Journalists** reporting on the public statements of senior Sudanese officials were targeted by an official denial that recast accurate reporting as politically motivated distortion. The pattern exposes the press to delegitimization campaigns and signals to the wider media environment that documenting officials' own words carries a real reputational and security cost.

Actors

- **Pro-SAF:** Reasserted a central position this month, driving atrocity denial around the RSF attack west of Bara, defending Burhan's exclusionary framing of dialogue around those "steeped in Sudanese blood," backing the SAF-appointed Khartoum governor's property- and lineage-based remarks, and discrediting the Middle East Eye reporting on Burhan's UAE engagement after the Sovereign Council's denial.
- **Pro-RSF and Ta'asis-affiliated:** Substantially more visible than in April, particularly through Abdelrahim Dagalo's May 31 speech denying RSF responsibility for the atrocities in El Fasher and Hemedti's Eid pledge that the RSF would continue its war against the Islamic Movement. The al-Safna defection partly weakened their narrative position, but the camp absorbed and reframed the loss rather than letting it set the agenda.
- **Tribal and regional exclusionary currents:** Emerged this month as a more diffuse but distinct actor cluster, mobilizing identity-based discourse in eastern Sudan around the dispute with Darfuri miners and, in parallel, articulating a property- and lineage-based exclusionary register from the capital through the Khartoum governor's remarks. The clustering of these registers in the same month suggests that exclusionary actors are now operating across multiple regional theaters rather than along a single separatist axis.
- **Pro-civilian and pro-peace:** Continued to be active through the Somoud Alliance's unity statement and Abdalla Hamdok's conditioning of any ceasefire on a clear political track. Their relative visibility contracted compared with April, however, as the substantive peace language they have been developing was partly absorbed into the wider polarization around "dialogue" and overshadowed by the month's atrocity and rehabilitation dynamics.

Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In May 2026, calls for peace and solidarity accounted for 1.34% of all recorded posts, totaling 1,121 posts. This represents a 39.73% decrease compared with April 2026, when 1,860 such posts were recorded. These posts generated 702K likes and 54.38K comments, accounting for 0.23% of all recorded likes and 0.35% of all recorded comments during May.

The decline reflects a shift in the broader online environment rather than a simple reduction in peace messaging. While April benefited from several moments that enabled civilian actors to rally around shared calls for peace, May was dominated by military developments, atrocity-related debates, and exclusionary rhetoric. As a result, public attention increasingly focused on conflict dynamics rather than political alternatives.

This changing environment made it more difficult for civilian peace actors to shape the online conversation. Much of their engagement was driven by responding to unfolding events rather than proactively advancing their own narratives, reducing the visibility of peace-oriented messaging during the month.

Despite this decline, peace narratives continued to generate comparatively high engagement relative to their overall volume, suggesting that there remains an audience for civilian voices. The challenge is therefore less one of public interest than of maintaining visibility during periods when conflict-related narratives dominate online discussion. Strengthening the capacity of civilian actors to respond quickly to major developments while continuing to promote longer-term visions for peace will be important in sustaining their influence.

