

Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

June 2026

BUILD UP 

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We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to mahmoud@howtobuildup.org

Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during June 2026. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), or unaffiliated) as well as references to specific regions and communities.

This report focuses on recurring narrative patterns and tactics observed across social media rather than on the intentions, affiliations, or authenticity of its authors. While some posts originate from accounts aligned with conflict actors, the narratives they promote are often reproduced by unaffiliated users and spread widely once they circulate online. We recognize that individuals can shift their perspectives and communication approaches over time, and this snapshot analysis should not be taken as a permanent characterization.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the [Phoenix](#) social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results

Volume and Engagement

- In June 2026, hate speech accounted for 9.67% of all recorded posts, down from 11.75% in May using the same data collection methodology—a decrease of approximately 17.7%. This decline coincided with a month characterised by fewer major military escalations and less intense conflict-related activity than in May. While June remained politically contentious, many of the month's major discussions centred on diplomatic initiatives, historical anniversaries, and civilian politics, which generated significant polarization but did not produce the same levels of hate speech observed during periods of heightened military escalation.

Spikes in Online Activity

- **3 June 2026**, Online debate centered on responsibility for the massacre of the 3rd of June, 2010. SAF supporters placed full blame on the RSF, while RSF-aligned accounts accused the army and Islamist networks. Civilian voices held all components of the former Transitional Military Council responsible and rejected attempts to reinterpret the events in light of later political developments in ways that absolved one actor at the expense of another.

- **7 June 2026**, Meetings of Somoud’s leadership and executive bodies coincided with a post by Minni Minawi describing the Tasis alliance and the RSF as “two sides of the same coin” and dismissing attempts to separate them as largely symbolic. The launch of separate Sudanese secondary-school examinations in RSF-controlled areas also triggered debate over educational fragmentation and the exclusion of students in different parts of the country.
- **9 June 2026**, A joint statement by the United States, several European countries, the African Union, the European Union, IGAD, the Arab League, and the United Nations called for accelerated efforts to end the war and launch a civilian-led transition under an independent civilian authority. Reactions were divided, particularly within the SAF camp, where allied actors split between supporting and rejecting the statement.
- **13 June 2026**, Reports of the sexual exploitation of refugee women and minors by international and local employees linked to Doctors Without Borders in Chad generated widespread online outrage. According to an Associated Press investigation, survivors reported abuse by staff working with the organization.
- **14 June 2026**, comments by Khalid Omer Yousif in the UAE-based newspaper *Al Bayan*, praising the UAE’s role in ending the war and supporting sustainable peace, sparked a heated online debate. Critics presented the remarks as evidence of civilian forces’ alignment with the UAE and the RSF, while supporters viewed them as a positive political position.
- **23 June 2026**, U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos, said he had strongly urged the RSF leadership by phone to halt any actions that could endanger civilians in and around El-Obeid. On the same day, the SAF announced that it had taken control of the Al-Bar area in Blue Nile, renewing debate over the viability of military solutions. The dismissal of Sovereignty Council Secretary-General Lieutenant Gen Mohamed Al-Ghali and his replacement by Lt Gen Ahmed Saleh Abboud also drew attention, particularly amid claims that Al-Ghali had exercised unusually broad authority.
- **27 June 2026**, Remarks by Masad Boulos at the UN Security Council, accusing the SAF of failing to respond to or accept a truce proposal, triggered widespread controversy. Sudan’s UN representative said that a response had already been delivered to the US side. SAF-aligned accounts accused Boulos of acting as a cover for the UAE, while anti-SAF voices cited the dispute as evidence of the army’s obstruction and unwillingness to pursue peace.
- **30 June 2026**, Civilian forces marked the anniversary of the 30 June 2019 demonstrations by recalling the atrocities of the current war, calling for peace, and linking Sudan’s present crisis to the Islamist-backed coup of 30 June 1989. Notably, Islamist and former-regime supporters also openly celebrated the 1989 coup online, perhaps more visibly than at any point since the revolution. The date therefore became a site of competing narratives: liberation and resistance in 2019 versus the establishment of the Islamist regime in 1989.



Overview of Narratives

This section outlines the main narratives observed during June 2026 and provides examples of how they appeared across social media.

- 1. Contested memory, accountability, and political legitimacy:** The anniversaries of the 3 June Sit-in massacre and the 30 June demonstrations revived disputes over responsibility for Sudan's violence and the political legacy of the former regime. SAF-aligned accounts placed primary blame for the Sit-in massacre on the RSF, while RSF-aligned voices accused the army and Islamists. Civilian accounts held the Transitional Military Council collectively responsible and rejected attempts to rewrite the event according to present-day alliances. Similar divisions appeared on 30 June, when civilian voices commemorated the 2019 demonstrations and linked the current war to the 1989 Islamist coup, while former-regime supporters openly celebrated the coup and defended its political legacy.
- 2. Negotiations, civilian rule, and foreign alignment:** The debate around international efforts to advance a ceasefire continued. The 9 June joint statement endorsing an independent, civilian-led political process divided SAF-aligned actors, while remarks by U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos on the proposed truce triggered accusations that the United States and other international mediators were biased toward the UAE or the RSF. Khalid Omer Yousif, a founding member of the Sumoud coalition, praised the UAE's role in peace efforts that were similarly framed by opponents as evidence of Somoud's alignment with foreign interests, while supporters defended them as pragmatic political messaging. Across these discussions, support for mediation was repeatedly contested by narratives presenting negotiations and civilian political actors as threats to sovereignty or military victory.
- 3. Competing authority, territorial fragmentation, and civilian protection:** Developments on the ground reinforced concerns that Sudan was becoming divided between parallel political, military, and administrative systems. Separate secondary-school examinations in RSF-controlled areas triggered debate over educational fragmentation and unequal access, while Minni Minawi's comments linking the Tasis alliance directly to the RSF challenged attempts to distinguish its political and military structures. SAF territorial gains and changes within the Sovereignty Council renewed debate over the viability of military solutions and internal power arrangements. At the same time, allegations of sexual exploitation involving

refugee women and minors in Chad shifted attention toward the vulnerability of displaced populations and failures of accountability within humanitarian institutions.

4. **Humanitarian accountability and protection failures:** Allegations of sexual exploitation involving refugee women and minors in Chad generated widespread anger and shifted attention toward abuse within humanitarian settings. The discussion focused not only on the alleged perpetrators but also on institutional oversight, survivor protection, and the accountability of international organizations operating among highly vulnerable communities.



Translation : June 30 is one of the immortal days of the revolution. Indeed, it represents the peak of its courage and the strongest expression of the impossibility of turning back, as the military and the Islamists had planned and attempted to impose.

On that day, the decisive response came to the first coup attempt against the revolution: the massacre that dispersed the sit-in at the General Command. Today, we invoke that same will and determination to defeat the final episode of the coup against the revolution, represented by this criminal war, whose ultimate aim is to return the Sudanese people, humbled and humiliated, to the enclosure of the very regime that the revolution overthrew.

But that will never happen.

#TheWarOfRegretWillNotDefeatOurRevolution



Translation : Since its establishment, the Sudanese army is the only army that has not fired a single bullet against an external enemy, while more than five million Sudanese citizens have been killed at the hands of the army itself. It is also the only army since the dawn of history that has created parallel militias inside its own country to use them in killing the people and igniting strife and civil wars.

The General Command massacre, in addition to dozens of other massacres committed against the Sudanese people, is a damning image of the true nature of this army, and of the fact that criminality within it is both an origin and a doctrine. The Rapid Support Forces are a glaring example of the militias that absorbed the genes of criminality from this army.

They are all criminals.

#GeneralCommandMassacre


#SitInDispersalMassacre

#AnniversaryOfTheGeneralCommandMassacre



Translation : Back when we said there had to be coordination between the two sides of the war on issues such as exams, banking, passports, and other matters that directly affect civilians, and when we said that collectively punishing innocent citizens living in areas controlled by the RSF would isolate them from the rest of Sudanese society and strengthen separatist sentiment, the pro-war hardliners called us traitors and agents. They kept chanting, "Just finish them off."

So what good will all this crying do now?



Translation : This exam's issue is a catastrophe in the fullest sense of the word.

This Hemedti is an ignorant man who does not hesitate to commit foolish acts, and the cliques controlling the Khartoum government have the ability to negotiate and reach understandings over the distribution of shares of South Sudan's oil revenues, but they are unable to reach an understanding over an issue like exams.



Translation: The concerns of many of those who care about Sudan's interests and unity regarding the decision to hold the Sudanese Certificate exams in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces are understandable, especially if this step is read in the context of other measures being taken here and there, as though the warring parties, despite their differences, are united by an undeclared agreement



Translation: Of course, this is an extremely misleading framing of the news item, especially coming from a professional journalist.

The Sudanese Certificate is exclusively under the authority of the Ministry of Education affiliated with the internationally recognized government.

or a shared desire to push the country toward partition.

But it is also important to note that, apart from the efforts of the Teachers' Committee and the committee that worked to enable students in RSF-controlled areas to sit for the Sudanese Certificate exams, there have not been sufficiently strong voices pressing for a solution to this crisis.

Sudan is not the only country in the world, or even in the region, facing war. It was possible, and remains possible, to learn from the experiences of other countries in ensuring the continuity of education, health services, and financial services, instead of invoking the conditions of war as an excuse and waiting until partition becomes a recognized reality.

Sudan's unity is both a duty and a necessity, but it will not be achieved through chants and slogans. The parties to the conflict and their leaders, regardless of how much they speak about unity, are moving, consciously or unconsciously, along a path that leads toward partition.

The discourse of unity will also remain elitist and isolated unless it is tied to theoretical and practical solutions that directly affect people's lives, from their children's education, to their health, to their security and livelihoods. Fears of partition should not push us into despair, nor should they lead us to abandon the public sphere to discourses of hatred and division.

Despite the tragedies and evils contained in Sudan's war, it can, if there is genuine will and sincere intent, become an entry point for building a new Sudan: one in which the relationship between citizens and state institutions is redefined on foundations that place people's lives, security, dignity, freedom, and improved living conditions at the heart of that relationship.

As for "Tasis," it is essentially a parasitic creation with no recognition in the first place.

But the motive is malicious.



Join · الشيوخ حسن صالح
18 June · ام جهاد ابو الفتوح

عندما تكون النساء هاربات من مليشيات الدعم السريع خوفاً من الاغتصاب، وتوجد منظمة تقدم مساعدات غذائية للنساء، ... ثم يتضح أن بعض موظفي هذه المنظمة أخطر من مليشيات الدعم السريع على النساء، فهذه مصيبة كبيرة. تبين أن هؤلاء الموظفين التابعين لمنظمة أطباء بلا حدود كانوا يستغلون جوع النساء والقاصرات ويطلبون منهن ممارسة أفعال فاحشة معهم مقابل الحصول على الطعام.

لا أعمم الحكم على المنظمة بأكملها، فقد اتخذت إدارة المنظمة إجراءات عندما اكتشف الأمر، وتم فصل الموظفين الذين استغلوا النساء السودانيات.

الوحوش البشرية موجودة في كل مكان؛ حتى في الأماكن التي تظنها آمنة قد تُخدع وتُستغل. ❤️

#نساءالسودان

#السودان

#النازحين

عندما تكون النساء هاربات من مليشيات الدعم السريع خوفاً من الاغتصاب، وتوجد منظمة تقدم مساعدات غذائية للنساء، ... ثم يتضح أن بعض موظفي هذه المنظمة أخطر من مليشيات الدعم السريع على النساء، فهذه مصيبة كبيرة. تبين أن هؤلاء الموظفين التابعين لمنظمة أطباء بلا حدود كانوا يستغلون جوع النساء والقاصرات ويطلبون منهن ممارسة أفعال فاحشة معهم مقابل الحصول على الطعام.



Translation: When women are fleeing the Rapid Support Forces out of fear of rape, and there is an organization providing food assistance to women, only for it to turn out that some of this organization's staff are even more dangerous to women than the RSF militias, then this is a major catastrophe.

It was revealed that these staff members, affiliated with Doctors Without Borders, were exploiting the hunger of women and minors, asking them to engage in obscene acts with them in exchange for food.

I am not generalizing this judgment to the entire organization. The organization's management did take action when the matter was discovered, and the employees who exploited Sudanese women were dismissed.

Human monsters exist everywhere. Even in places you think are safe, you may be deceived and exploited. ❤️

#WomenOfSudan

#Sudan



Ismael Hagana · Follow
19 June ·

أطباء بلا حدود نموذج

حين تتحول المساعدات الإنسانية إلى أداة للابتزاز الجنسي، فإننا لا نكون أمام فضيحة مؤسسة، بل أمام سقوط أخلاقي مدو لمنظومة يفترض أنها وجدت لحماية المستضعفين.

اللاجئات السودانيات لم يهربن من الحرب والجوع والنزوح ليواجهن نوعاً آخر من الاستغلال تحت لافتة العمل الإنساني.

أن موظفين أطباء بلا حدود استغلوا حاجتهن مقابل الغذاء والدواء والخدمات الإنسانية، فهذه لا يمكن أن تكون باي حال من الأحوال مخالفات وظيفية، بل جرائم تمس الكرامة الإنسانية في جوهرها.

لا حصانة لأحد، ولا قدسية لأي منظمة، ولا يمكن أن تكون الشعارات الإنسانية درعاً يحمي الجناة من المساءلة.

العدالة للضحايا أولاً... ثم لكل حديث بقية.

فشكراً حكومة السلام اعلان انتهاء خدمات منظمة أطباء بلا حدود وغلق مكاتبها انتصاراً للضحايا

See less



Translation: Doctors Without Borders as an example:

When humanitarian aid becomes a tool for sexual extortion, we are not merely facing an institutional scandal but a resounding moral collapse of a system that is supposed to exist to protect the vulnerable.

Sudanese refugee women did not flee war, hunger, and displacement only to face another form of exploitation under the banner of humanitarian work.

If Doctors Without Borders staff exploited their need for food, medicine, and humanitarian services, then this cannot, under any circumstances, be treated as mere workplace misconduct. These are crimes that strike at the very core of human dignity.

No one is immune, no organization is sacred, and humanitarian slogans cannot serve as a shield protecting perpetrators from accountability.

Justice for the victims comes first. Everything else can be discussed afterward.

So thank you to the Government of Peace¹ for announcing the termination of Doctors Without Borders' operations and the closure of its offices, in victory for the victims.

¹ "The Government of Peace" is the name used by the Tasis Alliance and the Rapid Support Forces for their parallel government, which is headed by Mohamed al-Taayshi.



همام عبدالله · Follow

30 June at 13:01 · 🌍

في الثلاثين من يونيو 2026 ستذكر ثورة الإنقاذ الوطني في الثلاثين من يونيو 1989 و تذكر شعارات الإنقاذ :
 🌸 ناكل مما نزرع و نلبس مما نصنع ..
 🌸 ثورة التعليم العالي و الثورة الصناعية
 🌸 موبة طريق مستشفى و النهضة خيار الشعب
 .. و الكثير الكثير الكثير من الشعارات ..
 و أتذكركم مع المشير عمر حسن أحمد البشير ليخبركم عن بعضها لا كلها و عن قليل من كثير و نقطة في بحر خير رجل
 الخير السيد الرئيس المشير البشير رجل التعمير ..
 🌸 الثورة بنها ندين أهل الفكر و الدين الثورة ليها نديم أهل الفكر و الدين .. 🌸
 🌸 ضيعناك و ضعنا وراك يا ابي حليلك يا بشة ..
 متعلك الله بالصحة و العافية سيدي الرئيس المشير البشير
 همام عبدالله See less



Translation: On June 30, 2026, we will remember the National Salvation Revolution of June 30, 1989, and we will remember the slogans of the Salvation regime:

- 🌸 We eat what we grow and wear what we manufacture.
- 🌸 The higher education revolution and the industrial revolution.
- 🌸 Water, roads, hospitals — and renaissance is the people's choice.

And many, many, many other slogans.

I leave you with Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir to tell you about some of them, not all of them; about a little of so much; a drop in the ocean of the goodness of the man of goodness, Mr. President Field Marshal al-Bashir, the man of reconstruction.

🌸 Through the revolution, we are indebted to the people of thought and religion; for the revolution, we remain companions of the people of thought and religion. ❤️👉

🚫 We lost you, and we were lost after you. Oh, how we miss you, Basha.
 May God grant you health and well-being, my master, President Field Marshal al-Bashir.



Hus Sam

30 June at 14:15 · 🌍

٣٠ يونيو يوم من ايام الثورة الخالدة، بل هو قمة جسارتها والتعبير الاقوى علي استعصاء الردة الي الخلف كما خطط ونفذ العسكر والكيزان، في ذلك اليوم كان الرد الحاسم علي اول محاولة انقلابية علي الثورة وهي مجزرة فض اعتصام القيادة العامة، واليوم نسدعي ذات الارادة والتصميم لهزيمة اخر حلقات الانقلاب علي الثورة ممثلة في هذه الحرب الاجرامية التي غايتها اعادة الشعب السوداني صاغرا ذليلا الي حظيرة النظام الذي اسقطته الثورة وهبيها!!
 #حرب_الندامة_لن_تهزم_ثورتنا See less



Translation: June 30 is one of the immortal days of the revolution. Indeed, it represents the peak of its courage and the strongest expression of the impossibility of turning back, as the military and the Islamists had planned and attempted to impose.

On that day, the decisive response came to the first coup attempt against the revolution: the massacre that dispersed the sit-in at the General Command. Today, we invoke that same will and determination to defeat the final episode of the coup against the revolution, represented by this criminal war, whose ultimate aim is to return the Sudanese people, humbled and humiliated, to the enclosure of the very regime that the revolution overthrew.

But that will never happen.

#TheWarOfRegretWillNotDefeatOurRevolution

Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month's online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- **Historical memory remains politically contested:** Competing narratives around the 3 June sit-in massacre and the legacies of 1989 and 2019 show that Sudan's recent history continues to be actively contested and repurposed in support of present-day political agendas. Peacebuilding efforts should recognize these competing narratives while promoting inclusive approaches to truth, memory, and accountability.
- **Mediation legitimacy is increasingly fragile:** International statements, ceasefire proposals, and civilian engagement are quickly framed as foreign interference or alignment with one side. Mediators should communicate their mandates clearly, demonstrate consistency toward all belligerents, and strengthen visible Sudanese ownership of any process.
- **Fragmented authority complicates engagement:** Parallel examinations, competing political structures, territorial shifts, and internal divisions among SAF-aligned actors point to a more fragmented governance environment.

Harmful and Divisive Narratives

Patterns

- **Weaponisation of historical memory:** Major anniversaries, particularly the 3 June Sit-in massacre and the competing meanings attached to 30 June 1989 and 30 June 2019, were repeatedly used to strengthen present-day political positions. Rather than treating these events as shared national traumas, aligned networks selectively reassigned responsibility, defended current allies, and reinterpreted the past according to today's conflict lines. This turned collective memory into a tool for political mobilization and made consensus around accountability more difficult.
- **Foreign-agent and betrayal framing:** Civilian leaders, international mediators, and supporters of negotiations were frequently portrayed as serving the UAE, the RSF, or other external interests. Khalid Omer's remarks and Masad Boulos's statements became key triggers for this pattern, with political disagreement framed not as a difference in strategy but as evidence of disloyalty. This narrative delegitimized civilian engagement with mediation and increased the reputational and personal risks faced by actors publicly supporting a negotiated settlement.
- **Conflation and collective blame:** Harmful narratives often collapsed political, military, and social actors into broad hostile blocs. Civilian coalitions were equated with the RSF, the Tasis alliance was treated as indistinguishable from the RSF, and responsibility for violence was extended from institutions or leaders to entire political constituencies. This pattern erased internal differences, reduced space for nuance, and encouraged audiences to view whole communities or political groups as collectively responsible for the war.

- **Zero-sum framing of peace, sovereignty, and governance:** Ceasefire proposals, international mediation, and civilian rule were commonly presented in absolute terms—either as the only route to saving Sudan or as surrender to foreign pressure and armed opponents. Similar polarization appeared around parallel examinations, territorial control, and competing political structures, which were interpreted through narratives of partition, illegitimate authority, and institutional collapse. This framing narrowed the space for compromise by making political flexibility appear equivalent to weakness or betrayal.
- **Institutional distrust and protection failure:** The allegations of sexual exploitation involving refugees in Chad generated harmful discourse centered on institutional failure, impunity, and the vulnerability of displaced women and minors. While much of the outrage reflected legitimate demands for accountability, some discussions risked sensationalizing survivors' experiences or generalizing accusations across humanitarian organizations. The episode exposed deep distrust toward institutions operating in fragile settings and reinforced perceptions that vulnerable communities remain unprotected even within humanitarian systems.

Targets

- **Civilian leaders and coalitions:** Figures such as Khalid Omer and members of Somoud were portrayed as UAE-aligned, sympathetic to the RSF, or serving foreign interests.
- **International mediators and peace initiatives:** Massad Boulos, the United States, and wider international mediation efforts were accused of bias, interference, and pressuring the SAF while favoring the RSF.
- **Political and military constituencies:** SAF, RSF, Islamist/NCP, and Tasis supporters were frequently treated as unified blocs and assigned collective responsibility for atrocities and the continuation of the war.
- **Refugees and displaced communities:** Refugee women and minors in Chad were exposed not only to alleged abuse but also to sensationalized online discussion that risked undermining their dignity and protection.
- **Communities under competing authorities:** Students and civilians in RSF-controlled areas were drawn into narratives of partition and illegitimate governance, reducing complex service-delivery failures to political accusations.

Actors

- **SAF-aligned and hardline Pro-SAF networks:** Led attacks on civilian leaders, international mediators, and ceasefire efforts, while framing negotiations as foreign interference or betrayal.
- **RSF-aligned and Tasis-affiliated networks:** Shifted responsibility for past and current violence toward the SAF and Islamist actors while defending RSF-linked political structures and contesting army narratives.

- **Islamist and NCP-linked accounts:** Promoted anti-civilian and anti-mediation narratives, defended the legacy of the 1989 regime, and amplified accusations of foreign influence.
- **Pro-civilian:** Though smaller and less coordinated than SAF-, RSF-, and Islamist-aligned networks, they still defended civilian leaders, supported international mediation and civilian rule, called to end the war, and challenged attempts to rewrite responsibility for past violence. While mostly targeted by harmful narratives, some accounts also used polarizing language against Islamists, the NCP, and military actors.

Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In June 2026, peace and solidarity narratives accounted for 1.62% of all recorded posts, up from 1.34% in May using the same data collection methodology, an increase of approximately 20.9%. Their engagement grew more sharply: these posts generated 1.28 million likes, an increase of around 82% from May's 702,000, while their share of total likes rose from 0.23% to 1.03%. Most notably, peace-related posts received 12.77% of all comments, compared with only 0.35% in May. This suggests that peace content remained limited in volume but became far more visible and contested within the wider conversation.

The increase was partly supported by several moments that gave civilian and pro-peace networks clear points of intervention. These included calls for accountability on the anniversary of the 3 June massacre, support for the international statement advocating a civilian-led political process, demands for a ceasefire following renewed diplomatic engagement, and efforts to reclaim the meaning of 30 June from Islamist and military narratives. Pro-civilian voices also challenged selective accounts of past violence, defended mediation, and linked peace to civilian rule, institutional accountability, and protection for displaced and refugee communities.

However, the exceptionally high share of comments should not be read as straightforward support. Peace narratives frequently became sites of confrontation, attracting attacks from SAF-aligned, RSF-aligned, and Islamist networks that framed mediation as foreign interference or civilian engagement as betrayal. June therefore appears to mark a partial recovery in the visibility of the peace constituency rather than a decisive expansion of its influence. The audience for a civilian political horizon remains present, but peace-oriented actors are still operating reactively, defending their legitimacy and responding to rapidly shifting narratives rather than consistently setting the terms of the broader debate.

