

# Understanding Harmful Digital Narratives and Behaviors Ahead of the 2026 Bangladesh Elections

Preliminary Analysis Report  
*August - October 2025*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION

Background and Context

Historical Political Trajectory

July 2024 Protests to Now

Social Media and Evolving Information Environment

### METHODOLOGY

Data Gathering

Topic Classification

Narratives

### KEY FINDINGS

Platform Analysis

Facebook

Accounts with most posts and attention

Key observations

TikTok

Accounts with most posts and attention

Key observations

X (Formerly known as Twitter)

Accounts with most posts and attention

Key observations

Prominent Digital Harms

Hate Speech

Incitement to Violence

Mis/ Disinformation

Prominent Narratives

Harmful Narratives

Posts claiming the delegitimization of the interim government

Posts claiming the July revolution and the political transition was propaganda

Posts claiming foreign interference in July protests and regime change

Constructive Narratives

Posts calling for de-escalation of violent rhetoric and peace

Posts claiming the spread of mis- and disinformation by others

### CONCLUSION

Preliminary Recommendations

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This baseline analysis examines how social media narratives are shaping political discourse, civic integrity, and social cohesion in Bangladesh in the lead-up to the 2026 national elections and the planned referendum on the July Charter. Drawing on social media data collected from Facebook, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter) between August and October 2025, the report focuses on the prevalence and dynamics of harmful digital behaviors, including mis- and disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, alongside constructive narratives that promote de-escalation, tolerance, and democratic norms. The findings demonstrate that social media has become a central arena in which Bangladesh's political transition is being contested, with significant implications for electoral integrity and peace.

The analysis is situated within a context of profound political change following the July 2024 uprising, the resignation of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the establishment of an interim government tasked with overseeing reforms and elections. In this volatile environment, social media platforms are key sites where political actors, media outlets, influencers, and citizens frame the legitimacy of the interim administration, interpret the meaning of the July movement, and mobilize support or opposition ahead of the elections and referendum. While much online discussion reflects routine electoral debate and demands for justice and accountability, a substantial proportion contributes to polarization and digital harm.

Using Build Up's Phoenix social media monitoring tool, the study analyzed nearly 199K pieces of content, with 71.2K posts classified across six topics:

1. Elections
2. Human Rights / Justice / Accountability
3. Foreign Interference
4. Mis- and Disinformation
5. Hate Speech
6. Incitement to Violence

Facebook emerged as the dominant platform in terms of reach and sustained engagement across demographics, serving as a primary space for political commentary and mobilization. TikTok, while lower in volume, generated exceptionally high engagement through emotionally charged short-form videos, including leader-centric content, dramatized accounts of the July uprising, and election-related messaging. X functioned largely as a platform for elite commentary and real-time political debate, with a notable concentration of geopolitically framed narratives and claims of foreign interference.

Across platforms, the analysis identifies significant levels of harmful digital content. Hate speech is deeply embedded in political discourse, frequently targeting political opponents and religious or communal groups through dehumanizing language and historically loaded slurs. Incitement to violence, while smaller in volume, represents the most acute risk, including explicit calls for physical confrontation and narratives that normalize mob justice. Mis- and disinformation often blends partial truths with unverified or false claims, portraying the interim government, international actors, civil society organizations, and minority communities as foreign-backed conspirators. These narratives erode trust in institutions and independent information sources and interact with hate speech and calls to violence to intensify polarization.

At the same time, the analysis identifies a substantial presence of constructive narratives. Calls for de-escalation, peaceful political engagement, religious tolerance, and restraint generated high levels of engagement across platforms, as did content warning about the spread of mis- and disinformation and encouraging verification and responsible online behavior. These dynamics indicate that digital spaces in Bangladesh are not only sites of risk, but also potential entry points for resilience, dialogue, and harm reduction.

Overall, this baseline highlights a highly contested and volatile information environment in which digital narratives are playing a critical role in shaping public trust, civic integrity, and social cohesion. The risks identified are not solely technical or platform-specific, but deeply political and narrative-driven, rooted in historical grievances, power struggles, and unresolved questions of legitimacy. Understanding how these narratives circulate and evolve online is essential for anticipating points of escalation and for designing timely, context-sensitive interventions to support a more informed, inclusive, and peaceful democratic process as Bangladesh approaches the 2026 elections and July Charter referendum.

# INTRODUCTION

This report examines how social media is shaping political discourse and civic integrity in Bangladesh leading up to the next national elections and July Charter referendum in February 2026. It focuses on identifying and analyzing online narratives related to the country's political transition, with particular attention to harmful content, such as mis/disinformation, hate speech, incitement to violence.

The analysis is guided by the overarching problem statement “Understanding Digital Harms and Behavior Ahead of Bangladesh Elections: Impact of Social Media on Civic Integrity and Political Discourse” with a focus on:

1. Identifying predominant online narratives related to the elections
2. Assessing how these narratives shape public perception and engagement, and
3. Mapping the prevalence and characteristics of mis- and disinformation, hate speech

Drawing on social media analysis across Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok, the report maps topics and key narratives, identifies where the most concerning patterns of digital harm are concentrated, and highlights implications for peace, justice, human rights, and democratic participation. It is intended as a practical resource for civil society organizations, media actors, and policymakers working to safeguard civic space, information integrity and governance in a volatile information ecosystem and critical electoral environment. This preliminary report aims to provide an evidence-based picture of the online discourse, highlight where the most concerning narratives are concentrated, and identify potential entry points for counter-speech, dialogue and policy engagement.

## Background and Context

### Historical Political Trajectory

Bangladesh has had a complex political landscape since it gained its independence in 1971, after a 9-month war for independence from Pakistan. The new state, under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who led the independence movement, adopted a 1972 constitution built on four foundational principles: nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism, and initially operated a parliamentary system. Within a few years, however, economic hardship, famine, and intense political turmoil contributed to a centralization of power, the creation of a one-party system through BAKSAL in early 1975, and Mujib's assassination in a military coup that August, ushering in successive military and quasi-military regimes.

Through the late 1970s and 1980s, Generals Ziaur Rahman and H. M. Ershad re-engineered the political landscape, promoting new parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jatiya Party, diluting the original secular framework and embedding the armed forces as major political actors. A broad pro-democracy movement forced Ershad's resignation in 1990 and ushered in the non-party caretaker government system to oversee elections during the 1990s and 2000s. That arrangement was later abolished in 2011, contributing to deepening mistrust around election management and helping to set the stage for a long period of polarized competition between the

Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), punctuated by hartals (political protests), street violence, and recurring questions over the credibility of national polls.

From the late 2000s onwards, politics became increasingly dominated by Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. Three consecutive Awami League–led governments consolidated power amid concerns about shrinking civic space, politicization of institutions, human rights violations, and a pattern of uncompetitive elections, including boycotted or heavily contested polls by the major opposition party BNP under Khaleda Zia’s leadership. The January 2024 national election, in which much of the opposition did not participate and turnout was widely perceived as low, intensified debates over legitimacy, representation, and the future of democratic governance in Bangladesh.

## July 2024 Protests to Now

In mid-2024, a student-led mobilization over civil service quotas rapidly escalated into a broader confrontation with the state. What began as protests perceived injustice in recruitment policies for civil service jobs, turned into the July 2024 uprising, with large segments of the public expressing anger over authoritarian governance, economic pressures, and long-standing impunity for abuses. The ensuing crackdown and street violence left 1400 dead and thousands injured according to [UN estimates](#) and ultimately culminated in the resignation and flight of Sheikh Hasina, a constitutional crisis, and the emergence of an interim administration under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. It has also led to the emergence of a new political party, formed by the student protest leaders, the National Citizen’s Party (NCP) and the reemergence of Jamaat-e-Islami, the only Islamic party in Bangladesh, which was banned in the Hasina era.

The interim government positioned itself as a caretaker authority tasked with stabilizing the country, pursuing accountability for past violence, and laying the groundwork for a “New Bangladesh.” Central to this process is the so-called July Charter, a proposed framework for political and institutional reform that is intended to reshape the architecture of the state. The Charter has also become a point of contention among political parties, and many have refrained from signing or have major objections to certain provisions. The interim authorities have announced that the next parliamentary elections will be held alongside a national referendum on the July Charter, turning the upcoming polls into a dual test of both electoral legitimacy and public support for a new political settlement.

## Social Media and Evolving Information Environment

In this turbulent context, social media has become a primary arena for narrating Bangladesh’s transition. Political parties, movement leaders, influencers, media outlets, and ordinary citizens use platforms such as Facebook, X, and TikTok to frame the meaning of the July uprising, question or defend the legitimacy of the interim government, campaign ahead of the election and referendum, and contest the narratives of rival actors. Alongside this, digital spaces host mis/disinformation, communal rumours, hate speech, and calls for mobilisation that can undermine civic integrity and fuel polarisation.

Understanding how these narratives emerge and circulate online is therefore essential for assessing risks to democratic processes and social cohesion. The sections that follow present findings from a structured social media listening exercise designed to capture these dynamics and to inform

responses by peacebuilding, human rights, and governance actors in the lead-up to Bangladesh's next elections.

The report begins with a methodology section detailing the study process and tools used including Phoenix. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of each social media platform and their role in how narrative is being shaped online around the upcoming 2026 elections. A key part of the study explores the kind of dominant narratives present, with a deep dive into harmful content, and how such content could be used in information warfare and political campaigns. The report reveals how narratives that dramatizes and sensationalizes violence, the political transition and regime change, can be used to trigger uncertainty, volatile and distill lack of confidence in the people regarding the democratic processes in Bangladesh, including to manipulate public opinion and potentially destabilize the electoral process. This highlights the intersection of digital narratives, actors and geopolitical interests.

## METHODOLOGY

This report uses targeted social media analysis to examine “Understanding Digital Harmful Narratives Ahead of Bangladesh Elections: How Social Media Impact Civic Integrity and Political Discourse.” The analysis focuses on content related to the upcoming 2026 national elections and broader democratic transition in Bangladesh. A curated keyword list was developed to guide data collection, combining general election-related terms (for example voting, polling, campaigns) with Bangladesh-specific political vocabulary, prominent party and movement slogans, references to trending political issues, and the names of key political figures and institutions. This design ensures that the analysis process captures both broad electoral narratives and more localized, context-specific conversations.

The approach is explicitly structured around the core research questions: (1) What are the predominant narratives related to the upcoming elections in Bangladesh as observed on social media? (2) How do these narratives shape public perception and engagement in the democratic process? and (3) What types of mis/disinformation are prevalent in the political discourse of Bangladesh?

### Data Gathering

In consultation with FCDO, the research problem and questions were first discussed and refined by the technical group and using local expertise familiar with Bangladesh's political context and digital landscape. Based on this, a **keyword list** and an **account list** were developed to guide data collection. The keyword list, English, Bangla and transliteration, combined:

- General election-related terms (e.g. voting, polling, campaigns, election results)
- Bangladesh-specific political language and commonly used phrases
- Prominent slogans associated with political parties, movements, and the July protests
- References to key political issues (e.g. justice for July, the July Charter, interim government, quota movement)
- Names of major political parties, leaders, institutions, and other influential actors

In parallel, an account list was compiled to capture the main nodes of influence in Bangladesh's online political space. This included:

- Major news media outlets with large audiences and strong social media presence
- Prominent journalists and commentators known for political reporting and election coverage
- Verified or widely followed accounts of political parties, student and movement actors, and interim government officials
- Influential public figures and civic actors engaging on democracy, rights, and governance

The monitored accounts included major media outlets with strong readership and large social media followings, prominent journalists known for political commentary or election coverage, verified accounts of key political parties and their affiliated organizations, and leading political figures and interim government officials. These actors were chosen to cover mainstream media, political elites, and influential public voices, allowing the analysis to trace how narratives originate, gain visibility, and circulate across different segments of the digital ecosystem.

Data was collected from open sources on Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok using [Phoenix](#), Build Up's social media monitoring tool.. **The study period covers the months from August 2025 to October 2025**, to capture the early stages of preparation for the 2026 national elections, predicted to be held in February 2026, and evolving election-related discourse. In total 199K pieces of content were collected and 71.2K were classified for the purposes of the analysis.


## Topic Classification

To make sense of the large volume of content across Facebook, X and TikTok, all posts were assigned to high-level thematic categories using a rule-based keyword classifier in Bangla and English. The aim was not to label every nuance of each post, but to reliably detect where key types of digital harm and election-related discourse were concentrated.

In total, the classifier tagged 35.3K posts under Elections, 10.9K posts under Human Rights / Justice / Accountability, 8.13K posts under Hate Speech, 3.14K posts under Foreign Interference, 2.46K posts under Incitement to Violence and 2.23K posts under Mis/Disinformation. It's important to note that a post can carry more than one label. This distribution shows that most of the conversation is framed in terms of electoral politics and debates about rights and justice, while a sizable subset directly concerns foreign influence, information integrity and more harmful content such as hate speech and incitement.

*Figure 1: Topic classification*

## Topic Classification



The six main topic classes are defined as follows:

### **Elections**

Posts referencing the upcoming national elections, the referendum on the July Charter, electoral rules and procedures, candidates or election campaigning, using general and Bangladesh-specific election terminology. Given the transition context, this is the largest class and provides the backbone for analyzing how different actors frame the vote and its legitimacy.

### **Foreign Interference**

Content that talks about external actors shaping or manipulating conversations related to Bangladesh's political transition, including references to India, Western governments, international organizations or "foreign agendas," and narratives about "regime change projects," "puppet regimes" or constitutions written or imposed from abroad.

### **Human Rights / Justice / Accountability**

Posts that focus on accountability for past abuses, national healing and redress, including demands for justice for those killed in the July uprising, calls for trials of past leaders, discussions of truth commissions, and references to building a fairer, more rights-respecting state.

### **Mis/Disinformation**

Posts that match lists of known false or misleading narratives or explicit misinformation markers, such as claims that the July Charter is "100% fake", unfounded rumors about prominent figures (for example Yunus becoming UN Secretary General), or clearly debunked communal trigger stories. Only narratives that could be verified as false or baseless were coded in this class, making it a deliberately conservative category.

## **Hate Speech**

Content that uses political or communal slurs, dehumanizing language, or calls to exclusion against identifiable groups (for example Hindus, Muslims, parties or ideological opponents), detected via curated keyword lists in Bangla and English. This class captures posts that attack people based on religion, ethnicity or political identity, even when there is no explicit call to physical violence.

## **Incitement to Violence**

Posts that contain explicit calls or threats of physical harm, or language encouraging people to attack, burn, kill, “teach a lesson,” or “wipe out” particular individuals, groups or areas. These were identified through high-risk verbs and phrases relating to mobilization for violence rather than generic anger or criticism.

Together, these classes provide a structured way to track how core themes in Bangladesh’s transition are discussed online: from routine electoral politics, through contentious debates on foreign influence and justice, to the more acute zones of digital harm such as mis/disinformation, hate speech and incitement to violence.

## **Narratives**

The methodology for narrative building began with the systematic classification of the collected social media data. Initially, all relevant posts, articles, and discussions gathered through the social media analysis process (detailed in the data gathering section) were organized and classified into overarching Topics. These Topics represented the major thematic areas of conversation surrounding the 2026 Bangladesh elections, the post-July 2024 political transition, and related civic integrity issues.

Following this initial classification, a deep dive analysis was conducted to identify the specific narratives embedded within each Topic. This stage involved moving beyond simple thematic grouping to understand the underlying stories and framings used by different online actors.

Crucially, the identification and analysis of these Narratives were continually cross-referenced with real-world events occurring during the study period (July 2025 to October 2025). This contextual mapping ensured that the analysis was grounded in the sociopolitical reality of Bangladesh. By correlating spikes in specific online narratives with political developments, protest activities, legislative changes, or statements from key figures, the analysis was able to:

1. Trace the origin and evolution of particular narratives.
2. Determine how real-world events catalyze or are exploited by digital discourse, particularly in the context of harmful content (mis/disinformation, hate speech).
3. Assess the relationship between online mobilization efforts and physical actions.


This two-tiered approach, classifying data by broad Topics and then dissecting them into contextually-linked Narratives, allows for a granular understanding of how social media is shaping public perception and political discourse in the run-up to the election. Below are the popular narratives based on engagement across the platforms.

Popular Narratives - Engagement			
post_class	Number of Posts	Number of Likes	Number of Shares
Narrative: July Charter and its legitimacy	13.5k	113M	4.95M
Narrative: Posts that are de-escalating violent rhetoric and calling for peace	11.8k	145M	6.64M
Narrative: Posts claiming delegitimization of interim government	10.4k	72.6M	2.72M
Narrative: Posts claiming acts of violence, killings and massacres	7.81k	26.2M	5.5M
Narrative: Posts claiming the spread of Mis/Disinformation by others	7.53k	127M	12.8M
Narrative: Posts discussing overseas voting for migrants/expats	5.77k	85.6M	7.87M
Narrative: Posts claiming that the July revolution and the political transition was propaganda	5.76k	102M	2.11M

## KEY FINDINGS


### Platform Analysis

This section outlines what Bangladeshi social media users are sharing/discussing online particularly around the upcoming electoral process. We look at three predominant social media platforms in Bangladesh from the period of August 2025 till October 2025 for this initial report. Facebook is the most popular and used social media in Bangladesh among all demographics.



### Facebook


Facebook is the most popular and used social media in Bangladesh among all demographics.



Bangladesh social media usage statistics ([Statcounter](#), November 2025)

Between 01 August and 31 October 24.9K posts were collected from Facebook, published by 9.92K unique authors, generating roughly 140.5 million likes, 7.94 million shares and 1.06 million comments. This indicates a very high-engagement environment where political content routinely triggers large audiences and intensive discussion.

The time range shows a clear upward trajectory in posting volume over time. Daily posts are relatively moderate in early August, with intermittent spikes, then increase gradually through September and significant spikes are observed in October. This suggests that as the elections approaches, discussions around the interim government, July Charter, candidate announcement, and upcoming electoral process intensifies and Facebook is becoming increasingly central to political communication and mobilization.



### Accounts with most posts and attention

The most active authors by volume are dominated by political party pages and prominent political actors:

post_author_name_pi	Number of Posts
National Citizen Party - NCP	2.06k
Bangladesh Nationalist Party -BNP	1.78k
Pinaki Bhattacharya - পিনাকী ভট্টাচার্য	1.1k
Chief Adviser GOB	791
Bangladesh Jamaat - e - Islami	733
Zulkarnain Saer	727
Elias Hossain	636
Nijhoom Majumder - নিঝুম মজুমদার	630
Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain	506
Nahid Islam	355

Taken together, the top 10–11 accounts are responsible for roughly a quarter of all posts in the dataset, even though they represent a tiny fraction of total authors. This points to a highly skewed production pattern: most accounts post only occasionally, while a small cluster of party pages and high-profile influencers continuously feed the stream with content. This suggests ongoing political campaigns and narrative creation of each party to create a favorable image for them leading up to the elections. It is also important to note that for some of these accounts, all posts within the target period were collected as part of our methodology which may result in a proportionally higher number of posts that we collect from these actors.

## Key observations


From our analysis, a few observations emerged:

1. Facebook is a high-engagement arena for politics in Bangladesh: tens of thousands of posts generate hundreds of millions of reactions and comments over just three months.
2. Political parties are major content producers, with BNP, NCP and Jamaat among the most active authors, but they are not the only – or even always the main – drivers of engagement. Influential individuals (journalists, commentators, movement leaders) and the Chief Adviser’s official page frequently attract comparable or higher total engagement with fewer posts.
3. Facebook mostly contains long posts on political commentary and events
4. Posting intensity increases as the political process heats up, with a clear upward trend from August through October, suggesting that Facebook is being used both for continuous narrative building and for peak-moment mobilization.

## TikTok

Between 01 August - 31 October 7.93K videos were collected from TikTok, published by 5.71K unique authors, generating 98.1 million likes, 9.59 million shares and 3.56 million comments. TikTok delivers very intense engagement, suggesting that short-form video captures the audience with emotional, attention-grabbing political material.

The timeline of videos shows sustained activity from early August onward, with a notable spike in the first week and a clear upward trend through October. Similar to Facebook, TikTok activity increases as the political activity heats up, but with a stronger baseline and less extreme day-to-day volatility.




## Accounts with most posts and attention

The most active accounts by number of videos are dominated by political and news-style pages. It is interesting to note that we collected posts specifically from BNP and AL official accounts, however we do see other accounts also show up as most prominent ones based on keywords.

- bnpbd\_org (official BNP TikTok)
- bangladeshtimes3 and bangladeshtimes (news/clip channels)
- dbcnews\_tv (broadcast news)
- albdofficial (Awami League account)

Evidently, most political videos with high engagement on TikTok are generated by fan accounts of political leaders and parties.



post_author_name_pi	Number of Videos
bangladeshtimes3	542
bangladeshtimes	309
bnpbd_org	290
dbcnews.tv	137
jamaat_islam1977	69
jamunatv	65
fx.suhed.ahmed	57
ncpbd_unofficial	55
asifmahmud352	54
albdofficial	43
ntvbangladesh	41

## Key observations

From the analysis, we can observe some key trends:


1. TikTok, while has less volume of posts than facebook, has a much higher intensity of engagement for Bangladeshi political content in the form of short form videos such as
  - a. Fan-style edits, chants, and hero shots of leaders.
  - b. Emotional retellings of July, martyrs, and Hasina's trial.
  - c. Quick clips about the national election and referendum happening on the same day.
2. Compared to other social media platforms, mis/disinformation here is more implicit with how short form videos are clipped and cut to generate a narrative or disguise it as news or factual, which may be misleading.

3. As the platform is primarily for short form videos, the analysis revealed that compared to other platforms this is where the highest number of AI-generated content was identified.

## X (Formerly known as Twitter)

Over the same period, 117K posts were collected from X published by 50.5K unique authors, with roughly 1.36 million likes, 358.5K retweets and 79K replies & quotes. Compared to Facebook and TikTok, X has a large volume of posts, because it includes both tweets and retweets. The engagement is intense here as there are more high-profile, elite individuals, such as journalists, activists and politically engaged users on the platform along with the inclusion of commentary outside of Bangladesh.

The timeline shows a significant spike between 8th to 15th September, and then consistent level of engagement, with event-driven smaller peaks in the 3 months. This is consistent with X being used as a platform for live commentary.



## Accounts with most posts and attention

The most active accounts by number of posts and engagements:

- @basherella (pro-BNP, based in Dhaka/London)
- The official @ChiefAdviserGOB account
- Media and political accounts such as @bbcbangla, @BNPBdMediaCell

## Key observations

From the analysis, we can observe some key trends:

1. X seems to have conversations framed around geo-politics and foreign interference. This is amplified by attacks on minorities, mostly coming from non-local, non-Bangladeshi accounts.

## Prominent Digital Harms

The analysis also identified topics and narratives that are harmful in the context of triggering communal tensions, insecurity in state institutions, creating information warfare and further fueling polarization. In the context of Bangladeshi politics, polarization is not based on any ideology as in the West but more so based power struggle, fueled by intense competition, between the dominant political parties, national identity regarding state building and historical grievances. In light of the July Movement, as the political landscape has changed so has the manifestation of polarization. In this changing context we identified three topics and three narratives as harmful in the context of the upcoming elections.




### Hate Speech

The hate speech subset (3.36K posts) reveals how deeply polarising language has become embedded in the online conversation around Bangladesh's transition.

A higher percentage of these posts are observed on X, but the intense engagement comes from Facebook and TikTok. The keywords used for this classifier flags posts that use political or communal slurs (e.g. রাজাকার, terrorist, কুলাঙ্গার, কাফের), as well as some posts that quote or criticise hate speech.

The analysis revealed three key findings:

1. Politicised hate speech: opponents described as “terrorists,” “রাজাকার,” traitors or enemies of the nation. A large share of high-engagement posts use hate terms to attack political opponents, especially BNP, Jamaat and their supporters, or to normalise slurs like রাজাকার.
2. Religious / communal hostility and exclusion: content that ridicules or delegitimises other faiths or minorities, or uses religious language to justify hostility. A second strand uses religious framing to mock or delegitimise other communities or practices, especially around Hindu festivals and debates on Islam.
3. Mixed and ambiguous cases: There is also a smaller subset of posts that condemn hate speech or describe it as a problem; they are captured here because they quote the terms used for keyword classification, which is a limitation of the methodology. This reflects a limitation of a purely keyword-based classifier: not every labelled item is itself a perpetrator of hate, but together they map a discursive space saturated with slurs and demeaning language.



Many posts repeatedly label opposition actors as terrorists. (Top left). Post explicitly compares opponents labelled as “রাজাকার” to Jews targeted by Hitler and suggests they should not have been “left alive,” which is direct dehumanisation with genocidal overtones. (Top right). Here a whole group of opponents is collectively branded as “রাজাকারের নাতিপুত্র,” tying current political disagreement to the historically loaded label of collaborator. (bottom)



A viral TikTok by @hafizimaduddin2 (29 September 2025) uses a long string of hashtags:


“#পূজামন্ডপে\_গীত\_পাঠ\_করে\_ইসলাম\_কায়েম\_করছেন\_জামাত... #ঈমান\_থাকবে\_না\_দিলে\_ঈমান\_থাকবে\_না #জামাত #রাজাকার #fblifestyle”. The caption criticises people “establishing Islam” while reading the Gita at Puja pandals and warns that Iman will not remain. It frames Hindu worship and political rivals in a mocking, exclusionary way and links them to রাজাকার, feeding suspicion around inter-religious engagement. (left), A Jamaat leader is attacked for appearing with ISKCON, and those associated are said to have a character “worse than a dog,” combining political and religious shaming with explicit dehumanisation (right)

## Incitement to Violence

While the Incitement to Violence class is smaller than election or foreign-interference content, it sits at the sharpest edge of digital harm. A handful of high-reach posts explicitly urge supporters to chase, beat and encourage street violence ‘resistance’ against named political opponents, while a wider set of posts narrates killings, shootings and “genocide days” in highly emotional terms and sometimes normalises “গণধোলাই” as patriotic justice. The incitement to violence subset has posts.

There are two patterns of content:

1. Direct or near-direct calls to violence or organised physical confrontation. These include posts that openly urge supporters to physically attack or chase political opponents on the street.
2. Normalization of mob justice that narrates, justify or frame violence. Several posts do not spell out instructions but implicitly validate mob violence as an acceptable response to political opponents.



Post summary: Pinaki argues that Awami League (AL) is the main enemy and praises opposition parties for resisting AL rallies. He then tells followers that if they see an AL procession they should shout “ধর ধর”, come out of shops, take sticks and chase AL supporters with “no mercy”, and to build neighbourhood “আওয়ামী প্রতিরোধ বাহিনী”.




*Explicit call for extra-judicial killing, framed as necessary because “the law frees them,” and tied to a communal frame that no muslim women is safe from Hindu men (“কোন হিন্দু থেকেই নিরাপদ নয়”)*

## Mis/ Disinformation

The mis/disinformation dataset, which includes 2.1K posts collected between August and October 2025, reveals how misleading narratives are being used to harden social and political divides. Content repeatedly portrays the so-called “Yunus government,” UN mechanisms and indigenous or minority activists as foreign-backed conspirators, while reframing protest violence and accountability processes through emotionally charged terms such as “genocide,” “terrorists” and “information war.”

These posts often mix partial truths with unverified claims, presenting speculation as fact and collapsing complex events into a binary struggle between patriots and traitors. In doing so, they erode trust in institutions and independent information sources, normalise hostility towards targeted groups, and interact with hate speech and calls to violence documented elsewhere in this study, thereby contributing directly to digital harm and deepening political polarization. The dataset also includes known, prebunked disinformation claims.



*This post from the son of Sheikh Hasina (ousted PM) describes Bangladesh under the Yunus government as a dictatorship where ordinary citizens "live in terror," and explicitly calls for international intervention.*

*\*Note: These are further expanded in the narratives section.*

## Prominent Narratives

The popular narratives have been divided into two categories, harmful narratives that may further fuel social tensions and trigger violence and conflict, and constructive narratives that help to build bridges and reduce existing social tensions.

### Harmful Narratives


#### Posts claiming the delegitimization of the interim government

This dataset contains 5.41K posts between August and October 2025 across all platforms. Together they generated roughly 33.1 million likes, and 1.26K shares. The class includes content from across the political spectrum: Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, BNP pages and leaders, National Citizen Party (NCP), Awami League-aligned pages and student organizations, as well as individual commentators and analysts. Despite this diversity, the unifying thread is that these posts call into question the legitimacy, mandate or independence of the interim administration, often using very strong language. At the same time, the dataset also contains a smaller number of more ambivalent or pragmatic posts that acknowledge the interim government's limited role while still criticizing its foundations. Given the recent [survey](#) by International Republican Institute (IRI), where the Interim government received 70%

favorable public opinion, this shows that most of these posts are dominated by political parties, particularly the majority coming from AL and their affiliates, more so than the general public.



English translation: "A call to pay homage to the Father of the Nation Bangabandhu at Dhanmondi No. 32, ignoring the bloodshot eyes of the illegal Yunus government and overcoming all fears."



English translation summary: Read on to know more about how fascist Yunus handed over Bangladesh to America

## Posts claiming the July revolution and the political transition was propaganda

This dataset contains 2.32K posts. Content in this category revolves around contesting the very reality of the July 2024 revolution and the subsequent political transition, with opposing camps constantly accusing each other of "propaganda" and "opprochar." In practice, this framing blurs the line between legitimate critique and disinformation, encourages audiences to dismiss unfavourable reporting as inherently biased, and deepens mistrust of media, civil society and political opponents. By portraying rival narratives as calculated attempts to deceive the public, these posts contribute to a polarized information environment where citizens are less able to agree on basic facts and more likely to see politics as a zero sum struggle between truth and deceit.



Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP

4 August · 🌐

জুলাই-আগস্ট গণঅভ্যুত্থানে গাজীপুরের মাওনা ওয়াপদা মোড়ে পুলিশের গুলিতে শহীদ আবু কাউসার বিজয় ফরাজীর প্রথম শাহাদৎবার্ষিকী উপলক্ষে আজ ৪ আগস্ট ২০২৫, সোমবার বিকেলে ময়মনসিংহের হালুয়াঘাট উপজেলার নড়াইল ইউনিয়নের বাদশা বাজারে কাউয়ালীজান সরকারী প্রাথমিক বিদ্যালয় মাঠে স্মরণ সভা ও দোয়া মাহফিল অনুষ্ঠিত হয়।

এসময় প্রধান অতিথি হিসেবে উপস্থিত ছিলেন বিএনপি'র যুগ্ম মহাসচিব সৈয়দ এমরান সালেহ প্রিন্স।

জুলাই সনদ ও ঘোষণা পত্রের সাথে জনগণ নির্বাচনের ঘোষণাও চায় উল্লেখ করে বিএনপি'র যুগ্ম মহাসচিব সৈয়দ এমরান সালেহ প্রিন্স বলেছেন, রোজার আগে নির্বাচনের জন্য জনগণ অধীর আগ্রহে অপেক্ষা করছে।

এমরান সালেহ প্রিন্স বলেন নির্বাচিত সরকার ও সংসদের মাধ্যমেই জুলাই সনদ ও ঘোষণা পত্র বাস্তবায়ন করে গণঅভ্যুত্থানের আকাঙ্ক্ষা বাস্তবায়ন হবে। জুলাই সনদ ও ঘোষণা পত্র বিএনপি ধারণ করে। কিন্তু একটি মহল নির্বাচন বিলম্বিত করতে বিএনপি'র বিরুদ্ধে অপপ্রচার চালাচ্ছে, অহেতুক বিভ্রান্তি ও জটিলতা সৃষ্টি করছে। তিনি বলেন, বিএনপি শহীদদের রক্তের ঋণ পরিশোধ করতে প্রতিশ্রুতিবদ্ধ। বিএনপি জনগণের রায়ের রাষ্ট্র পরিচালনার সুযোগ পেলে জনগণের কাছে প্রদত্ত সকল অঙ্গীকার বাস্তবায়ন করতে বদ্ধপরিকর।

বিএনপি'র এই যুগ্ম মহাসচিব বলেন, স্বাধীনতার পর আ.লীগ মুক্তিযুদ্ধের একক দাবিদার সেজে মুক্তিযুদ্ধের চেতনা নিয়ে বারওয়ামী ব্যবসা করতে চেয়েছে।

বেগম খালেদা জিয়া ও তারেক রহমান নতুন বাংলাদেশ উপহার দেবেন, যেখানে গণতন্ত্র, সুশাসন, জানমালের নিরাপত্তা, কর্মসংস্থান, শিক্ষা, ধর্ম, সাংস্কৃতিক, মানবিক ও সামাজিক মূল্যবোধ, শান্তি, সম্প্রীতি, সৌহার্দ্য বজায় থাকবে।

জনগণের আর্থসামাজিক ও অর্থনৈতিক উন্নয়ন সাধিত হবে।

তিনি বলেন, আগামী দিনে বিএনপি ফ্যাসিবাদ আওয়ামী রেজিমে গুম খুনের শিকার সকল শহীদদের রাষ্ট্রীয় মর্যাদা ও তাদের পরিবারের পুনর্বাসনসহ শহীদদের স্মৃতি ধরে রাখতে সড়ক বা স্থাপনার নামকরণ করবে এবং রাষ্ট্রীয় ভাবে তাদের স্বীকৃতি প্রদান করবে। একই সাথে বিএনপি ফ্যাসিস্ট হাসিনাসহ গুম, খুন ও দুর্নীতি, লুটপাট, অধিকার হরণের সাথে জড়িত সকলের দৃষ্টান্তমূলক বিচার নিশ্চিত করবে।

তিনি সকলকে শহীদ পরিবারের পাশে থাকার আহবান জানিয়ে বলেন, বিএনপি তাঁদের আত্মত্যাগ শ্রদ্ধার সাথে স্মরণ করে।

এর আগে এমরান সালেহ প্রিন্সসহ নেতৃবৃন্দ শহীদ বিজয় ফরাজীর বাবা ও পরিবারের সদস্যদের নিয়ে কালো ব্যাজ ধারণ করে কালো পতাকা নিয়ে মোন মিছিল সহকারে শহীদদের কবর জিয়ারত ও পুষ্পমাল্য অর্পণ করেন এবং তার বাবা, মা সহ আত্মীয় পরিজনের সাথে সাক্ষাত করে সমবেদনা জানান।

*Post commemorating a protester killed during the July-August mass uprising. At one point, it notes that “জুলাই সনদ ও ঘোষণা পত্রের বিরুদ্ধে অপপ্রচার চালাচ্ছে, অহেতুক বিভ্রান্তি ও জটিলতা সৃষ্টি করছে,” accusing opponents of running propaganda to confuse people about the July charter.*

## Posts claiming foreign interference in July protests and regime change

This dataset has 2.13K posts tagged. The narrative reframes the July protests and subsequent political transition in Bangladesh as the outcome of covert operations by external powers rather than domestic grievances. Across Facebook, X and TikTok, posts repeatedly attribute events to US “regime change” tactics, Indian or Pakistani intelligence agencies, and broader Western conspiracies, often linking Bangladesh to protests in Nepal, and Sri Lanka. It has also been observed, a large chunk of this content originated from X connected to accounts based in India.

This framing erodes trust in genuine civic mobilisation by casting student protesters, opposition groups and independent voices as foreign puppets, while simultaneously fuelling xenophobic and anti-neighbour hostility. In doing so, it contributes to digital harm by normalising conspiracy theories and disinformation, provides rhetorical cover for repression “against foreign agents”, and deepens online and offline polarization between communities who see the transition as a popular demand for change and those convinced it is an externally engineered plot.

15 September

**US DEEP STATE REGIME CHANGE PATTERN IN SOUTH ASIA**

Over the past few years, several South Asian nations have experienced significant political upheavals, leading to the ousting of their leaders.

The external influences from the US Deep State have contributed to these developments:

- Pakistan:** In April 2022, Pakistan's Prime Minister Imran Khan was removed from office following a no-confidence vote. Khan has said the Deep State orchestrated his ouster with the help of the army because the US was angry with his independent foreign policy, including the improvement of ties with Russia, Iran and China.
- Bangladesh:** US interfered in Bangladesh for regime change, leading the country to chaos, leading to ouster of PM Sheikh Hasina and handing the power to US puppet Muhammad Yunus.
- Myanmar:** The CIA is reportedly working on a covert project for a new Christian-majority country, carved from Myanmar. Prior to her undemocratic ouster, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina warned of a plot to establish 'a Christian state like East Timor' in the region.
- Nepal:** The sudden ban of 26 social media platforms in Nepal acted as a catalyst for youth protests. The scale, speed, and narrative management of these demonstrations strongly suggest external orchestration, potentially involving the US Deep State.
- India:** During last year's farmers protests, a suspicious meeting between US Consul General Jennifer Larson and the Indian opposition have taken place, sparking speculation of the possible "no-confidence motion" against the Modi govt.
- US' traces** has been found in the 2019 anti-CAA protests, 2020 Delhi Riots, the farmers' protests and even last year's general elections in India.

Geopolitics Prime

15 September

3 others.

The compromised co-opted Civil society members of Bangladesh acted as intermediaries of restoration of old establishment rather than transformation by -

- 1) channeling revolutionary demands of July into reformist ideas/cosmetic reforms ( see July proclamation and July charter draft)
- 2) pushing for " order" rather than deep transformation thanks to their fear of instability.
- 3) producing narratives for preservation of status-quo.
- 4) framing the demands in such a way that excludes radical voices.
5. Negotiating with ruling elite establishment, compromising with them and legitimizing preservation of old structures of power in the name of constitutional continuity or stability.

Through all these processes Bangladeshi so called liberal civil society members have destroyed the revolutionary potential of July and acted as player for preservation of fascistic colonial mafia systems.

They turned July mass uprising into only a regime change.

HinduPost @hindupost

**One key reason for regime change ops failing to create anarchy in Bharat - the 'Internet Hindu'**

Ramchandra Guha described them as "a certain kind of Indian who gets up before dawn, has a glass of cow's milk, prays to the sun god, and begins scanning cyberspace for that day's secular heresies."

Well, not all Internet Hindus get up before dawn and not all are fueled by cow's milk alone...but this organic army of ideologically-committed individuals & the loose ecosystem they have built up, is what is keeping well-funded, meticulously organized domestic and foreign regime change ops at bay.

Take the Nepal regime change.

Indian polity - the established think tanks (many funded by govt), mainstream media, policy folks, academia - all failed miserably at predicting what was afoot, and still haven't identified the hidden hands behind it all.

But @OpIndia.com and digital activists like @vijaygajera have dug it out - Hami Nepal, the Magasaysay award winner connection, the white saviour lady who goes native to 'help' her adopted society...all the classic ingredients we have come to recognize.

MSM is still flapping on about 'Gen Z' protests, just like they still peddle Bangladesh regime change as 'student-led protest' and portray pogrom of Hindus by Islamists as 'anti-Awami League violence'.

While our mentally colonized establishment 'thinkers' limit themselves to dated Western frameworks & thus miss out (or deliberately ignore) on undercurrents & movements in our neighborhood .....the Internet Hindu (IH) remains ever wary.

Indian establishment thinkers and legacy media devote most of their energy to critiquing India & Hindus through a Western lens. They are globalists at heart who are deeply uneasy with Bharat's civilizational awakening.

IH may be rough at the edges, but they are good at their core job - research, unmasking hypocrisy and exposing hidden agendas. They have learnt to fight and win in the jungle of Indian public discourse - braving legal cases, establishment witch-hunts and the ever-present danger of STSJ mobs.

The rise of IH as a force to be reckoned with can be traced back to Radia Gate of 2009-10

Since then, the IH have honed their analytical skills to smell hypocrisy from afar and have developed long memories. Their analytical ability & responsiveness is second to none.

Like a 'swarm of bees' (Sagarika's coinage), they have self-organized themselves into different roles. Starting off by monitoring politics & media, they and have now advanced to spheres of policy, geopolitics and even academia.


For eg., @DisinfoLab has done exceptional service in making Bharatiyas aware of how Deep States use a web of NGOs for deception and to wage information/cognitive warfare

Yes, some of our other neighbours are still a blind spot, but the IH don't have institutional backing and there is a limit to their bandwidth, given that most of their effort goes into constant fire-fighting to counter disinformation at home & cover the stream of human rights abuses occurring each day, but buried by MSM.

So thank the IH for standing guard, preventing our discourse from being manipulated by enemies & pushing Bharat into anarchy.

How can you help? Use every legal mean to save on taxes, and contribute those savings to the efforts of the Internet Hindus - that is the only way to grow this ecosystem. No Tata or Ambani is coming to our help...we have to wage & win this war on our own.

Satyamev Jayate.



10:38 PM · Sep 9, 2025 · 19.7K Views

22 297 681 113

Post claiming the recent protests across South Asia was due to the US deep state (Top Left). Post claiming the civil society is compromised and pushing their own colonial agenda (Top Right). Post that praises "Internet Hindus" as a self-organized online community that counters foreign-backed regime change operations in India by exposing hidden networks, such as Hami Nepal's links to Magasaysay awardees and Western NGOs, along with the regime change in Bangladesh unlike mainstream media's superficial coverage. The post implies that the protests in Bangladesh and Nepal was due to foreign influences. (Bottom).

## Constructive Narratives

### Posts calling for de-escalation of violent rhetoric and peace

The second-largest volume of posts (approximately 7.7K) published between August and October 2025 across Facebook, TikTok, X, and online media generates roughly 123 million likes, and 5.98 M shares. These posts call for greater unity and calm amid the backdrop of uncertainty and ongoing tension between electoral and political processes.

This suggests that as the transition unfolds, more actors feel the need to explicitly call for calm, unity, and lawful responses to harm. The dominant pattern is clear: influential voices from across the political spectrum are actively pushing back against polarization and communal division, framing their vision in terms of shared responsibility rather than revenge. This represents a significant shift in Bangladesh's political environment. If this is a legitimate change or a strategic effort to position different political parties more favorably with the people and youth remains an intriguing question to

observe after elections. We can also note various actors' concerns about the fragility of democracy in Bangladesh due to external influences and propaganda from the ousted party.



Post showcasing the unity of political parties representing Bangladesh at the UN (left) English translation summary: “Religious tolerance is an integral part of the culture of Bangladesh. Since ancient times, Bangladeshis have never lost generosity, mutual goodwill and respect for other religions. Here, people of all religions have been living in the bond of harmony and brotherhood for ages. Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP is firmly committed to keeping that bond unbroken. On this auspicious day of Janmashtami, I extend my warmest greetings to all members of the Hindu community.” (right)

### Posts claiming the spread of mis- and disinformation by others

This dataset contains 3.23K posts between August and October 2025 across all platforms: Together, the social posts generate around 19.5M likes, 909K shares.

This narrative doesn't focus on confirmed false content but rather examines how people discuss mis- and disinformation: cautioning others about rumors, providing corrections, making accusations of propaganda against opponents, and evaluating the influence of AI and media on information distortion. It suggests that much of the discussion centers around the widespread flow of false information and highlights the ongoing battle over controlling narratives.

**Dr Tasnim Jara** • 22 August • 95K

আমাকে ঘিরে ধারণাবাহিতবার অনেক মিথ্যা ছড়ানো হচ্ছে। আমি এসব নিয়ে মাথা ঘামাতে চাই না, শুধু কাজে মনোযোগ দিতে চাই। তবে সত্যটা তুলে না ধরলে মিথ্যা প্রতিষ্ঠিত হওয়ার সুযোগ পায়। তাই কয়েকটি বিষয় স্পষ্ট করা প্রয়োজন মনে করছি।

- ১। আমি নেপালে গিয়েছিলাম নেপাল সরকারের আমন্ত্রণে নিরাপদ বাতাস (clean air) নিয়ে কথা বলতে। আমাদের স্বাস্থ্যের ওপর দুর্ভিত বাতাস কীভাবে প্রভাব ফেলছে, সেটা ছিলো আমার বক্তব্যের বিষয়। এ প্রোগ্রামে যাওয়ার জন্য নেপালের একাধিক আমার সাথে যোগাযোগ করেন প্রায় দুই মাস আগে (২ জুলাই)। ছবি কয়েকটি দিছি।
- নেপালে আমার সঙ্গে আমেরিকার কোনো অফিসিয়ালের কোনো ধরনের যোগাযোগ হয়নি, মিথিং তো দুব্বের কথা। অথচ তারদের একটি পোর্টাল থেকে গুজব ছড়ানো হয় যে আমি নেপালে গিয়ে এক আমেরিকান অফিসিয়ালের সাথে রেকর্ড মিটিং করেছি এবং দাবি করা হয় যে বাংলাদেশের গোয়েন্দা সংস্থা তাদেরকে এই তথ্য দিয়েছে। এই সংবাদ সম্পূর্ণ মিথ্যা ও কাল্পনিক।
- ২। এই মাসেই আমাকে নিয়ে মিথ্যা সংবাদ ছড়ানো হয়েছিল যে আমি আমেরিকার সাবেক রাষ্ট্রদূত পিটার হাঙ্গের সঙ্গে বৈঠক করছি কলকাতায়। পরবর্তীতে যে মিডিয়া এটি প্রচার করেছিল তারাই স্বীকার করে নেয় যে এটি মিথ্যা ছিল এবং তারা দুঃখ প্রকাশ করে জানায়, গোয়েন্দাদের দেওয়া তথ্যে ভরসা করেই তারা এই মিথ্যা সংবাদটি ছড়িয়েছিল।
- ৩। ১১ আগস্ট আমাদের পার্টির একটি বৈঠক হয় মার্কিন রাষ্ট্রদূতের সঙ্গে। সেই বৈঠকে আমাদের পার্টির আহবায়ক, সমস্যা সচিব, আমি ও একজন যুগ্ম সদস্য সচিব যোগদান করি। এটি কোনো গোপন বৈঠক ছিল না। আমরাই প্রেস রিলিজের মাধ্যমে সংবাদটি প্রকাশ করি। জুলাই ও আগস্টে মার্কিন রাষ্ট্রদূত বিএনপি ও জামায়াতের সঙ্গেও একই ধরনের বৈঠক করেছেন। অর্থাৎ এটি ছিল রাজনৈতিক দলগুলোর সাথে নিয়মিত কূটনৈতিক কার্যক্রমের অংশ।
- কিন্তু আমাদের বৈঠকের সময় একটি সংবাদমাধ্যম গোয়েন্দাদের দেওয়া একটি ছবি প্রকাশ করে, যেটি আমার পেছন থেকে তোলা, দেখে মনে হবে আমি নাকি গোপন কিছু করত আছি। অথচ বিএনপি বা জামায়াতের বৈঠকের ক্ষেত্রে তারা এমন কিছু করেনি। প্রায় হচ্ছে আমাদের গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার কাজ কি দেশের নিরাপত্তা নিশ্চিত করা, নাকি মিডিয়ার ছড়ানো প্রচারের ভূমিকা পালন করা ও উদ্দেশ্যমূলকভাবে কুৎসা ছড়ানো?
- ৪। এই আগস্ট মাসে অন্তত তিনবার একই ধরনের মিথ্যা প্রচার করা হয়েছে। তিনটা ক্ষেত্রেই গোয়েন্দা সংস্থা উৎস হিসাবে এসেছে। আর এসব নিউজ ছড়ানোর ক্ষেত্রে প্রধান ভূমিকা রাখছেন আওয়ামী স্বার্থ সংরক্ষিত মিডিয়া। তাদের উদ্দেশ্য স্পষ্ট। এই মিথ্যা ঘরঘর বলে ত্রা সত্য পরিষ্কার করার চেষ্টা। রাজনীতিতে পক্ষেপন বাস্তবতার মতোই গুরুত্বপূর্ণ। তাই মিথ্যা নিয়ে আমাকে 'বিএনপি শক্তির একেই' হিসেবে উপস্থাপন করার চেষ্টা চলছে। এটি স্ক্রল কিছু নয়। রাজনীতিতে বিশ্বাসযোগ্য কোনো কণ্ঠের উঠে এলে তাকে বিদেশি বক্তব্যের সঙ্গে জড়িয়ে দুর্বল করার চেষ্টা করা হয়।
- এসব মিথ্যা আমাকে দমনানো যাবে না। আমি আমার কাজে তথা নতুন বাংলাদেশ বিনির্মাণে সচেষ্ট থাকবো। আশা করছি, আপনারাও আমার সাথে থাকবেন। শেষ পর্যন্ত সত্য টিকে থাকবে, মিথ্যা গুঁসে হবে। এটা সুনিশ্চিত।

10.2K comments 1.8K shares

**Bangladesh Army** • 28 September • 39K

সংবাদ বিজ্ঞপ্তি

খাগড়াছড়ি ও গুইমারায় ২৭ ও ২৮ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে সাম্প্রদায়িক সহিংসতা সম্পর্কে সেনাবাহিনীর বিবৃতি

ঢাকা, ২৮ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ (রবিবার): গত ২০২৪ সালের ১৯ সেপ্টেম্বর খাগড়াছড়িতে মোটরসাইকেল চালক মামুন হত্যাকাণ্ডে কেন্দ্র করে ইউনিটেড সিপলস ডেমোক্রেটিক ফ্রন্ট ইউপিডিএফ মূল এবং অসংগঠন সমূহ দায়িত্বশীলতা ও রাজনীতিতে সাম্প্রদায়িক অস্থিতিশীলতা সৃষ্টির চেষ্টা করে এবং নিরাপত্তা বাহিনীর সাথে সংঘর্ষে লিপ্ত হয়। ফলস্রুতিতে তিন জন নিহত সহ বেশ কিছু এলাকাবাসী আহত হয়। গত বছরের ১৯ সেপ্টেম্বর এর ঘটনার এক বছর পূর্তি হিসাবে এই বছর ইউপিডিএফ এবং এর সহযোগী সংগঠনসমূহ পর্বতা চট্টগ্রামের বিভিন্ন স্থানে প্রতিবাদ মিছিল এর আয়োজন করে এবং অনুরূপ ঘটনার পুনরাবৃত্তি ঘটানোর চেষ্টা করে।

গত ২৩ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে রাতে খাগড়াছড়ির সিনিয়ালো এলাকায় এক স্কুলছাত্রীর ধর্ষণের অভিযোগকে আমলে নিয়ে ইউপিডিএফ (মূল) এর দাবিকৃত সম্মেলনস্থল শয়ন শীলকে সেনাবাহিনীর সহযোগিতায় গত ২৪ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে গ্রেপ্তার করা হয় এবং পুলিশ হেফাজতে রিমান্ডে নেয়া হয়। ঘটনার সত্যতা বিচারে আইনি প্রক্রিয়া বর্তমানে চলমান রয়েছে। শয়ন শীলকে গ্রেফতার করা সত্ত্বেও ইউপিডিএফ এর অসংগঠন পিসিপি এর নেতা উথালু মামুন 'চুম্ব ছাত্র জনতা' বানারে গত ২৪ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে খাগড়াছড়িতে বিক্ষোভ মিছিল এবং প্রতিবাদী মানববন্ধনের ডাক দেয়। এর ধারাবাহিকতায় গত ২৫ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে ইউপিডিএফ এর আন্ডলে খাগড়াছড়িতে অর্ধবেলা হরতাল পালিত হয়। একই সময় দেশে বিদেশে অবস্থানরত ব্রগার এবং পর্বতা অফলের কিছু দায়িত্বশীল ব্যক্তিবর্গ কর্তৃক অনলাইনে বাঙালিদের উদ্দেশ্য করে বিভিন্ন বকম অপপ্রচার ও উজ্জ্বলমূলক বক্তব্য দেয়া হয়।

গত ২৬ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে ইউপিডিএফ এর কর্মী উথালু মামুন নেতৃত্বে এবং সামাজিক মাধ্যমে দেশী ও প্রবাসী ব্রগারসহ পর্বতা জেলার কিছু দায়িত্বশীল ব্যক্তিবর্গ উজ্জ্বলমূলক প্রচারণার প্রভাবে সমগ্র খাগড়াছড়িতে উত্তেজনা ছড়িয়ে পড়ে। অবরোধে চলাকালে এক পর্যায়ে ইউপিডিএফ এর প্রবোচনায় উপস্থল এলাকাবাসী উত্তরত সেনানিলের উপর ইট পাটকল নিক্ষেপ করে। ফলস্রুতিতে তিনজন সেনা সদস্য আহত হয়। সার্বিক পরিস্থিতি এবং উসকানির বিষয়টি বিবেচনায় নিয়ে সেনাবাহিনী অত্যন্ত ধৈর্য, সংযম ও মানবিকতার সঙ্গে পরিস্থিতি মোকাবেলা করে এবং বল প্রয়োগ থেকে বিরত থাকে।

গত ২৭ সেপ্টেম্বর ২০২৫ তারিখে ইউপিডিএফ এবং অসংগঠন কর্মীরা আবারো দাঙ্গা-হাঙ্গামা সৃষ্টির চেষ্টা চালায় এবং বিভিন্ন স্থানে বাঙালি সহ সাধারণ মানুষের উপর গুলি, ভাঙাচুরা, অ্যাচুলেপে আক্রমণ এবং রাঙ্গা অবরোধসহ মানবত্ব করে সমগ্র খাগড়াছড়ি পৌসভতা এলাকার আইন শৃংখলা পরিস্থিতির চরম অবনতি ঘটায়। উক্ত দিন দুপুর নাগাদ সামাজিক বিষয়টি পাহাড়ি-বাঙালির একটি সাম্প্রদায়িক দাঙ্গার রূপ নেয়। অবশ্য বিচারে জেলা প্রশাসন কর্তৃপক্ষ কর্তৃক খাগড়াছড়ি ও গুইমারা এলাকায় ১৪৪ ধারা জারি করা হয়। এমতাবস্থায়, সেনাবাহিনী, বিজিবি এবং আইন শৃংখলা রক্ষাকারী বাহিনী চরম ঠেংয়ের সাথে সারা রাত অক্রান্ত পরিশ্রম করে পরিস্থিতি নিয়ন্ত্রণে নিয়ে আসে এবং একটি অবশ্যায়ী সাম্প্রদায়িক দাঙ্গা প্রতিহত করা সম্ভবপর হয়।

English translation summary: "There are a lot of lies being spread around me continuously. I don't want to worry about these things, I just want to focus on the work. However, if the truth is not brought out, lies get a chance to be established. So I think it is necessary to clarify a few things." (left) A very detailed press release on 28 September 2025 from the official Bangladesh Army page 39K reactions, 7K comments, 4.5K shares) describes recent communal tensions in Khagrachhari and Guimara and explicitly links them to propaganda and incitement. (right)

**২১শে আগস্ট এর গ্রেনেড হামলা নিয়ে তারেক জিয়ার বিভিন্ন মিথ্যাচারের জবাব**

২১শে আগস্ট গ্রেনেড হামলা নিয়ে বিএনপি ও তারেক জিয়ার মিথ্যাচারের জবাব | 21... 38K · 3.9K comments · 638K views

21 August

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English Translation: "Response to BNP and Tarique Zia's lies about the 21st August grenade attack | 21 August Grenade Attack | Bangladesh"

## CONCLUSION

This baseline analysis demonstrates that social media has become a central arena in which Bangladesh's political transition and the lead-up to the 2026 national elections are being actively contested. Across Facebook, TikTok, and X, online discourse reflects both deep political polarization and significant public engagement with questions of legitimacy, justice, accountability, and national identity. While electoral issues and debates around the July Charter dominate the volume of conversation, a substantial proportion of content intersects with more acute forms of digital harm, including mis- and disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence.

The findings show that harmful narratives are not confined to fringe actors. Political parties, influential commentators, and media-adjacent accounts play an outsized role in producing and amplifying narratives that delegitimise institutions, reframe domestic political developments as foreign conspiracies, and normalise dehumanising language toward political or communal "others." It has been observed that the dominant narrative comes from political elites, where it becomes important to also look at comments to help identify voices of the general population. Based on the local laws around defamation and digital security, particularly the [Cyber Security Act \(CSA\)](#), where opposition voices and dissent are targeted, it can be inferred that there still remains self-censorship and societal trauma of the general public fully speaking out and disclosing opinions online.

The narratives observed between August-October 2025, interact with emotionally charged interpretations of real-world events, blurring the line between critique and disinformation and weakening trust in democratic processes, independent media, and accountability mechanisms. At the same time, the analysis also identifies a significant presence of constructive narratives. Calls for de-escalation, religious tolerance, peaceful political engagement, and public awareness of mis- and disinformation suggest that digital spaces are not only sites of harm, but also potential entry points for resilience, dialogue, and harm reduction. The coexistence of these dynamics highlights a volatile and contested information environment in which the direction of online discourse remains open to influence.

Taken together, this baseline underscores that the risks to civic integrity in Bangladesh's electoral context are not solely technical or platform-specific. They are deeply political and narrative-driven, rooted in historical grievances, power struggles, and unresolved questions about state legitimacy. Understanding how these narratives circulate online is therefore essential for anticipating points of escalation, designing effective interventions, and supporting a more informed, inclusive, and peaceful democratic process as the elections and the July referendum approach.

## Preliminary Recommendations

In light of the findings from this baseline analysis, a set of coordinated policy and programmatic actions is needed to mitigate digital harms and strengthen civic integrity ahead of the 2026 national elections. The following steps outline priority interventions that can be pursued in the short to medium term.

## **1. Establish a Coalition of Civil Society and Media Actors for Coordinated Monitoring**

A formal or semi-formal coalition of civil society organizations, independent media outlets, and fact-checking initiatives should be supported to enable coordinated monitoring of election-related digital narratives. By pooling expertise, data, and contextual knowledge, such a coalition can improve early detection of mis- and disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, while avoiding fragmented or duplicative efforts. Joint analysis and shared alert mechanisms can also strengthen public reporting and provide credible, evidence-based inputs to regulators, platforms, and the public.

## **2. Strengthen Regulatory Frameworks Through CSO Consultation and Platform Engagement**

The Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (BTRC) and other regulators should adopt clearer, more consistent regulatory strategies for tackling digital harms. These strategies must be developed through meaningful consultation with civil society and independent experts, and should enforce accountability on social media companies. Engaging CSOs in the design and review of regulatory measures can help ensure that responses to mis- and disinformation, hate speech, and incitement are context-sensitive, proportionate, and aligned with international human rights standards. In parallel, regulators should actively engage social media platforms to set clearer expectations around content moderation, transparency, and responsiveness during the electoral period, with the aim of reducing the spread and amplification of harmful content while safeguarding legitimate political expression.

## **3. Invest in Capacity Building for Civil Society and Public Education**

Targeted capacity building is needed to equip civil society organizations with the skills and tools to monitor digital harms, analyze online narratives, and respond effectively. This includes training on social media listening, data analysis, documentation of online harm, and responsible public communication. In parallel, broader public education initiatives should promote digital literacy, responsible online engagement, and respectful political discourse. Improving understanding of social media etiquette, verification practices, and the real-world consequences of harmful online behavior can help reduce the amplification of polarizing and violent narratives.

