

Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

November 2025

BUILD UP 

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We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to mahmoud@howtobuildup.org

Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during the month of November. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, and actor affiliations (e.g., SAF, RSF, or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the [Phoenix](#) social media listening platform and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

Main Results

Volume and Engagement

- In November, hate-speech posts on Facebook represented around 6.6% of all content. Compared with October, when hate-speech content made up 4.91% of posts across platforms, this reflects an increase of about 30%, while peace or solidarity messages decreased roughly by 48% compared to the previous month. November, after what happened in Fasher, atrocities and massacres and recapture al fasher and rsf capture, militarisation movement all across the country, the lack of resources to produce content for peace narratives in the past month.
- **Engagement trends :**
In November, hate-speech posts on Facebook received 2.06M likes and 429k comments, up by 14% compared with the 1.8M likes and 373k comments recorded in October 2025. Posts containing explicit calls for violence received 204k likes and 34.6k comments on Facebook in November, down by about 66% and 92% compared with the 600k likes and 447k comments on such posts in October.

Spikes in Online Activity

- On 11 November, the circulation of videos showing Sudanese **Islamist figures in Doha calling for armed mobilization** triggered a sharp spike in online reactions. Civilians and pro-peace activists denounced the rhetoric, accusing Islamists of blocking peace efforts and fueling further violence.
- On 17 November, **journalist Azmi Abdelrazek exposed that PM Kamel Idriss was absent during and after the atrocities in Al-Fasher**. This triggered an online spat between the Prime

Minister's office in Port Sudan and Azmi, further driving engagement and amplifying polarization.

- On 18 November, reports of **Abu Aqila Kikel's injury in Kordofan** battles surfaced amid conflicting information, fueling misinformation, debates, and a surge in related posts across social media platforms.
- On 19 November, **comments by US president Donald Trump on Sudan**, following the Saudi Crown Prince's visit to the United States, triggered one of the few moments of broad consensus online. Across different political and ideological camps, Sudanese users largely welcomed the statements.
- On 24 November, **Hemedti's unilateral declaration of a "humanitarian truce"** produced another wave of online discussion. While civilians welcomed the move and called on the army commander to take a similar step, accounts affiliated with SAF questioned the seriousness of the move and renewed accusations that civilians are merely a political cover for the RSF.

Overview of Narratives

Online conversations in November 2025 clustered around three overlapping narratives: shifting reactions to external actors and Quartet diplomacy (from "Thank you MBS" euphoria to open hostility toward the US envoy), polarized responses to the RSF's unilateral truce and wider mediation efforts, and escalating attacks on civilian political forces and displaced communities, driven by hate speech and regional polarization.

1. **MBS/Trump Moment & Political Victory Narrative:** Pro-army accounts framed the Mohammed bin Salman/Trump episode as a political victory, driving a "Thank you MBS" wave and prematurely declaring the Quartet process effectively dead.
2. **Al-Burhan Accuses US Envoy:** When US officials confirmed the Quartet would continue its work, the same pro-army networks abruptly shifted to attacking the US envoy and adviser Masad Boulos, amplifying Al-Burhan's hostile stance.
3. **Attacks on Civilian Leaders:** Pro-army backlash to Khalid Omer's speech in the Canadian Parliament portrayed civilian leaders as aligned with foreign agendas rather than "national interests." Yasser Al-Atta's speech—attacking civilian forces and openly threatening a coup even if they were elected—reinforced this narrative. This was celebrated by pro-army accounts as a safeguard against "civilian betrayal" and cited by pro-democracy voices as stark evidence of the military's anti-democratic posture.
4. **RSF Truce and Narrative Split:** The RSF's unilateral truce announcement deepened a narrative split: pro-peace and civilian accounts broadly welcomed it, encouraging the SAF to accept it, while SAF-affiliated accounts dismissed it as a propaganda ploy and framed international pressure as unfairly targeting the army.
5. **Polarization on Mediation:** These debates reinforced a divide between those invoking international mediation and the Quartet to advance a political process and hardline voices portraying such efforts as dangerous concessions that undermine the prospect of a "decisive victory."
6. **Hate Speech and Regional Polarization:** The River and Sea separatist group-affiliated accounts escalated exclusionary rhetoric against displaced people from El-Fasher in

Al-Dabba. intensifying dehumanization and deepening regional polarization toward conflict-affected communities.



القائد العام للقوات المسلحة السودانية البرهان
الرباعيّة إذا كان الإمارات جزء منها غير مرحب بها
لان ثبت للعالم دعمها للمليشيا المتمردة



ما أعلنه قائد مليشيا الدعم السريع المتمردة بشأن هدنة إنسانية لا يتجاوز كونه مناورة سياسية مكشوفة تتناقض بشكل صارخ مع الواقع المرير الذي ارتكبهت قواته على الأرض. فهذه المليشيا التي تجردت من كل قيمة إنسانية حاصرت المدنيين العزل، وجوعتهم، وقطعتهم بالطائرات المسيّرة في مدن عدة، وعثقت بعضهم على الأشجار، ودفنت آخرين أحياء، وآخر تلك الجرائم المروعة ارتكبت في مدينتي الفاشر ونيارا، لذا لا يمكن أخذ حديث قائدها عن "هدنة لاعتبارات إنسانية" على محمل الجد أو الصدق.

إن التصريح الذي أدلى به بالأمس ليس سوى محاولة جديدة لخداع المجتمع الدولي وتلميع صورة شوتهما الحقائق الدامعة بجرائم قواته وإنهاكها المستمرة. وعلى العالم ألا يسمح لنفسه بأن يستدرج إلى هذا الخطاب المضلل: فقد أثبتت التجارب السابقة - وفي مقدمتها هدن اتفاق جدة - أن الجيش السوداني التزم بما وُقع عليه، بينما استغلت المليشيا تلك الهدن لتعمير إمدادات مرتزقتها من السلاح والعتاد وتحقيق مكاسب عسكرية على حساب المدنيين.

لقد رأى العالم أجمع حجم المعدات العسكرية والذخائر التي أدخلتها المليشيا خلال فترات الهدن إلى المدن المكتظة بالسكان، وفي مقدمتها العاصمة الخرطوم، قبل أن تفر منها، والحقيقة الواضحة أن من يمارس القتل والحصار والاغتصاب لا يصنع سلاماً، ولا يؤمن بأي قيمة إنسانية. ومن ينقض العهود لا يمكن الوثوق بوعوده.

وعلى المجتمع الدولي أن يدرك طبيعة هذه المناورة المفضوحة، وأن يقدم معاناة الشعب السوداني على أي اعتبارات سياسية أو دعائية، وأن يضغط على المليشيا لتنفيذ خارطة الطريق الموعودة لدى الأمم المتحدة التي قدمها رئيس مجلس السيادة الانتقالي، بوصفها السبيل الأجدى لطي صفحة المعاناة واجتثاث مسببات الحرب من جذورها بهدف دامة، ووفق أسس موضوعية تستجيب لتطلعات الشعب السوداني وكل الشعوب التواقة للسلام.

خالد الإيميس
وزير الثقافة والإعلام والسياحة

الكيزان الطرايطير الهانين نغسهم ديل واقفين صف عشان يضافحوا مناوي .
تخيل اقيف في الشمس عشان مناوي يضافحي و أبتسم ليه ابتسامة الكيزان الخرقاء
واللي هي ابتسامة واحد كأنما ضرب في المسجد و الناس عرفوه ، ابتسامة بتاعت
احراج و كسوف و هبالة .
مناوي ده لو ما البلد دي فوضى هسج كان يكون عنده سبتين قدام أستاذ الدبة واحد
فيه تسالي و الثاني فيه ترمس و في النص بيناتهم كرتونة مكتوب فيها يوجد تهويل
رسيد.
كيزان عواليقي .
#وهكذا

ترمب: سأوقف الهجرة بشكل دائم من كل دول العالم الثالث للسماح للنظام الأمريكي
بالتعافي بشكل كامل.
أزحري العرض : نحن حنطع ليكم أرقام وطنية في الشمالية عشان ما ترمقوا منها
تاني و ما يقولوا أنتو من حنة تانية .
#وهكذا



Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month's online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- **Mediation efforts face intense opposition:** Individuals supporting the Quartet, the US envoy, or civilian figures like Khalid Omar are often labeled "traitors." Public support for negotiations results in severe online backlash, smear campaigns, and safety concerns.
- **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are vulnerable:** Families fleeing El-Fasher to Al-Dabba are being characterized by separatist factions as a burden or a threat. This rhetoric increases their hardship and complicates their access to protection and community acceptance.
- **Peace advocates face a hostile online environment:** proponents of a ceasefire, the Quartet, the RSF's truce offer, or SAF participation—identifiable activists and citizens—suffer intense public attacks. They require robust support from allies to amplify their messages and mitigate harassment.

Harmful and Divisive Narratives

Patterns

- **Politically driven delegitimization:** Harmful content targeting civilian leaders, pro-democracy coalitions, and international mediators (especially the Quartet and US envoy), labelling them with different accusations, while amplifying Yasser Al-Atta's coup threat as a "necessary" safeguard against civilian rule.
- **Regional and identity-based hate:** Exclusionary and dehumanizing rhetoric directed at displaced people from El-Fasher in Al-Dabba, especially from River and Sea separatist group-affiliated accounts, portraying them as a burden or security threat.
- **Militarization and calls for violence:** Explicit and implicit incitement embedded in pro-army and hardline content, justifying continued fighting, presenting escalation as the only acceptable path, and normalizing violence as a solution to political disagreement.
- **Event-driven surges in harmful content:** Spikes in hate speech and incitement clustered around key moments such as the MBS/Trump episode, US confirmation of the Quartet's role, the RSF's unilateral truce announcement, and Al-Atta's speech, with each incident triggering short, intense waves of hostile narratives.

Targets

- **Civilian leaders and pro-democracy coalitions:** Framed as "foreign/UAE agents" or RSF partners, with Al-Atta's coup threat used to justify excluding them from any future settlement.
- **Displaced people from El-Fasher in Al-Dabba:** Targeted with regional, exclusionary hate speech that portrays them as a demographic and security threat rather than war-affected civilians.
- **International mediators, especially US actors:** The US envoy, Masad Boulos, and the Quartet framework are depicted as hostile to Sudan and obstructing a "decisive" military victory, alongside Sudanese voices backing ceasefire

Actors

- Harmful content in November was driven mainly by pro-army hardline networks and the River and Sea separatist group, with Islamist/NCP-aligned figures embedded in the same ecosystem amplifying attacks on civilian leaders, the Quartet, and international mediators. These actors produced most of the hate speech, coup-justifying narratives, and regional incitement against displaced communities.

Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In November, 539 Facebook posts explicitly promoted peace, solidarity, or mediation, generating around 341,000 likes and 105,000 comments. These posts called for an immediate end to the war, expressed support for the Quartet's role in facilitating a political process, and welcomed Donald Trump's remarks on Sudan as potential leverage to stop the fighting. Many of these voices also

attacked the NCP and Islamist networks as key actors responsible for prolonging the conflict and blocking any credible path toward peace.

Within this peace and solidarity camp, users broadly welcomed the RSF's unilateral truce announcement and publicly urged SAF leadership to accept a ceasefire and engage in negotiations. The same accounts defended Khalid Omer and other civilian leaders against smear campaigns, framing them as necessary partners in any political settlement rather than as foreign proxies. Together, these posts combined demands to halt the war with support for international mediation, rejection of Islamist influence, and solidarity with civilians and displaced communities affected by the violence.

