# Sudan Monthly Social Media Report

October 2025



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We welcome collaboration with researchers, practitioners, and organizations working to understand and address digital conflict dynamics in Sudan. The Phoenix dashboard and underlying data can be made available to partners upon request. For access or further inquiries, please reach out to mahmoud@howtobuildup.org

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## Introduction & Methodology Note

This report provides an overview of conflict-related social media content in Sudan during the month of October. It focuses on narratives of hate speech, incitement to violence, and expressions of solidarity across different geographies. It highlights how these narratives evolve online and reflect the country's broader conflict dynamics.

The analysis draws on content from Facebook, X, and TikTok. The data collection combines account-based and keyword-based tracking, focusing on public posts that engage with conflict-related discourse. Content is classified to identify hate speech, incitement to violence, solidarity expressions, actor affiliations (e.g., SAF, RSF, or unaffiliated), as well as references to specific regions and communities.

All analysis follows a do-no-harm approach and includes only public content. The report is written and disseminated by Build Up, based on participatory analysis work with a group of Sudanese researchers. All data is collected and processed using the <a href="Phoenix">Phoenix</a> social media listening platform, and can be made available for Sudanese and international researchers who are working towards peace in Sudan.

## Main Results

## Volume and Engagement

- The hate speech posts totaled 3,826 across all platforms, representing 4.91% of the overall posts in October 2025, while the calls for violence posts numbered 1,206, accounting for 1.55% of the total, and the peace or solidarity messages came to 1,032 posts, making up 1.32% of all posts.
- Engagement trends: Hate speech posts received 1.8M likes and 373K comments or replies combined across platforms, while calls for violence posts garnered 600K likes and 447K comments.

## Spikes in Online Activity

- On 27 October, the fall of El-Fasher and the circulation of viral execution videos led to a
  major spike in online activity. On X, content volume that day was around 15 times higher than
  the daily average.
- Other surges occurred following key political and media developments: the ICC conviction of Ali Kushayb on 6 October; the France 24 report on the army's alleged use of chlorine gas on 9 October; the Al-Burhan–El-Sisi meeting and Quartet statement on 15 October; and the start of indirect talks in Washington on 23 October.

## Key narratives

Online debates were shaped by competing narratives from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) around both the political process and developments on the ground. Much of the discussion focused on the **Quartet negotiations**, which drew mixed reactions ranging from cautious support to firm rejection by different actors. The most prominent narrative, however, revolved around the **massacres in El-Fasher**, which triggered widespread calls for solidarity from accounts in Sudan and abroad. SAF-affiliated voices used the moment to rally public backing and encourage recruitment, while RSF-aligned networks sought to downplay the events and shift blame.

#### 1- Negotiations & political process (Quartet influence; splits within pro-army camp

- Quartet framing vs. hardline rejection: Conflicting positions emerged between pro-civilian narratives welcoming US/Quartet involvement and its peace-led negotiations in Sudan and SAF-affiliated accounts dismissing any negotiation as capitulation.
- Internal divergence among pro-army accounts: Shift from denial to partial acknowledgement to conditional acceptance of a truce, creating visible fractures in messaging.
- Pro-army accounts are placing blame and accusing civilian coalitions of providing "political cover" to RSF.







X.com

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بدأت في واشنطن مفاوضات غير مباشرة، بين الجيش والدعم السريع، برعاية وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية ضمن مسار الرباعية.

العودة إلى التفاوض خطوة تستحق الإشادة، وتفتح باب الرجاء، لشعبنا المكتوي بنار الحرب، في أن يعلو نداء العقل على صوت البندقية.

نرجوها بدايةً جادّة لعملية وطنية شاملة تضع حداً للحرب والكارثة الانسانية، وتمهد الطريق للتوافق على أسس بناء وطن ٍ جديد - معافى من خطايا الماضي وخيباته - يسع الجميع بشروط الحياة الكريمة.

نُقدِّر جهود التيسير الخارجية ونرحب بها، غير أن الخلاص من الأزمة يبقى مسؤولية السودانيين أنفسهم، عبر رفضهم لدعوات استمرار الحرب لصالح خيار الحل السياسي السلمي.





#### 2- Al-Fasher

- On 26–27, RSF seized control of El-Fasher, the last major stronghold of the SAF in Darfur, after an 18-month siege. The takeover was followed by widespread reports of civilian massacres, executions, and mass graves, with humanitarian organizations warning of thousands killed or displaced and entire neighborhoods destroyed amid looting and retaliatory violence.
- Many Sudanese and foreign accounts expressed shock and called for accountability, condemning the RSF and its backers while promoting fundraising efforts and acts of solidarity across various Arab and international capitals. Others, however, echoed the polarized framings pushed by the warring parties. The incident became a rallying point for both pro-army and pro-RSF narratives, each seeking to claim moral legitimacy and public sympathy.
- SAF-aligned accounts contributed to mobilizing public anger and digital solidarity, with attempts to leverage the incident to strengthen their own positioning. Major Egyptian and Gulf-based accounts amplified these messages, linking the violence to UAE backing of the RSF, while also encouraging recruitment and calls to arm civilians across northern, eastern, and central Sudan — including appeals to Sudanese youth in Egypt to return and join the fight.
- RSF-affiliated and pro-UAE networks downplayed the scale of the violence and sought to redirect blame. They portrayed incidents as isolated or exaggerated, questioned the authenticity of images (sometimes labeling them as Al-generated), and spread conflicting explanations implicating military intelligence or Islamist factions. These efforts aimed to obscure accountability and maintain RSF's public image amid growing scrutiny following the fall of El-Fasher.







التعريف الصحيح للحرب دي هي حرب الجيش ضد حواضن وقبائل عربية دارفورية لا وجود لما يسمى بقوا...ت الد...عم السر...يع فيه كارثة إنسانية بتحصل في الفاشر من قوات الدعم السريع ضد المدنيين من مجازر الامرية في الامداد اللا نهائي من المقاتلين ومن قبائل معينة الوضع هناك بشع ومأساوي والتغطية هناك شبه منعدمة. الفياس ما تتخم بحرب الكيزان والكلام الفارغ الفارغ الشيع فكل الي بيدعمهم.



Examples of posts from accounts supporting SAF and their comments on the events in El Fasher






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Examples of posts from accounts supporting RSF and their comments on the events in El Fasher

## Implications for peacebuilders & mediators

This section highlights how this month's online dynamics affect the work of peacebuilders and mediators. The goal is to flag emerging risks and shifts that could influence ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

- Polarization around the Quartet and El-Fasher has intensified mistrust in mediation efforts.
   Peacebuilders should anticipate that each new diplomatic move will be reframed online through partisan narratives and prepare coordinated, factual communication to preserve credibility.
- Disinformation and Al-generated content are deepening divisions and eroding confidence in verified sources. Strengthening collaborations with fact-checking networks and training mediators to identify synthetic media can help reduce manipulation risks.
- Weak engagement channels with platforms mean harmful content and coordinated campaigns remain largely unaddressed. Peacebuilders and partners could pursue direct advocacy with platforms to ensure faster response mechanisms and better protection for civic actors.

## Harmful and Divisive Narratives

#### **Patterns**

- Militarization of civilian identity: Online framing of ordinary citizens and civic actors as extensions of military or political factions — especially portraying civilian alliances as RSF collaborators — fueled calls for arming communities and blurred the line between combatant and non-combatant.
- Disinformation and denial tactics: Coordinated campaigns from RSF, particularly around El-Fasher and Bara, sought to obscure responsibility by downplaying atrocities, falsely labeling content as Al-generated and shifting blame to other groups like the Islamists or military intelligence.
- Recruitment narratives: Calls to arm communities spread across northern, eastern, and central Sudan, amplified by messages urging Sudanese youth in Egypt to return and join the fight. These narratives framed participation in the war as a patriotic duty, normalizing mobilization outside formal military structures.
- **Existential threat framing:** Both SAF- and RSF-aligned accounts employed narratives portraying the other side as an existential danger. This deepened polarization, justified escalation, and made online audiences more susceptible to manipulation and recruitment.

## **Targets**

- **Northern, Eastern, and Central Sudan:** There is a concerted effort to incite violence by calling for the arming of communities in these regions.
- **Sudanese Youth in Egypt:** Egyptian accounts are encouraging Sudanese youth residing in Egypt to return to Sudan and join the ongoing conflict.
- El Fasher and Bara: Pro-UAE and RSF accounts are disseminating false narratives to deny or downplay atrocities committed in these areas, often blaming military intelligence or Islamists, and in some cases, justifying the violence by falsely claiming that no civilians were present or that the targets were exclusively Islamist, which undermines solidarity and aid efforts.

### Actors

 The harmful content appears primarily through accounts affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces, in addition to Emirati or pro-UAE accounts. Other harmful narratives are promoted through accounts affiliated with the armed forces, as well as Egyptian and Gulf accounts that joined the conversation in the last week of October.

# Solidarity and Peace Narratives

In October 2025, 1,032 posts about peace or solidarity were recorded across X, Facebook, and TikTok, generating 689,000 likes and 284,000 comments. On average, each post received around 668 likes and 276 comments, suggesting that while peace content attracted fewer reactions overall, it sparked more conversation and engagement than other categories. This shows a continued resonance of peace-related messages, even within a highly polarized environment.

Civilian voices continued to advocate for an end to the war, emphasizing the humanitarian crisis and ongoing human rights abuses. After the RSF's capture of El-Fasher, these voices led widespread campaigns condemning the RSF and expressing solidarity with affected communities.

Many of these same networks promoted international mediation efforts—especially those of the Quartet—sharing updates on negotiations and calling for genuine engagement. However, pro-army circles reacted aggressively, framing such campaigns as naïve or disloyal, further exposing how even peace-oriented messages are pulled into the polarized information environment.

