

Sudan's Digital Battleground

How social media narratives lead to real-world violence

BUILD UP 

About this report

This report analyzes how social media have shaped Sudan's ongoing conflict. It draws on data collected between February 2024 and February 2025 across major platforms, and centers on two key events in Al Jazeera state: the massacre in Wad al-Nura (June 2024) and the targeting of Al-Kanabi communities in (January 2025), and the subsequent violence in South Sudan. The report is part of ongoing efforts to understand and respond to digital harms and address online conflict dynamics in Sudan.

Authors & Acknowledgments

This report was written by Hussam Abulfateh and Mahmoud Bastati. It was edited and developed with guidance from Helena Puig Larrauri.

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INTRODUCTION

The ongoing civil war in Sudan has evolved into a complex conflict fought in parallel on the battlefield and across social media platforms. This report examines the critical role of social media in shaping narratives, fueling animosity, and directly contributing to real-world violence. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), through accounts they control, use social media to craft systematic narratives aimed at normalizing and justifying crimes, criminalizing democratic civilian forces, and fueling social polarization. These narratives also militarize the public imagination and collectively stereotype and dehumanise communities.

The report focuses on two events, the massacre in Wad al-Noura and the targeting of Al-Kanabi communities, to explore the link between online discourse and real-world violence. We outline the divisive media tactics used in these two cases, in the hope that understanding them can help build critical awareness and envision policies that turn social media into a space for fostering sustainable peace in Sudan.

METHODOLOGY

The findings in this article draw on social media data collected between February 2024 and February 2025 . 3.97 million posts from X, based on context-specific keywords; 147,000 posts from Facebook, using a combination of account and keyword tracking; and 42,300 TikTok videos, sourced from a curated list of accounts.

We used feature-based classification to analyze the content. Classifications were guided by keywords related to the two main actor groups: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). We also identified hate speech and violence-inciting content by using a lexicon that combines existing lexicons for hate speech in Arabic with context-specific terms. Other classifications were applied to identify references to tribes and regions. In addition, we developed a classification model based on the affiliation of the content author, assessing whether users appeared to support or align with SAF or RSF.




Figure 1: Volume of posts by platform over time




Figure 2: Total volume of posts, and likes by platform

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Sudan's current conflict has its roots in historical divisions created or exacerbated by the British and Egyptian rulers. The legacy of colonial rule and political complexity created a country with about 600 tribes, including 19 main ethnic groups, and over 100 languages. The British and Egyptian rulers split the country into a "civilized Muslim North" and a "primitive non-Arab South," a hierarchy that was reinforced by the Inqaz regime, who seized power in 1989 and ruled Sudan for 30 years.

The December 2018 revolution ended with the overthrow of the Inqaz regime under Omar Al Bashir in April 2019. The "Forces of Freedom and Change," FFC, representing the revolution, reached an agreement with the Transitional Military Council. This council represented the regime's security committee and included personalities from the official Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF is a paramilitary ethnic militia

created by the Bashir regime in 2003 that committed war crimes in Darfur under the regime's cover. The RSF was later legalized in 2017, becoming a parallel army with significant economic and political influence. The FFC and the TMC signed a Constitutional Declaration and agreed on a transitional period of four years.

There was a sense of hope when a civilian-led government was formed under Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, but that hope was shattered by the October 2021 coup, led by generals from both the SAF and RSF, which overthrew the civilian government, effectively nullified the Constitutional Document, and reinstated figures from the former regime.

Soon after that, internal conflicts within the October 25th coup coalition began to grow, especially as they faced wide public rejection and mass protests demanding a return of the civilian government. Tensions between the SAF and the RSF continued to rise even after facilitated negotiations and the signing of the framework political agreement, ultimately leading to deadlock and mutual mobilization that ended in the outbreak of full-scale war between the two sides on April 15, 2023.

Despite this being a war between military generals, the current conflict cannot be viewed in isolation from Sudan's complex realities, the fragility of the state, the volatility of society, and the long-standing manipulation of social divisions by military regimes. The war builds on these unresolved tensions, which continue to shape the dynamics and direction of the conflict.

THE SOCIAL MEDIA BATTLEFIELD

Social media is central to the ongoing conflict, with both sides aggressively trying to control the narrative around the war. The RSF portrays itself as a democratic force fighting a state controlled by "northerners" and remnants of the former Islamist regime. They also have adopted a "center and periphery" discourse to claim that they are against the historical power imbalances and accuse northern/central Sudanese of dominating the country since independence in 1956—a system they refer to as "دولة ٥٦" (state of 56).

SAF named the war the "War of Dignity." This term was first used in marches called "مواكب الكرامة" "Marches of Dignity," which were backed by the dissolved National Congress Party (previous regime) in order to support the outcomes of the military coup in October 2021. The SAF narrative also redefines national identity, casting certain groups as non-Sudanese, claiming that RSF members were of West African origin, and casting them as outsiders. They also worked on positioning the civilian forces—the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) at the time—as a political backer of the RSF because they did not take their side in the war, spreading hashtags like *جنجويد_فحانة* which means the FFC is the Janjaweed/RSF, and hence claiming that the democratic civilian entities politically supported the RSF. They also promoted the concept of "social incubators," suggesting that entire communities or tribes sympathize with or support the RSF, and therefore violence against them is justified.

The impact of this narrative warfare – unfolding primarily on social media – is evident in the data we collected from February 2024 to February 2025, where we found 75,700 posts

containing hate speech across all three platforms monitored. On Facebook alone, we found 3,740 posts, or 2.73% of all posts in this period, contained hate speech; 1,550 posts (or 1.13% of all posts) incited violence in that period. Figure 3 shows that hate speech on social media is most closely linked to al-Jazeera (5.3%), then Darfur (4.98%) and Khartoum (3.8%), which are areas where the military conflict was most intense.

Online narratives manifest differently across platforms. Facebook is the SAF's strongest platform, dominated by nationalist and militaristic narratives backed by legacy media and army-aligned influencers. Around 58% of content is generated by pro-SAF accounts, with emotional content—like tributes to soldiers and commanders—going viral. Civilian forces have low visibility, and RSF content is largely absent (most likely taken down by Meta).

The RSF's digital stronghold is TikTok, where short battle clips and emotive speeches frame its fighters as heroic. Key speeches by Hemedti and the February 2025 Nairobi conference boosted RSF-linked content. TikTok's fast-paced, dramatic style aligns well with RSF's media strategy.




Figure 3: Hate speech by location



حذيفة الرفاعي Huzafa Al-Rifai @hu11537 · Mar 5
 حيا الله صانع الكباب العظيم 🙏
 من هذه اللحظة انتهاء مخطط دولة العطاوة
 وثبتت دوله 56 🙏
 حيا الله أبناء النهر والبحر حيا الله العرب 🙏

Rahim Mohi @Rahimmohi1959 · Mar 13, 2024
 Replying to @yousifizz
 ايها الخنزير الغادر إنها بداية غروب شمس مرتزقة الجنجويد في السودان الذي سوف تكون
 عاصمته مقبرة كبير لكل مرتزقة العطاوة ولا تظن أن مناداتك بالسلام لا تعكس شعورك
 بهزيمة مرتزقة الإمارات أما الكيزان فهم رجال صمدوا ضد غزوكم الخائن الجبان وجرعوكم
 الحنظل

الكنج @Jaafar_N2009 · Apr 27, 2023
 شاف في عيونه "الدولة الجديدة" و مشروع " #السودان الجديد".
 #جنجويد_قحانه



عبد الرحمن A.Rahman Amasib عمسيب
 2 Dec · 🌐
 البعض يروج لبعض القصص عن جنجويد طيبين .. الخ .
 لا وجود لجنجويدي جيد .
 الجنجويدي الجيد هو فقط الجنجويدي الميت .
 #بل_بس — feeling positive 🤔
 1.5K 359 comments · 12 shares
 Like Comment Share

Shadi Ali @shadi_ali_1
 Follow
 إسمها قوات الدعم السريع : ميليشيا الرزيقات والمسيرية
 وعموم العطاوة الذين تحالفوا مع الإمارات لضرب النظام
 السياسي الموجود في الخرطوم.
 العطاوة يحاسبوا على المشاريب زي ما الإمارات عبر مجلس
 الأمن تحاسب على مشاريب الحصل ليها دا.
 الأمر كذا ببساطة

Figure 4: Examples of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) narratives

ادلا محمد الدود
 1d · 🌐
 مساكين عيال مناوي البوايين لا في زول بنعيمهم
 ولا زول بتضامن معاهم 🙏🙏🙏
 🙏🙏🙏 ابويعبيدة احمد and 90 others 50 comments 1 share

الرز يقي Follow · 25m · 🌐
 بنات شندي خليكن جاهزات للعرس 🙏🔥
 175 90 comments · 4 shares



Figure 5: Examples of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) narratives

AL-JAZEERA: FROM SOCIAL MEDIA TO VIOLENCE

It is not possible to have a full understanding of the conflict of this critical war of narratives on social media is not well understood. In the remainder of this report, we focus on two specific incidents: the massacre in Wad al-Nura in June 2024 and the targeting of Al-Kanabi communities in January 2025.

About AL-Jazeera State

Al-Jazeera State, located in central Sudan between the Blue and White Niles, is one of the country's most vital and densely populated regions (around 5 million people). Known as Sudan's agricultural heartland, it is home to the historic Gezira Scheme—once the largest irrigated agricultural project in Africa. Its capital, Wad Madani, has long been a center of trade, education, and civil mobilization, with a rich history of union activism and political engagement.

The state is inhabited by tribes from northern and central Sudan, primarily in villages and small towns, as well as communities from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and South Sudan who have lived for generations in agricultural settlements. Despite their longstanding presence and contributions, many of these communities remain excluded from the full benefits of citizenship, lacking access to basic services, formal recognition, and political representation.

Wad al-Nura Massacre

Wad al-Nura is a village located in Al-Jazeera State and is inhabited by various tribes from the north and center, including the Shukriya, Rifai, Rakabiya, Batahin, Ja'aliyin, and Kawahla tribes, in addition to tribes that migrated to Al-Jazeera to work in agriculture. The RSF attacked civilians in Wad al-Nura village after taking control of the area on June 5, 2024, killing at least [100](#) civilians, including 35 children¹. Videos shared by Madani's Resistance Committees and several activists showed the burial of dozens of victims in a public square. Survivors reported executions of the wounded and assaults on women and children. The RSF later justified the attack on its official X account², claiming the village hosted Burhan and Mujahideen Brigades preparing an offensive.

¹<https://apnews.com/article/rapid-support-forces-sudan-military-gezira-d9432885669564a745e9005fe4e63cb7>

² At the time of writing this article, the official RSF account on X was deleted; you can find a version of the statement on RSF's Telegram page: <https://t.me/RSFSudan/6392>

MEDIA STATEMENT

Earlier this week, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its allied terrorist militias linked to the former regime began to mobilize significant forces across three enemy camps in western Mangil in Wad al-Nour in Gezira State. Their objective is to launch an attack on our soldiers in Jebel al-Awla.

In light of these movements, the RSF attacked yesterday morning three strategic camps belonging to the opposing force in the west, south, and north of Wad al-Nour. The enemy forces based in these areas included SAF soldiers, the General Intelligence Service, and a battalion of radical Islamist fighters known as Zubair bin al-Awam, along with their supporters.

Our courageous soldiers engaged the enemy in these locations outside the city and successfully seized four fully equipped combat vehicles, 70 Kalashnikov rifles, and four Qurnov guns. We mourn the loss of eight martyrs and several wounded personnel.

The RSF will not stand idly by in the face of enemy movements or gatherings. We will actively pursue and resolve these threats, countering all attempts by the former regime to mislead the public and conceal the truth that is already well known to all, including the people of the region.

Office of the Official Spokesperson
Rapid Support Forces

<https://t.me/RSFSudan>



Figure 6: RSF statement regarding the attack on Wad al-Nura

Content about the massacre went viral on social media in a way that is not comparable to other similar atrocities committed in this period³. The Resistance committees⁴ in Madani published real-time videos of mass burials; RSF fighters themselves also circulated videos celebrating the massacre and portraying it as a justified victory. These were rapidly picked up across platforms, helped by stable internet access and the viral nature of violent content online. Hashtags such as *ود_النورة* and *مجزرة_ود_النورة* (and their English counterparts *#Wad_Al_Nura* and *#Wad_Al_Nura_Massacre*) quickly trended, creating emotionally charged digital spaces and escalating public outrage.

The virality of this event created a suitable environment for spreading polarizing content, malinformation, stigmatizing specific groups, and disinformation, all aimed at reshaping the narrative in favor of those spreading it. During this period, we found 5,900 pieces of content containing hate speech, of which 20% were linked to Al Jazeera State. Across the year, only 5.3% of hate speech posts were from Al-Jazeera. We also saw a surge in content on June 6 (the day after the massacre), where daily posting jumped from 13,000 to 58,000, a 346% increase.

³ Compared to lots of atrocities that took place at the same period of time, especially the one committed by the SAF airstrike in Darfur.

⁴ Resistance Committees are local political pressure groups that initially formed under the name "Neighborhood Committees" in 2013. They evolved into what is now known as Resistance Committees and played a key role in the fieldwork during the December 2018 revolution. Over time, especially after the October 25, 2021 coup, they became a more organized and influential political actor.




Figure 7: Hate speech by location during June 2024

Following this event, we saw a surge of compassionate content, calls for solidarity, and demands to hold the perpetrators accountable. However, we also identified hate speech and content inciting violence (2300 posts). The massacre was being used by parties for their political agendas. While the RSF was trying to justify and trying to shift the blame, SAF-affiliated accounts were amplifying online hate and spreading divisive content, calling for retaliations, inciting violence against civilians, portraying entire ethnic groups as complicit, and in some cases openly calling for acts of collective punishment and genocide.

Many anti-civilian voices also seized the moment to link the RSF to Tagadom (Coordination Body of the Democratic & Civil Forces), using the Wad al-Nura events to discredit the civilian movement, just days before its Founding Conference was due to take place. This narrative manipulation was evident in widespread posts blaming Tagadom for the massacre, portraying them as aligned with RSF violence. In this way, the images and videos that shocked the public also became tools in a broader political war against democratic forces.

Al-Kanabi

Al-Kanabi are informal settlements of agricultural laborers in Al-Jazeera state, long inhabited by generations of people descended from tribes in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and South Sudan. For months, social media campaigns—especially on SAF-aligned accounts—portrayed Al-Kanabi's residents and other non-northern residents of Al-Jazeera state as RSF collaborators, dehumanizing the community and casting them as traitors to justify violence against them.

After the army regained control of Al-Jazeera in January 2025, multiple violent incidents took place between January 11 and 15, particularly in areas like the Kambo Tayba farming settlement, where at least 13 people were killed⁵. The entry of the armed forces into the state was accompanied by widespread violence, some of it documented in video footage captured by SAF soldiers and allied militias, including the Al-Bara Bin Malik and Sudan Shield militias. These clips showed citizens being executed on accusations of cooperating with the Rapid Support Forces, including scenes of individuals being thrown from bridges into the Nile and shot. According to Reuters, the army condemned the “ethnically targeted killings” that occurred during this period. Videos of arrests, beatings, and extrajudicial killings circulated widely on social media, often shared by SAF-aligned accounts and amplified by influential online figures who openly celebrated the violence.

In response, the army announced the formation of an investigation committee on January 15⁶, 2025, to look into the events that took place in the Kanabi areas. However, to date, the committee has not released any findings, despite the initial decree mandating it to submit a report within one week.

In the online narratives, an entire community was framed as complicit in RSF crimes without any evidence of involvement. Crimes committed by the RSF—such as the massacre in Wad al-Nura—were not only condemned but also instrumentalized to justify violence against communities like Al-Kanabi. This framing ignored the fact that most residents were civilians uninvolved in any combat. Their mere presence in RSF-held areas, or their social and geographic affiliations, made them targets for violent retribution and collective punishment.

The impact of this digital narrative went beyond direct violence. It helped silence voices that might question the dominant military narrative, as many feared being labeled collaborators and facing violent reprisals. This atmosphere of fear reinforced pro-SAF discourse and made it harder for alternative perspectives to be expressed.

Beyond Borders: South Sudan

The social media imagery and content from Al-Kanabi showing South Sudanese individuals being targeted quickly reached South Sudan, causing widespread outrage. On January 16, retaliatory riots broke out, calling for violence against Sudanese people (650,000 Sudanese had taken refuge in South Sudan at the time). People started protesting in front of the Sudanese embassy, and angry youth looted and burned Sudanese-owned shops in Juba and other cities. These events resulted in the deaths of at least 16 Sudanese across four South Sudanese states⁷. In response, the South Sudanese government shut down access to social media platforms, including Facebook and TikTok, in an attempt to curb further violence⁸.

⁵

<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-army-condemns-ethnically-targeted-killings-civilians-el-gheir-2025-01-14/>

⁶ <https://sudantribune.net/article296022/>

⁷ <https://aja.ws/46vtz>

⁸ <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-sudan-blocks-social-media-following-recent-violence/3459861>

DIVISIVE MEDIA TACTICS

SAF supporters, RSF supporters, and other influencers on social media employed different tactics to engage in a war of narratives. Understanding what tactics they chose and how these showed up in social media content not only helps to untangle how we got to a level of division online that led to offline violence but can also help design strategies to address these divisive tactics as the war continues. This section looks in detail at divisive media tactics used in the two cases described in the previous section.

Tactic 1: Collective Blame

A central tactic in this narrative war is the portrayal of entire communities as complicit. It has been used by actors affiliated with both the SAF and the RSF, each in their own way.

For example, the post below claims that there are mercenaries from South Sudan fighting with the RSF; therefore, all South Sudanese are aligned with the RSF, and they are the ones who started with the violations, implying that violence against them (all South Sudanese) is justified.

Another post claims that Al-Kanabi communities are responsible for all the violations in Al-Jazeera state, says they are all in the RSF, and explicitly calls for violence and cleansing.



Tactic 2: Identity-based Attacks

Ethnic and racial slurs, as well as stereotypes, were frequently used to portray “others” as outsiders. References to “foreigners” and “West Africans” appeared in many posts, especially in relation to Kanabi communities in Al-Jazeera state. This framing dehumanizes people by

casting them as invaders or infiltrators rather than Sudanese civilians. It justifies violence not as retaliation, but as a form of cleansing—reclaiming land from those framed as illegitimate or impure.



Tactic 3: Framing Others as an Existential Threat

This tactic targets communities already cast as “other,” portraying them not just as different, but as inherently dangerous. It frames them as a threat to society—their mere existence seen as a risk to security. In this logic, violence becomes not just justified but necessary for security.

In the case of the Kanabi, this framing was widely used. One post called for holding the Kanabi accountable as a community, not as individuals, describing them as part of a broader organized plan to destabilize Al-Jazeera. Another called for the removal of Kanabi and settlements altogether, claiming it was necessary to restore order and prevent crime and disease.



sayf aljazeera @hu11537 · Jun 23

إزالة الكناي والسكن العشوائي ضرورية لاستعادة الأمن، حفظ حقوق الأهالي العشوائية بتخلق الجريمة والأمراض



دولة 56

22 December 2024 · 🌐

طرد الكناي و محاسبة المجتمعات

✂ يجب محاسبة الكناي كمجتمع، وليس كأفراد، لأن ما يحدث ليس مجرد أفعال معزولة يقوم بها أشخاص، بل هو توجه منهجي ومنظم تتبناه جماعات عرقية أو سياسية لتحقيق أهداف تخريبية.
✂ الفرق كبير بين عمل عشوائي يقوم به فرد، وبين مخطط ممنهج تنفذه جماعات تهدف لزعزعة استقرار الجزيرة وبث الفوضى.
✂ المحاكمة الجماعية ليست مجرد عقاب لأفراد، بل هي آلية ضرورية لمحاسبة المجتمعات أو الكيانات التي تتبنى توجهات ممنهجة تؤدي إلى جرائم كبرى.
القانون الدولي يعترف بمبدأ "المسؤولية الجماعية" ويتيح محاسبة الكيانات الجماعية التي ترتكب جرائم ممنهجة.

Tactic 4: Undermining the Incident

Another tactic used was to undermine incidents by downplaying the scale and gravity of the violence that occurred. Specifically in Wad al-Nura, the crimes were framed by SAF as either fabricated or exaggerated by civilian forces, who were accused—alongside the Janjaweed, or Rapid Support Forces—of using these events for political gain. This narrative shifts attention away from the perpetrators and casts doubt on the victims' accounts, reducing the incidents to mere propaganda.



YASIR MOSTAFA @YASIR_MOS91 · Jan 13

بعد هزيمة المليشيا بتاعتهم القحاة شغالين يعزفون على وتر إثارة حرب عنصرية في الجزيرة....
أعوذ بالله
#جنجويد قحانة

53

66

505

33K



Khaled SDN @KAlbarti · Jan 13

موضوع الكناي دا شغل قحاته و جنجويد
و باقي الناس الفهمهم ضيق فقط.



Tactic 5: Whataboutism

Rather than acknowledging the incident, many posts attempted to shift the conversation to other events—specifically atrocities committed by groups other than the one the writer is defending. In the example below, one user asks, “Where was this call for the international community when army planes were wiping out Darfur? ...” This tactic engages with the event, and works to undermine its significance by deflecting attention and creating false equivalence.



Tactic 6: Shifting Blame to the Victims

Specifically in Wad al-Nura, some posts shifted responsibility by claiming the SAF had used civilians in Wad al-Nura as human shields—and that this tactic made them, not the RSF, responsible for the deaths. This framing implies that civilian casualties are the fault of those who were “hiding among them,” not the forces who carried out the attack. It reframes the massacre as a tragic but unavoidable consequence of warfare, rather than a deliberate targeting of non-combatants.

Gabar جابر Ibrahim @AbdelgabarI · Jun 12, 2024

Translate post

في الهلالية سمم الاخوان المسلمون مصادر المياة و هذه هي طريقهم في الحرب البيولوجية كما حذر بذلك جبريل ابراهيم عندما كان معارضا لهم .. ود الثورة معركة حربية باعتراف الانصرافي و سبق ان نزلت حديث الانصرافي .. صحيح ان الدعم السريع تعامل بعنف زائد لكن الحرب مع حاملي السلاح ليس فيها (حنان) .. بل ان جيناء الجيش و المستنفرين قد لاذوا بالفرار و استعصموا بالمدينين البسطاء لتتم المتاجرة بدمائهم .. لو كان الدعم السريع محنك سياسيا لما اجتاحت القرية بأسلحة ثقيلة..

Gabar جابر Ibrahim @AbdelgabarI · Jun 12, 2024

كالوا لنا الشنائم و سبوا لنا الدين و فرح اخرون و دعا علينا اخرون كما هددنا اخرون بالمقاطعة الاجتماعية .. كل هذا لاننا قلنا ان ما حدث في ود الثورة هي معركة حربية بين مقاتلين .. جيش و مستنفرين و الدعم السريع (يعني ليست مجزرة مدينين) .. هذا الفيديو يثبت صحة ما ذهبت اليه بالتفصيل .. اذ ان هناك قوة من الجيش و المستنفرين لها ارتكازات في هذه القرية دخلت مع الدعم السريع في معركة .. انهزمت من الدعم السريع .. اصدر قائد القوة من الجيش و اسمه عبدالرحيم امرا بالانسحاب كالعادة و ترك المستنفرين يواجهون قوة مسلحة باحدث الأسلحة فهربوا إلى داخل القرية .. مما أدى إلى سقوط قتلى من المدينين بالإضافة إلى غرق الذين سقطوا في الكنار (الترعة) .. جدير بالذكر ان المدعو عبدالرحيم من قيادات (الجيش) التي انسحبت من مدني .. يتحمل القتل المسؤولية الكبرى و يتحمل الدعم السريع مسؤولية تعقب المستنفرين بأسلحة ثقيلة داخل قرية بسيطة ..

#الاخوان_المسلمون_منظمة_ارهابية

عمر رحمون @Rahmon83 · Jun 11, 2024

يصب تنظيم #الاخوان_المسلمين جام غضبه على السودان والسودانيين ويكرس كل قواه لتخريب #السودان وتمزيقه وتفتيته واتهام الآخرين بما يقوم التنظيم به من جرائم بحق الانسانية ، وما فعله وحوش التنظيم الارهابية في قرية #ود_الثورة من مجازر معروف للقاصي والداني ، وإن حاولوا إلقاء التهم على #الدعم_السريع



2:18

13 46 107 57K

Join سوق الحماضيا Anonymous participant · 25 October 2024

كل ما يفعله الملافيط وخونة الكناي والمتعاونين من بني جلدتنا ! وزره سيصب كله على رأس ماهرية الرزيقات والمسيرية مدى الحياة.. وسيدفعون ثمنه عاجلاً وأجلاً
الآن مايقوم به سكان العشوائيات و الكناي في ام دقري وغيرها من قرى الجزيرة من هجوم على القرى هو نيابة عن مرتزقة الجنجويد الذين هربوا وتركوا الأسلحة لهؤلاء الاوباش من سكان الكناي للهجوم وخطف السكان وطلب الفدية بعدما ما انتهوا من سلب البيوت ونهبها..
فعلوا هاشتاق #الجزيرة_بدون_كناي

🔥 مدى الحياة 🔥

Tactic 7: Displacing Responsibility

A similar tactic involved redirecting blame for the massacre onto a different enemy while claiming that the perpetrators were being falsely accused. For example, the post below (and many others) falsely claims that the Muslim Brotherhood was behind the Wad al-Nura attack and had framed the RSF for it. This tactic aims to muddy the responsibility, deflect blame, and confuse public perception in favor of the poster's political alignment.

Another variation of this tactic was used to attack civilian actors. Several posts condemned individuals and groups for not immediately denouncing the massacre—even when they had already done so—or accused them outright of supporting it. The narrative that Tagadom is the political branch of the RSF was already being pushed by SAF-aligned voices but was being aggressively spread by SAF accounts after the Wad al-Nura massacre and again after the violence in South Sudan, turning grief into a political tool, using moments of collective mourning to discredit civilian forces and portray them as complicit in violence.



CONCLUSION

Othering and dehumanization have long been tools of war propaganda—well-documented, well-studied, and devastating in effect. But in the age of social media, these tactics are easier to create, faster to spread, and harder to contain. Today's digital infrastructure makes it incredibly difficult to challenge harmful narratives once they take root.

This report is an attempt to document how these dynamics are playing out in Sudan's ongoing war. The two events examined in detail are evidence of a more widespread trend that we will continue to track in subsequent social media analysis. Social media has become a weapon for division, spreading hatred and legitimizing violence. Traditional biases reappear in new formats - posts, hashtags, and viral videos - without a strong, cohesive counter-narrative. This digital animosity has tangible repercussions: from the massacre in Al-Jazeera to assaults on refugees in South Sudan, violence is often disregarded if it aligns with a particular agenda. Public opinion is manipulated, identities are distorted, and communities are targeted. Social media is not just reflecting the conflict—it's intensifying it. At times, the war is unfolding as much on screens as in the streets.

And yet, social media should be a contained space—governed by community guidelines, not propaganda. We can make that happen. This report is also an invitation. We invite social media companies, researchers, practitioners, and those working on social media and conflict in Sudan or beyond: collaborate with us. Let's pool our resources and knowledge to respond collectively to this urgent, complex challenge. Let's work together towards a safer, more responsible digital environment.

