MONITORING OF SOCIAL MEDIA PROVISIONS IN PEACE AGREEMENTS

MAY 1, 2024

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Introduction

A critical and evolving aspect of contemporary conflict mediation is the impact of social media on conflict dynamics and the mediation process. Mediators are beginning to address this impact through standalone social media agreements, pre-process codes of conduct, or the inclusion of specific social media clauses in broader ceasefire or peace agreements. This brief aims to address the as yet understudied challenge of how to implement and monitor social media provisions in peace agreements.

While traditional media clauses in peace agreements have been present for at least 30 years, social media provisions come with unique opportunities and challenges given their intersection with the public, propaganda, and (social media) platforms. They pose particular challenges for monitoring, as implementation of these clauses pertain to the digital, not physical, space.

To date the conversations about these opportunities and challenges have been largely theoretical. This publication is an outcome of a joint tabletop exercise on the monitoring of social media provisions with mediators, ceasefire practitioners, technical experts, and researchers that was designed to pull ideas and concerns into grounded application and operationalization. The exercise was convened and facilitated by Build Up, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the UN DPPA Mediation Support Unit in January 2024.

Who this brief is for:

- Mediators or mediation support teams in contexts where social media is an active conflict driver that may need to be discussed in a peace process.
- Peace agreement implementation mechanisms or monitoring bodies that are tasked with implementing communications or media-related provisions.
- Social media platform professionals that are considering the policy implications and partnership opportunities during moments of conflict and negotiated political settlements.
- Researchers who have the ability to contribute evidence to the open questions herein.

What we know:

Even where agreements have addressed social media, the effectiveness of these agreements or clauses have been limited by open questions on purpose and scope of social media provisions, undefined implementation structures, possible enforcement and accountability plans, and a lack of systematic integration with wider monitoring efforts.

What we don’t have:

A well-developed body of practical experience and knowledge on how to effectively operationalize and monitor social media agreements or social media clauses in broader peace and ceasefire agreements.
These are new challenges without clear-cut answers. The contexts inspiring the need for this brief are varied and dynamic, and subsequent solutions will be the same. Therefore, this brief serves as a guide to outline key considerations and perspectives, equipping mediators, negotiating parties, and implementation bodies with a framework and potential options to thoughtfully develop strategies—concretely, to be better prepared to address social media in peace processes.

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<tr>
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First Steps: Purpose and Scope of the Monitoring Efforts

Social media monitoring is a broad term that generally refers to the analysis and reporting carried out to gain insights into popular topics of discussion online, key influencers and networks, and public sentiment. This practice is now widespread in many fields, including mediation, where mediators and their teams regularly use social media monitoring to inform their conflict analysis, process design choices, and to communicate with conflict parties and the broader public.

This brief uses the term “social media monitoring” in a narrower sense that is focused on the efforts of peace agreement implementation bodies to monitor commitments related to social media that result from negotiations between conflict parties. As mentioned above, we use the term agreements here to refer to both stand-alone social media agreements (including pre-process codes of conduct) or the inclusion of specific social media clauses in broader ceasefire or peace agreements. This type of social media monitoring is distinct from general social media listening that may be carried out by mediation teams or social media analysis produced by academic centres and digital peacebuilding NGOs for advocacy or public reporting purposes.

Most critically, this type of social media monitoring is likely to be carried out by bodies that are established by, report to, and include the participation of the conflict parties that have signed a peace or ceasefire agreement. While new in terms of their focus on the realm of social media, their main purpose is likely to fit within the existing rubric of peace agreement implementation mechanisms: to further implementation of the agreement by promoting cooperation between the signatories and increasing predictability through establishing processes and mechanisms to deal with inevitable incidents and potential violations of the agreement. Effective monitoring of social media provisions should therefore aim to contribute to the durability and credibility of the agreement, including through the accompaniment of an independent third-party and technical experts in the monitoring mechanism. As with traditional monitoring mechanisms, the most effective social media monitoring plans will need to be realistic, implementable and sustainable.

To date, a key challenge to implementing social media commitments in peace agreements has been misaligned or unclear expectations on the purpose and scope of the provisions. Firstly, there is debate around whether social media commitments should be the subject of provisions at all, due to concerns that violations on these platforms could risk undermining the credibility of the broader peace or political process. Secondly, where negotiated, social media provisions have often been vaguely worded, raising questions about their ultimate purpose and the level of commitment to uphold them. This brief recognizes the importance of asking the first question, but operates within the confines of the second. Parties have included a social media clause in some form of an agreement – how can key questions (why, what, how, and who) about its monitoring be approached?

Setting up a social media monitoring or implementation support framework can be time and potentially resource-intensive from both a technical and financial standpoint. Before deciding on the structures and strategies of social media provisions or monitoring, these basic questions about objectives and their fit within the overall goal of the mediation process and vision of the conflict parties need attention.
WHY: Defining the purpose of a social media monitoring body

Key Questions:

What is the purpose of a social media provision, and how does it contribute to the overall goal of the peace or political process? Why did the conflict parties include it in their negotiations? How will or should the monitoring of social media clauses contribute to achieving this objective?

Ultimately—what is the purpose of monitoring social media, and how might not monitoring a social media provision have an impact?

Potential responses

A social media monitoring body can be created by the parties and operate for the purpose(s) of:

- **Reducing and mitigating the risk of conflict escalation resulting from inflammatory social media content**
  - Monitoring, identifying and potentially responding to potentially harmful social media incidents, such as content that incites violence
  - Developing a set of information and data related to harmful behaviors for sharing with social media platforms for their action
  - Tracking the potentially positive impact of a peace agreement or social media provisions on the social media landscape

- **Enhancing confidence between the conflict parties by establishing or building upon existing norms about the online behavior of parties.**
  - Cooperation and confidence building between the parties, including potential joint social media incident responses
  - Social media monitoring and potential responses to create a more positive climate for wider peace or ceasefire negotiations

- **Protecting the peace process**
  - Understanding or influencing the public narrative about the peace process
  - Dampening hostile narratives about the peace process
  - Responding to or mitigating malicious online behavior aimed at undermining the peace process
  - Promoting transparency and accountability around a peace process

WHAT: Defining the scope of what should be monitored

Understanding the purpose of the social media provisions and defining goals will also help identify the scope of the monitoring plan.

As with any clause, it is possible that the monitoring mandate is clearly defined by the terms of the agreement. In other instances, agreements may be ambiguous or incomplete and further consultation and negotiation with the agreement signatories will be required to understand what is expected of the monitoring body. It can
be reasonably assumed that social media provisions may fall into this category, lacking clarity due to their relative novelty as well as for other previously discussed reasons. In other cases, resource and technical capacity constraints may determine the scope of what is feasible to be monitored. Defining a scope answers the 'what' question; what will the monitoring body do and not do?

**Key Questions**

What will be monitored, what won’t, and what menu of political and technical responses to incidents is feasible? In light of this, where is it most advantageous to spend limited time and resources?

**Monitoring Scope**

When considering the scope, it can be helpful to think along several key dimensions (Fig. 1). The x-axis defines the level of engagement, ranging from strictly between the parties to engagement with the broader public. The y-axis represents the breadth of the interventions, spanning from broad, aspirational and norm-setting interventions to narrow, pragmatic and operational interventions.

![Monitorig Scope Matrix](image)

**Figure 1: Monitoring scope matrix**

A narrow, parties-focused approach in the bottom left quadrant represents a pragmatic and operational way of simplifying the scope. This would involve limiting it to only the most serious incidents or potential violations of the agreement that are directly tied to the signatories (e.g. potentially violative content that is posted on the official Facebook page of a signatory). However, the number of accounts monitored is narrowed, the body
could also fail to capture the problematic behavior of wider networks of accounts that are associated with the parties as informal or formal proxies. A party-centered aspirational/normative approach would seek to capture a broader set of influence associated with the parties but could raise political challenges in terms of obtaining their consent to the monitoring plan. Ultimately, the pragmatic approach is likely to be the more viable option, especially considering that a monitoring body’s primary goal is likely to be supporting the peacemaking process as opposed to driving broader societal change.

Towards the right side of the matrix, a pragmatic but public-centered approach focused on the entire social media landscape may limit the topics or content monitored to the most extreme and impactful behaviors. For example, coordinated inauthentic behavior, hate speech, incitement to violence, doxxing¹, harassment and/or targeting of negotiators. These are actions that could potentially be referred by the monitoring body to social media platforms for potential violations of their terms of service policies and possible content or account moderation. Moving towards a more aspirational approach, the monitoring body may also be interested in the broader patterns of hate speech, toxic polarization, or mis/disinformation (including related to the peace process) among the public as a driver of the broader conflict. However, such comprehensive monitoring could be beyond the political mandate, scope and capacity of a monitoring body itself. While partnerships or communication channels with outside researchers and experts are possible, these tasks are likely better suited to the efforts of civil society organizations dedicated to tracking and analyzing these broader societal trends.

**HOW: Understanding the types of responses the monitoring body might use**

In addition to deciding the scope of what accounts and behaviors could be monitored, there are also a spectrum of technical and political responses a monitoring body may have in their remit. Which of these response options are available to the monitoring body, and in what combinations, will also impact the type of monitoring that is conducted.

![Figure 2: Spectrum of Responses](image)

Clearly defining the purpose of the social media provision and monitoring body will inform decisions around the appropriate scope - whether monitoring is narrowly focused on specific parties and accounts, or more broadly covers public social media activity. The reason the parties included the social media provision(s) will

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¹ Doxxing refers to searching for and publishing private or identifying information about (a particular individual) on the internet, typically with malicious intent.
inform both the scope of monitoring and the most appropriate type of response. In addition, the scope should thoughtfully weigh priorities against resource and technical constraints to identify where monitoring efforts can have maximum impact. With purpose and scope established, the monitoring body can then develop tailored protocols and procedures to effectively carry out a monitoring mandate.

**WHO takes forward the objectives and strategy?**

Depending on decisions over purpose and scope, there are important conversations about who needs to be included in the monitoring body based on a consideration of factors such as political representation of the signatory parties, facilitation skills, technical capacities needed and existence or not of other monitoring structures if the relevant social media provisions are part of a wider peace or ceasefire agreement. This question brings a series of other considerations and decisions to bear, including training, resources, and logistics required to set up and operate an effective monitoring body.

The following decision tree represents a range of those decisions:

**Is the social media component a provision within a larger set of agreements?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>If NO</strong></th>
<th><strong>If YES</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who should be included in monitoring a standalone agreement?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Can social media provisions be monitored through the capacities and mechanisms that are set up to monitor other provisions?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What would the roles of parties and third parties, including technical experts, be?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What partnerships would increase effectiveness or legitimacy, whether with social media platforms, technical service providers, or civil society?</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>How can the agreement support other actors or broader peace processes?</strong></td>
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**If NO, separate monitoring body for social media:**

- **Who should be included?**
- **What would the roles of parties and third parties be?**
- **How would the monitoring body relate to other implementation structures under the peace agreement, social media platforms, or technical service providers?**

**If YES, same monitoring body as other provisions:**

- **What specifically is needed for social media provision monitoring, especially if the social media element is unlikely to be the main aspect that defines the composition and resources of the broader monitoring mechanism? Can additional capacities be added? How can social media aspects best be included in the design of the mechanism?**

In any scenario, additional key questions are likely to be relevant:

- What financial resources and technical and political skills are needed to carry out the mission and scope of work of the monitoring body? What internal hiring, training, or external partnerships may be required in the set up or implementation phases?
- How should the monitoring body relate to other relevant stakeholders, including academic and digital research centres, civil society and the public?
The following list represents essential skills, resources, and potential partnerships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Skills</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant technical skills: Social media analysis, digital forensics,</td>
<td>Subscription to monitoring software/tools: Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>database management, data science</td>
<td>listening platforms, media monitoring tools,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalization: Ability to deploy the monitoring framework, tools,</td>
<td>database management systems, data analytics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and processes, including recruitment, training, and management</td>
<td>programs, web scraping tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political facilitation skills: Stakeholder management, gender expertise,</td>
<td>High-speed Internet, computers, secure storage for sensitive data, and other IT infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication and narrative management, peace process implementation.</td>
<td>Access to data: Access to pages, profiles, websites, API access to relevant platforms that will be monitored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and legal expertise: Encryption, access controls for sensitive</td>
<td>Operational budget for staffing, equipment, software, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>data; support for privacy compliance; understanding of data protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>regulations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Potential Partnerships

- Technical service providers
- Social media platforms
- Civil society: Social media research centres; nonprofit organizations; advocacy groups;

Stepping Stones: Practical Steps and Takeaways

While much is contingent on the wider peacemaking context, goals, provisions and relationship or not with a wider peace agreement, there will be a common need to develop social media monitoring definitions and protocols. This process outlines how a monitoring process could work. Ideally such considerations would also inform how a social media provision could be drafted to include realistic, targeted objectives.

1. **Defining terms for monitoring:** Developing and agreeing with the parties on context-specific, actionable and gender-specific definitions of social media content or behaviors prohibited by the peace agreement text (e.g. “hate speech”, “disinformation”, “incitement”, “coordinated inauthentic behavior”, “doxxing”, etc). However, these delineations should also be adaptable to account for the evolving and growing nature of digital threats.
2. **Selecting social media platforms**: What platforms have the most impact on the specific conflict and require monitoring?

3. **Understanding what data is and isn't available**: Enlist the support of technical partners early to ensure that goals are feasible.

4. **Deciding what data is needed**: Social media listening is always restricted to a small subsection of social media activity and accounts. The monitoring body will need to define the scope and bounds of the information you need, likely in consultation with the conflict parties. Tip: “Hate speech” is a description of a type of data, but your search will be more accurate and actionable if it is specific, i.e. “10 specific terms denoting hate used by four specific accounts.”

5. **Getting the data**: There are manual and automated methods for monitoring social media. Either will need a technical set up and/or partnerships for access, and can involve a monitoring dashboard of real or near-real time updates. The monitoring body may also consider less-technical reporting mechanisms of incidents, for example providing ways for the parties or the public to report specific accounts or harmful online behavior.

6. **Evaluating the data and taking action**: The data received will need to be classified and organized in order to take action, even if action only includes reporting findings. This could include a metric system that puts the seriousness of the offense on a scale, assessing risk of the behavior to the peace process, for potential off-line harm to civilians, or the potential online reach of the problematic content. It could also be a simple descriptive system that catalogues incidents based on pre-defined behaviours in the agreement. Just as in traditional monitoring processes, not every reported incident will be a violation. Different types of potential violations could necessitate different types of responses from joint incident management and mitigation to escalation to senior political levels for serious or strategically significant offenses.

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**When an incident occurs:**

- How would a monitoring body determine whether it is a violation or not?
- What would a monitoring body do about the violation?
- Who would need to be involved?
- How would a monitoring body deal with spoilers who are not signatories?

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2 Protection Group International (PGI), a participant in the joint tabletop exercise, has developed a scaled framework for assessing impact. They can be contacted for more information.
Crossroads: Exploring Dilemmas and Divergent Views

While social media provisions offer new opportunities for peace processes, they also present complex dilemmas without clear solutions. Below we outline some of the most pressing issues and their tradeoffs.

Should social media be mainstreamed throughout other clauses of a wider peace agreement or addressed in a more separate fashion through standalone agreements or protocols? Writing social media provisions isn’t the focus of this practice note, but it is difficult to discuss monitoring without raising questions about their form in the agreement.

Mainstreaming throughout other clauses allows for the leveraging of existing mechanisms and resources. It also signals social media is not separate but part of a broader set of agreements, especially in light of information warfare tactics. There is a risk of social media dynamics being overlooked or deprioritized in broader monitoring mechanisms if it isn’t a standalone agreement or set of provisions. It is also possible to maintain separate clauses, while cross-referencing social media issues across an agreement.

Should a monitoring body function as a “watchdog” or a “guide dog?”

A “watchdog” approach to monitoring emphasizes accountability and enforcement, raising the stakes for compliance that could deter future violations through strict oversight. However, it also has less emphasis on trust-building and cooperation and risks being perceived as punitive or adversarial. It could discourage parties from taking ownership, or worse, derail a process for comparatively minor offenses. It may also not be technically or politically feasible in a given context and thus set unrealistic expectations that undermine confidence in the agreement. A “guide dog” approach focuses on problem-solving and incident resolution rather than accountability and possible sanctioning for violations. It allows flexibility and support towards positive communication behaviors. However, it has less deterrence value against willful violations, and risks downplaying the severity of harmful violations. Repeated violations without effective resolution or accountability may also undermine confidence in the agreement and monitoring mechanism.

How to balance confidentiality with transparency in reporting?
Transparency in the process, i.e. public sharing of what the monitoring body finds, builds public trust and demonstrates action and impact. It provides additional leverage for positive movement. It can, however, pose risks for those involved in the monitoring body.

Private reporting, problem-solving and management builds trust amidst the parties, and encourages them to take joint ownership of the process and to potentially take action to address incidents. It may however lead to a public perception of inactivity or non-response to incidents.

Should there be more active collaboration with social media platforms for the monitoring process?

Platforms have unique access to data and content moderation tools that could strengthen the ability to act, and formal partnerships allow for increased rapid response capacity. Platforms benefit from localized knowledge and conflict sensitivity from on-the-ground monitors, and a monitoring body benefits from platform buy-in to a peace process. Platforms also have unique offers that could be leveraged with close partnership. There may be specific interests, such as delisting restricted accounts associated with conflict parties, that could be an incentive for parties to engage positively.

There is a risk of over-reliance on platform goodwill and resources, when interests don’t fundamentally align with peace process goals. Platform moderation is imperfect, and standards don’t fully account for complex conflict contexts. Further, some departments or teams within companies may be more effective than others in their ability and willingness to take measures.

Finally, working too closely with certain platforms may undermine the actual or perceived neutrality of the monitoring body, and it can be complex to coordinate input across multiple platforms.

Looking ahead: Emergent ideas and future directions

As experience monitoring social media agreements accumulates, it will be important to analyze good practices across different contexts. This brief outlines a series of open questions for consideration. As with other more established types of clauses, research and experience-sharing will further clarify the advantages and disadvantages of different operating procedures.

Additionally, technological developments in artificial intelligence and natural language processing are unlocking new techniques for monitoring and potentially managing harmful content at scale during fragile political transitions. However, there are also technical limitations. Partnerships between technical service
providers, platforms, and mediation teams should be established in advance of an emergent need, to enable early input into agreement formation that is consistent with current possibilities.

Finally, the outcomes highlighted in this brief demonstrate that the tabletop exercise served as an effective exercise for fostering discussion and enhancing awareness regarding the challenges and realities of social media monitoring. In addition, future exercises could focus specifically on determining appropriate scope and purpose when negotiating or drafting social media provisions: a key finding of this first exercise is that the possibilities for monitoring are improved when there is more clarity and specificity within the agreement.

Mediation teams that anticipate addressing social media dynamics in a peace process or implementation plan they are working on could benefit from tailored versions of the simulated exercises and are invited to contact the co-organizers for support in this respect.

Additional Resources

- Toolkit: A Social Media Analysis Toolkit for Mediators and Peacebuilders (2021)
- Research Report: Peace Agreements, the Media, and Communication (2021)

Tabletop materials

This publication is an outcome of a joint tabletop exercise on the monitoring of social media provisions held by the Build Up, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the UN DPPA Mediation Support Unit, hosted in January 2024. This brief summarizes practical discussions and insights from the mediation teams present, and we include thanks for their contributions. If your teams would benefit from capacity-building or collaborative strategy setting on this topic, the material to hold the same tabletop exercise is available upon request. Email Julie Hawke at julie@howtobuildup.org with a brief description of your needs.
ANNEX 1: Social Media Provisions and Agreements

**Libya - Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya, 23/10/2020**
Clause 5: “Halt the currently rampant media escalation and hate speech by of audiovisual broadcasting channels and websites. The judicial and competent authorities shall be called upon to take the necessary measures to ensure serious and deterrent prosecution of these channels and websites. UNSMIL also calls for necessary measures to be taken to ensure that the administrations of social media applications shall take the necessary action regarding these platforms. To this end, the JMC decided to establish a sub-committee to follow up on hate speech and pursue the necessary actions. The JMC also decided to address a direct message to all audio-visual broadcasting channels not to broadcast any media material that includes such type of rhetoric.”

**Libya - Reconciliation Agreement between Tripoli and Tarhuna, 25/9/2018**
“The attendees all confirmed the importance of them adhering to not carrying out detentions or abductions based on identities or taking private property, that they shall all adhere to spreading a message of de-escalation, tolerance, and reform, and that they will reject the pages on social media sites that call for fighting and sedition”

**Myanmar - Code of Conduct for political parties and candidates, 25/06/2015**
“The Parties commit themselves, when addressing the public at political rallies or as part of their communications through mass media, including the social media, to refrain from: a) any form of intimidation or incitement to violence vis-à-vis any person or group of persons or beliefs; b) defamation and incitement to hatred, or accusation of apostasy, treason, terrorism or any other similar serious charges; c) fuelling regionalist, racial, sectarian or tribal trends that could threaten national unity; d) insult, libel and degradation.”

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**South Sudan - Grassroots Agreement to Promote National Dialogue in Yei River State and South Sudan, 30/04/2017**
“To reduce hate speech/propaganda and misinformation of communities including on social media”

**Syria - Agreement between Ahrar al-Sham (AAS) and Farqa 13, 22/05/2016**
“There will be a cease of provocations on social media such as Twitter and [similar platforms] and of protests and [similar actions] on the ground until the ruling of the unison committee is released and concluded.”

**Nigeria - Code of Conduct for Responsible Social Media in Kaduna State in the 2023 elections, 25/11/2023**
Standards for party leaders, candidate and influencers: “Refrain from using language on social media that threatens or incites violence against any person(s), group(s) or institution(s). Refrain from posting content that targets or harasses any person(s), group(s) or institution(s), particularly women. Refrain from posting disinformation about political opponents and the election process and commit to fact checking all information”
before posting online. Use only genuine and official accounts on social media and refrain from using fake accounts or inauthentic networks to mislead or undermine the election process.”

**Thailand - Annex I on Responsible Use of Social Media, Code of Conduct for 2023 General Election Campaign, 17/04/2023**

“The political parties agree that social media must be a safe, constructive, and responsible space where the values of dignity, integrity, and equity are respected. The harmful online behaviours and tactics listed in this annex shall not be deployed by political parties, candidates and their supporters. Parties shall not leave online harmful behaviours and tactics listed in this Annex unaddressed. They shall establish preventive and countering measures to address online harms by raising public awareness of the Annex and by developing appropriate response strategies.”

**Ethiopia - Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 12/11/2022**

“Article 3.3: The Permanent Cessation of hostilities shall include the cessation of all forms of hostile propaganda, rhetoric and hate speech.”

Agreement on implementation:

“Article 6.1: Responsible Use of Media The parties endorse Article 3 (permanent cessation of hostilities) and Article 12 (good faith implementation) of the Agreement that media platforms controlled by the respective parties should play a constructive role that would expedite the implementation of this Agreement.”

**Indonesia - Joint Commitment on the Code of Ethics for Election Campaigning on Social Media for the 2024 Indonesian Elections, 10/01/2024**

“In order to uphold freedom of expression, inclusivity, anti-discrimination, transparency, and accountability in the social media campaign process for the 2024 General in Indonesia, we, the undersigned stakeholders, hereby establish and commit to the Joint Code of Ethics for Election Campaigning on Social Media. This Joint Commitment on the Code of Ethics for Election Campaigning on Social Media for the 2024 Indonesian Elections is binding until the announcement of elected political parties and president/vice president in the 2024 Election by the KPU.”

**Kosovo - Declaration for Good Conduct of Political Parties and Candidates in Social Media during the 2021 Local Elections, 13/09/2021**

“With the purpose of respecting and properly implementing election laws and regulations, in order to improve the environment of the election campaign of the local elections of 2021, In order to respect the principles of non-discrimination, accurate information, and protection of privacy, and in order to combat negative content on social media, we pledge to: respect the election laws, regulations and the code of conduct for political entities, candidates and their supporters; ensure that advertisements, positions and messages given during the campaign do not contain negative content such as hate speech, fake news, disinformation, and slanderous language’ Use official accounts to communicate, and refrain from using third-party or fictitious accounts; disclose the expenditures incurred for the paid advertising in social media; provide objective and constructive criticism for other political entities, candidates and their supporters; Check the facts and take proper care of all information during the political campaign.”

**Bosnia-Herzegovina - Citizens’ charter on responsible use of social media for elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 01/08/2022**
“They should post accurate and verified information about themselves and their political opponents on social media. They should not disseminate threats or calls for violence, nor use insulting words, inflammatory speech and labelling, which could lead to harassment of citizens or other political subjects. They should only advertise on their official profiles and pages. They should not engage troll farms, bots, fake profiles and pages on social media with the aim of self-promotion, and/or discrediting and attacking political opponents. They should be transparent about the financing of their advertising and promotion on social networks.”